NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 21a0115n.06
No. 20-1832
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 03, 2021 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN BRYAN SORRELL, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant. ) )
BEFORE: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Bryan Sorrell appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
release. He argues that that the district court erred by applying the policy statement contained in
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 to conclude that he was ineligible for release, and
that its weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was an abuse of discretion. While it has now
been established that § 1B1.13 does not apply to defendant-brought motions for compassionate
release, we affirm because the district court adequately explained why the § 3553(a) factors did
not weigh in Sorrell’s favor.
I.
In 2015, a jury convicted Sorrell and others of several charges, including conspiracy to
commit murder in aid of racketeering, arising from their involvement in the Phantom Outlaw
Motorcycle Club. The evidence put forward at the trial established that Sorrell shot Leon McGee, No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
a member of a rival motorcycle gang, several times on September 8, 2013. See United States v.
Nicholson, 716 F. App’x 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court sentenced Sorrell to 252
months in prison, and he began serving his term of imprisonment in November 2015 with a
projected release date of September 23, 2031.
On July 20, 2020, Sorrell moved the district court for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He asserted that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an extraordinary
and compelling circumstance warranting a sentence reduction because his asthma rendered him
especially vulnerable, and his rehabilitation while incarcerated meant that he did not pose a danger
to the community if released. Further, defendant argued that the § 3553(a) factors weighed in his
favor because he had been rehabilitated. The government opposed Sorrell’s motion.
In a four-page written order, the district court sided with the government. It concluded that
the § 3553 factors did not weigh in Sorrell’s favor because “[t]he nature and circumstances of this
offense were extremely violent and harmful” and “[t]here is a need for the long sentence the Court
imposed to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, adequately deter criminal
conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes by Mr. Sorrell, notwithstanding his good
conduct in a prison environment.” As an alternative ruling, the court further concluded defendant
had not demonstrated any extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a reduction of his
sentence, citing § 1B1.13, and that Sorrell would still be a danger to the safety of the community
meaning that he was ineligible for compassionate release. Sorrell timely appealed.
II.
A.
A district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). This prohibition, however, comes with a few
-2- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
exceptions. Id. § 3582(c)(1)–(2). Among them, a district court may grant what has come to be
known as “compassionate release.” While compassionate release has long been a feature of federal
law, the First Step Act of 2018 allowed incarcerated persons to file their own motions for the first
time, rather than relying on the Bureau of Prisons. This, combined with the ongoing pandemic
related to COVID-19, has resulted in the rapid development of our compassionate release
jurisprudence. Accordingly, since the district court’s denial of Sorrell’s motion, we have issued
several precedential decisions providing guidance on how district courts are to evaluate
compassionate release motions brought by prisoners. See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d
1000 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Elias,
984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Quintanilla Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Hampton, 985 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951
(6th Cir. 2021).
First, Ruffin explained that there are three substantive requirements for granting
compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 978 F.3d at 1004–05. “[T]he court initially must
‘find’ that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Id. at 1004 (quoting
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, “the court next must ‘find’ ‘that such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Id. at 1005 (brackets
omitted) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)). Third, “[e]ven if a district court finds that extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist and that a sentence reduction comports with [the applicable policy
statements], the court may not grant the reduction before ‘considering the factors set forth
in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’” Id. (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Where
-3- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
a district court denies a motion based on its weighing of the § 3553 factors, we review for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 1005.
Next, in Jones, we concluded that the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
does not apply to defendant-brought motions for compassionate release. See Jones, 980 F.3d at
1108–11. Elias then reiterated that district courts have discretion to define “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” differently than § 1B1.13, and further clarified that “district courts may deny
compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is
lacking and do not need to address the others.” 984 F.3d at 519.
Our most recent cases have grappled with the adequacy of district courts’ explanation for
denying compassionate release. In Hampton, we held that remand was warranted where it was
unclear whether the district court strictly relied on § 1B1.13 to deny relief or had independently
concluded that the defendant had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances.
985 F.3d at 531. This “unique instance,” we said, meant that the “district court’s assessment [was]
not [amenable] [to] ‘meaningful appellate review.’” Id. (quotation omitted). Quintanilla Navarro
addressed a related issue: the extent to which a district court may use a “barebones” form order to
deny a motion for compassionate release. 986 F.3d at 670–72. We concluded, based on Supreme
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 21a0115n.06
No. 20-1832
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 03, 2021 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN BRYAN SORRELL, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant. ) )
BEFORE: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Bryan Sorrell appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
release. He argues that that the district court erred by applying the policy statement contained in
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 to conclude that he was ineligible for release, and
that its weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was an abuse of discretion. While it has now
been established that § 1B1.13 does not apply to defendant-brought motions for compassionate
release, we affirm because the district court adequately explained why the § 3553(a) factors did
not weigh in Sorrell’s favor.
I.
In 2015, a jury convicted Sorrell and others of several charges, including conspiracy to
commit murder in aid of racketeering, arising from their involvement in the Phantom Outlaw
Motorcycle Club. The evidence put forward at the trial established that Sorrell shot Leon McGee, No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
a member of a rival motorcycle gang, several times on September 8, 2013. See United States v.
Nicholson, 716 F. App’x 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court sentenced Sorrell to 252
months in prison, and he began serving his term of imprisonment in November 2015 with a
projected release date of September 23, 2031.
On July 20, 2020, Sorrell moved the district court for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He asserted that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an extraordinary
and compelling circumstance warranting a sentence reduction because his asthma rendered him
especially vulnerable, and his rehabilitation while incarcerated meant that he did not pose a danger
to the community if released. Further, defendant argued that the § 3553(a) factors weighed in his
favor because he had been rehabilitated. The government opposed Sorrell’s motion.
