USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4200
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRIAN LEE CORBETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:10-cr-00015-1)
Submitted: April 10, 2025 Decided: April 14, 2025
Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Rachel E. Zimarowski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Lesley Shamblin, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
In 2010, Brian Lee Corbett pleaded guilty to aggravated bank robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). The district court sentenced Corbett to 235 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Corbett began serving
his term of supervised release in 2022. In 2024, the court revoked Corbett’s supervised
release based on his violations of several conditions of his release. At the revocation
hearing, the court imposed a new term of 36 months of imprisonment. The court then
stated that it “impose[d] the term of supervised release as follows,” identifying the
conditions of Corbett’s new term of supervised release but failing to state the length of that
term. Realizing the omission, the court reconvened the hearing the next day and fixed the
term of supervised release at 24 months.
On appeal, Corbett first contends that the district court did not have the authority to
correct his sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Federal law “permits courts to modify
sentences only in limited circumstances.” United States v. Melvin, 105 F.4th 620, 623 (4th
Cir. 2024). “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, a court generally may not modify a sentence
once it has been imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, § 3582
contains a narrow exception permitting the sentencing court to alter a sentence pursuant to
Rule 35(a). Id. Rule 35(a) allows a sentencing court to “correct a sentence that resulted
from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within “14 days after sentencing.” Fed
R. Crim. P. 35(a). Rule 35(a) “extend[s] only to those cases in which an obvious error or
mistake has occurred in the sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in
a remand of the case to the trial court.” United States v. Fraley, 988 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no doubt that the sentence originally
imposed here, an indeterminate term of supervised release, was clear error. Therefore, the
district court had the authority to correct that error under Rule 35(a). *
Corbett next challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that
the district court failed to adequately address his nonfrivolous argument for a lower
sentence. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation
of supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We
“will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive
considerations that guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett,
788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). If a
revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will not proceed
to consider “whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the
* While counsel frames this as a jurisdictional issue, “it is not clear that Section 3582 is a jurisdictional rule.” Melvin, 105 F.4th at 623 n.4; accord United States v. May, 855 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (observing that Congress is required to specifically indicate “that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional before a court can treat the limitation as such” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But we need not resolve that question today. For present purposes, it suffices to note that § 3582 prohibits courts from modifying a previously imposed sentence, with only narrow exceptions, one of which is applicable here.
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unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range
and the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. at 436; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence,” it nevertheless must “provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the court imposes a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines policy
statement range, “less explanation” is typically required. Patterson, 957 F.3d at 439
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court, when imposing a revocation
sentence, must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular
sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough
manner that [we] can meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the
revocation sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the within-Guidelines policy
statement sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Corbett contends that the district court
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4200
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRIAN LEE CORBETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:10-cr-00015-1)
Submitted: April 10, 2025 Decided: April 14, 2025
Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Rachel E. Zimarowski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Lesley Shamblin, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
In 2010, Brian Lee Corbett pleaded guilty to aggravated bank robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). The district court sentenced Corbett to 235 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Corbett began serving
his term of supervised release in 2022. In 2024, the court revoked Corbett’s supervised
release based on his violations of several conditions of his release. At the revocation
hearing, the court imposed a new term of 36 months of imprisonment. The court then
stated that it “impose[d] the term of supervised release as follows,” identifying the
conditions of Corbett’s new term of supervised release but failing to state the length of that
term. Realizing the omission, the court reconvened the hearing the next day and fixed the
term of supervised release at 24 months.
On appeal, Corbett first contends that the district court did not have the authority to
correct his sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Federal law “permits courts to modify
sentences only in limited circumstances.” United States v. Melvin, 105 F.4th 620, 623 (4th
Cir. 2024). “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, a court generally may not modify a sentence
once it has been imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, § 3582
contains a narrow exception permitting the sentencing court to alter a sentence pursuant to
Rule 35(a). Id. Rule 35(a) allows a sentencing court to “correct a sentence that resulted
from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within “14 days after sentencing.” Fed
R. Crim. P. 35(a). Rule 35(a) “extend[s] only to those cases in which an obvious error or
mistake has occurred in the sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in
a remand of the case to the trial court.” United States v. Fraley, 988 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4200 Doc: 21 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no doubt that the sentence originally
imposed here, an indeterminate term of supervised release, was clear error. Therefore, the
district court had the authority to correct that error under Rule 35(a). *
Corbett next challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that
the district court failed to adequately address his nonfrivolous argument for a lower
sentence. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation
of supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We
“will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive
considerations that guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett,
788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). If a
revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will not proceed
to consider “whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the
* While counsel frames this as a jurisdictional issue, “it is not clear that Section 3582 is a jurisdictional rule.” Melvin, 105 F.4th at 623 n.4; accord United States v. May, 855 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (observing that Congress is required to specifically indicate “that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional before a court can treat the limitation as such” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But we need not resolve that question today. For present purposes, it suffices to note that § 3582 prohibits courts from modifying a previously imposed sentence, with only narrow exceptions, one of which is applicable here.
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unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range
and the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. at 436; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence,” it nevertheless must “provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the court imposes a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines policy
statement range, “less explanation” is typically required. Patterson, 957 F.3d at 439
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court, when imposing a revocation
sentence, must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular
sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough
manner that [we] can meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the
revocation sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the within-Guidelines policy
statement sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Corbett contends that the district court
failed to consider his nonfrivolous argument that a constitutional issue with a traffic stop
underlying one of his supervised release violations merited a downward variance. Corbett
acknowledges that the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights does not apply in revocation proceedings, see United States v.
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Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999), but nevertheless argues that a downward
variance was warranted because the search that occurred during the traffic stop was later
found to have violated the Fourth Amendment. However, based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the district court necessarily rejected Corbett’s argument by
finding the traffic stop highly relevant to its calculation of his sentence, discussing both the
large volume of drugs discovered during the stop and the fact that the incident occurred
only nine months into Corbett’s five-year term of supervised release.
We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED