United States v. Brown

279 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10377, 2003 WL 22075240
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedJune 17, 2003
DocketCR.A. 02-00185
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 279 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (United States v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Brown, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10377, 2003 WL 22075240 (S.D. Ala. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION and JUDGMENT

BUTLER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the bench trial of Defendants Kevin and Ronald Brown, with all the factual elements of the criminal act with which they were charged having been stipulated in a Joint Stipulation of Facts (Doe. 145), with the exception of the issue of whether the chemical structure of 1,4 butanediol (“BD”) is substantially similar to the chemical structure of gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (“GHB”) within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A) and § 813.

I. BACKGROUND

Kevin and Ronald Brown were both charged in a superseding information with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance analogue, BD, knowing that the substance was intended for human consumption, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 813, 841(a)(1) and 846. “A controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a controlled substance in schedule I.” 21 U.S.C. § 813. The Analogue Act defines a “controlled substance analogue” as a substance:

(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
*1240 (ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.

Id. at § 802(82)(A).

II. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

The court finds it appropriate to first address whether Section 802(32)(A) should be read disjunctively or conjunctively since the Eleventh Circuit has never ruled on the issue. See United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002). Obviously, if the statute is read in the disjunctive, then the Defendants are guilty because they have stipulated that BD, once ingested and metabolized, has an effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the effect on the central nervous system of the controlled substance, GHB. See Joint Stipulation at ¶ 3. The court notes that the majority of courts, in dealing with this issue, have read the statute in the conjunctive which requires the government to prove clause (i) and either clause (ii) or (iii). See, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 432-39 (3d Cir.2003) (surveying cases and going into extensive detail on the subject). Since a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation of the Analogue Act is not the primary issue here, the court, for the purposes of the order, assumes that the statute should be read in the conjunctive.

Turning to the issue at hand, the Defendants contend that the term “similar in chemical structure” is not defined by statute and should be explained as it is used in the scientific community. Doc. 136. “[W]here Congress has used technical words or terms of art, ‘it (is) proper to explain them by reference to the art or science to which they (are) appropriate.’ ” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (citations omitted). Section 802(32)(A)(i) does not use the term “similar in chemical structure” as the Defendants contend; rather' the phrase reads “substantially similar to the chemical structure.” There is no dispute that the term “chemical structure” should be explained as it is used in the field of chemistry, but the Defendants and the government are at odds over whether the phrase “substantially similar” should be interpreted according to its common or scientific meaning.

Words that have both a technical and common definition are construed in the latter sense unless the statute indicates otherwise. Huffman v. C.I.R., 978 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.1992). Since the Analogue Act does not indicate that the term “substantially similar” is to be defined as it is used scientifically, the court will interpret those words as they are used in everyday language. The dictionary defines “similar” as “1: having characteristics in common: strictly comparable 2: alike in substance and essentials ... 3: not differing in shape but only in size or position.” MeRriam Webster’s Collegiate DiCtionary 1093 (10th ed.1994). “Substantial” is defined in relevant part as “la: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory ... c: important, essential ... 2b: considerable in quantity: significantly great ... 5: being largely but not wholly that which is specified.” Id. at *1241 1174. Therefore, these definitions of the words “substantial” and “similar” will be the definitions employed by the court in determining whether the chemical structure of BD is substantially similar to the chemical structure of GHB.

Furthermore, the court is guided by controlling precedent in defining the language “substantially similar” found in the Analogue Act by its common meaning. In United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440, 443-44 (11th Cir.1996), the Eleventh Circuit, in finding that the phrase “substantially similar” in the Analogue Act was adequately defined, relied on the holding of United States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir.1993). Carlson, 87 F.3d at 444. In Hofstatter, the Sixth Circuit held that “a penal statute must define the offense with sufficient definiteness to enable ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and must do so in a manner that does not encourage discriminatory enforcement.” Hofstatter, 8 F.3d at 321 (citations omitted).

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Bluebook (online)
279 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10377, 2003 WL 22075240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-brown-alsd-2003.