In a four-page written order, the district court sided with the government. It concluded that
the § 3553 factors did not weigh in Sorrell’s favor because “[t]he nature and circumstances of this
offense were extremely violent and harmful” and “[t]here is a need for the long sentence the Court
imposed to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, adequately deter criminal
conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes by Mr. Sorrell, notwithstanding his good
conduct in a prison environment.” As an alternative ruling, the court further concluded defendant
had not demonstrated any extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a reduction of his
sentence, citing § 1B1.13, and that Sorrell would still be a danger to the safety of the community
meaning that he was ineligible for compassionate release. Sorrell timely appealed.
II.
A.
A district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). This prohibition, however, comes with a few
-2- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
exceptions. Id. § 3582(c)(1)–(2). Among them, a district court may grant what has come to be
known as “compassionate release.” While compassionate release has long been a feature of federal
law, the First Step Act of 2018 allowed incarcerated persons to file their own motions for the first
time, rather than relying on the Bureau of Prisons. This, combined with the ongoing pandemic
related to COVID-19, has resulted in the rapid development of our compassionate release
jurisprudence. Accordingly, since the district court’s denial of Sorrell’s motion, we have issued
several precedential decisions providing guidance on how district courts are to evaluate
compassionate release motions brought by prisoners. See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d
1000 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Elias,
984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Quintanilla Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Hampton, 985 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951
(6th Cir. 2021).
First, Ruffin explained that there are three substantive requirements for granting
compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 978 F.3d at 1004–05. “[T]he court initially must
‘find’ that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Id. at 1004 (quoting
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, “the court next must ‘find’ ‘that such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Id. at 1005 (brackets
omitted) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)). Third, “[e]ven if a district court finds that extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist and that a sentence reduction comports with [the applicable policy
statements], the court may not grant the reduction before ‘considering the factors set forth
in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’” Id. (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Where
-3- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
a district court denies a motion based on its weighing of the § 3553 factors, we review for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 1005.
Next, in Jones, we concluded that the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
does not apply to defendant-brought motions for compassionate release. See Jones, 980 F.3d at
1108–11. Elias then reiterated that district courts have discretion to define “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” differently than § 1B1.13, and further clarified that “district courts may deny
compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is
lacking and do not need to address the others.” 984 F.3d at 519.
Our most recent cases have grappled with the adequacy of district courts’ explanation for
denying compassionate release. In Hampton, we held that remand was warranted where it was
unclear whether the district court strictly relied on § 1B1.13 to deny relief or had independently
concluded that the defendant had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances.
985 F.3d at 531. This “unique instance,” we said, meant that the “district court’s assessment [was]
not [amenable] [to] ‘meaningful appellate review.’” Id. (quotation omitted). Quintanilla Navarro
addressed a related issue: the extent to which a district court may use a “barebones” form order to
deny a motion for compassionate release. 986 F.3d at 670–72. We concluded, based on Supreme
Court guidance, that the defendant’s motion for compassionate release—premised solely upon the
advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and the defendant’s poor health—was a “conceptually simple
matter” that could be resolved by form order. Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). Most
recently, we reiterated in Sherwood that Guidelines § 1B1.13(2)’s requirement that a defendant
not be a danger to the community is not a permissible basis for the denial of a defendant-initiated
motion for compassionate release, although district courts are free to consider a defendant’s history
-4- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
and characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community, when balancing the
§ 3553(a) factors. 986 F.3d at 953–54.
B.
We now turn back to the issues presented by defendant’s appeal.
As an initial matter, the government concedes that the district court mistakenly relied on
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 both to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and to conclude that
Sorrell’s present dangerousness rendered him ineligible for compassionate release under
§ 1B1.13(2). Although the matter was unsettled when the district court resolved Sorrell’s motion,
Jones and Elias make clear that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement for
defendant-initiated motions for compassionate release. See Elias, 984 F.3d at 519. However,
because the district court also explained that it would deny relief based on its weighing of the §
3553(a) factors, its application of § 1B1.13 does not require reversal. See Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1008.
In other words, this is not a case where it was unclear whether the district court gave more than
one independent justification to deny the motion as in Hampton, nor is it a case akin to Sherwood
where the district court relied solely upon § 1B1.13(2) to deny relief.
Regarding the district court’s weighing of the § 3553 factors, Sorrell claims that the district
court did not sufficiently recognize his rehabilitative efforts, his good behavior in prison, and the
Bureau of Prison’s assessment that he is at a low risk for recidivism. He further observes that other
district court judges have granted sentencing reductions to other prisoners who had served only
small percentages of their sentence at the time their motion for compassionate release was granted.
These arguments are unconvincing to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court’s
order. At bottom, the court recognized the positive developments in Sorrell’s life since he had
been incarcerated, but nevertheless concluded that they were insufficient to tip the § 3553(a) scales
-5- No. 20-1832, United States v. Sorrell
in his favor—specifically citing the factors it thought relevant in the process. Even if another
district judge would weigh the § 3553(a) factors differently than the court did here, we see no
abuse of discretion in the court’s reasoning because it did not rely on clearly erroneous findings of
fact, employ an erroneous legal standard, or improperly apply the law. See United States v.
Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020).
Finally, to the extent that defendant challenges the adequacy of the district court’s
explanation and faults it for not conducting an extensive “contemporaneous review” of the § 3553
factors, Quintanilla Navarro establishes that the district court’s four-page order did enough to
explain its reasoning to enable meaningful appellate review. Nothing more is required. See 986
F.3d at 670–71 (citing United States v. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2018)); see also
United States v. Keefer, 832 F. App’x 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[B]usy district courts do not abuse
their discretion in this context merely because they do not issue exhaustive opinions.”).
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
-6-