United States v. Buckardt

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 CASE NO. C19-00052 RAJ Plaintiff, 12 ORDER STRIKING ELMER J. BUCKARDT, et. al., DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 DISMISS Defendants. 14 15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ second Motion to Dismiss 18 (Dkt. # 24). For the reasons that follow, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ Motion. 19 On January 11, 2019, the Government filed a Complaint against Elmer Buckardt, 20 Karen Buckardt, the D’Skell Agape Society, and Snohomish County, asking the Court to: 21 (1) reduce the outstanding tax assessments against Mr. Buckardt to judgments, (2) set 22 aside transfers of two of the Buckardt’s properties to the D’Skell Agape Society, (3) 23 foreclose federal tax liens on the properties, and (4) sell the properties. Dkt. # 1. 24 Defendants Elmer Buckardt, Karen Buckardt, and the D’Skell Agape Society 25 (collectively the “Defendants”) subsequently moved to dismiss this action for lack of 26 jurisdiction. Dkt. # 12. On October 31, 2019, this Court denied Defendants’ motion to 27 1 dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, noting the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 2 Dkt. # 23. 3 Two days later, Defendants filed a second one-page motion to dismiss in which 4 Defendants argue: “The supporting reason for motion to dismissed [sic] is on grounds no 5 proof of jurisdiction has been filed by government.” Dkt. # 24 (emphasis in original). 6 Defendants provide no other facts or legal arguments in support of their motion. As 7 explained in this Court’s previous order, the jurisdictional basis for this action is federal 8 question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. # 23. Defendants’ second motion 9 ignores the Court’s previous order and asserts the exact same arguments raised in 10 Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. Compare Dkt. # 12 and Dkt. # 24. 11 Defendants’ Motion is frivolous and the Court declines to consider it. See Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 11 (allowing for sanctions where “a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or 13 without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose”). Defendants are also 14 cautioned against any future frivolous filings. Federal courts have the discretion to 15 impose sanctions on litigants engaging in frivolous litigation and the Court will not 16 hesitate to do so if Defendants continue to abuse the judicial process. See Gomez v. 17 Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133–34 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 18 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)). 19 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is STRICKEN. Dkt. # 20 24. 21 Dated this 12th day of November, 2019. 22 A 23

24 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 25 United States District Judge 26 27