United States v. Bowman Dairy Co.

185 F.2d 159

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: January 15, 1951
• Docket: 10080
• Status: Published

Opinions

DUFFY, Circuit Judge.

The indictment herein charged eight corporations, all engaged in the milk business, and nine officers of such corporations with violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, by conspiring to allocate, among such corporations, wholesale fluid milk customers in the Chicago area, and also to allocate the sales of fluid milk to certain public institutions located in said area.

The various defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, which motions were denied. Thereafter defendants moved for a bill of particulars, for discovery under Rule 16, and for a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 17(c), Federal rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.¹ The government did not object to the motion under Rule 16, which requested an order directing the attorney for the government to produce for defendants’ inspection the documents, books and papers which the government had obtained from the defendants and other persons by seizure or process. The motion under Rule 17(c), to which objection was made, was for an order requiring Willis L. Hotchkiss, special assistant to the Attorney General and chief of the midwest office of the AntiTrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, to produce documents, books and papers obtained by the government by means other than seizure or process.

The district court entered an order directing the attorney for the government to produce for defendants’ inspection, books, papers and documents designated in a subpoena duces tecum, which defendants had theretofore served and filed. The subpoena directed Mr. Hotchkiss to produce “ * * * all documents, books, papers and objects (except memoranda prepared by Government counsel, and documents or papers solicited by or volunteered to Government counsel which consist of narrative statements of persons or memoranda of interviews), obtained by Government counsel, in any manner other than by seizure or process, (a) in the course of the investigation by Grand Jury No. 8949 which resulted in the return of the indictment herein, and (b) in the course of the Government’s preparation for the trial of this cause, if such books, papers, documents and objects, (a) have been presented to the Grand Jury; or (b) are to be offered as evidence on the trial of the defendants, or any of them, under said indictment; or (c) are .relevant to the allegations or charges contained in said indictment, whether or not they might constitute evidence with respect to the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants.”

The government’s motions to quash the subpoena issued under Rule 17(c) and to set aside the order which directed compliance with the subpoena were denied. The grounds stated in the motion to quash were: (a) under Rule 17(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a subpoena for the production of documents may not issue against an attorney for the government; (b) the court has no jurisdiction to order the attorney for the government to produce for inspection by the defendants the documents and other papers designated in a subpoena issued under Rule 17 (c) ; and (c) the rights.of defendants in criminal proceedings to obtain access to documents and other papers in the custody of attorneys for the government, as such term is defined in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are limited to the rights granted to such defendants by Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the application of such Rule 16 exhausts the rights of the defendants to secure access to such books, records and docu-' ments or other objects in the custody of an attorney for the government. Objection was also made that the subpoena called' for the production of privileged documents, including among others documents which the government might have secured from confidential and voluntary informants and that the disclosure of such documents to defendants would be against public policy.

Hotchkiss submitted to the court a written statement in the form of an affidavit, which averred that all of the documents which the court had ordered produced were in his custody. After summarizing the reasons why he claimed the court did not have jurisdiction under Rule 17(c) to enter a pre-trial discovery order against an attorney for the government, he stated that, acting on the advice and instruction of the Attorney General of the United States and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-Trust Division, he respectfully declined to comply with the court’s order. The court then entered an order finding Hotchkiss guilty of contempt of court and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General, to be held until such time as he complied with the provisions of the subpoena duces tecum, or until discharged from custody by due process of law. The matter before us is Hotchkiss’ appeal from the order holding him in contempt of court.

It is readily apparent that Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is restricted in its scope. A defendant in a criminal case faces sharply defined limitations in securing access to documentary material in the hands of prosecuting attorneys of the federal government. The order granting access is directed to the attorney for the government. The only documents, papers, books and objects to which a defendant can have access are those obtained from or belonging to the defendant or such as were obtained from others by seizure or process. Furthermore, the defendant must make a showing (a) that the items sought may be material to his defense, and (b) that the request is reasonable.

The history of the development of Rule 16 shows that the limitations appearing therein were deliberately inserted. In May, 1943, the Advisory Committee in charge of formulating the new criminal rules released to the bench and bar of the country, for consideration and suggestion, the preliminary draft of such rules. The first predecessor to Rule 16 (Rule 19) provided broadly for discovery and inspection in this language: “ * * * the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the inspection * * * of any designated * * * documents, * * * not privileged, * *

As proposed this rule was substantially identical to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., then in effect, which provided for inspecting, copying and photographing “of any designated documents, papers, books, * * * not privileged.” To many members of the bench and bar who had assumed the law to be that the right of discovery was not recognized in criminal cases, the proposed rule was undoubtedly a startling innovation. See: Shores v. United States, 8 Cir., 174 F.2d 838, 844. It had been stated as a recognized rule of law that at common law a defendant had no right of discovery in criminal cases. Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.), Sec. 1859g. In the second preliminary draft, issued by the Advisory Committee in February, 1944, the provision in the proposed rule on discovery and inspection (which in that draft was Rule 18) was narrowed to: “ * * * designated books, * * * obtained from or belonging to the defendant, or constituting evidence in the proceeding, * *

The finally approved rule clearly reveals the standards set in the civil discovery rule (No. 34) were rejected in favor of an entirely new standard. In the Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 16, all reference to civil rules was omitted, and the limited nature of the provision for discovery in criminal proceedings is emphasized. The note reads: “Whether under existing law discovery may be permitted in criminal cases is doubtful, United States v. Rosenfeld, 2 Cir., 57 F.2d 74, certiorari denied, 286 U.S. 556, 52 S.Ct. 642, 76 L.Ed. 1290. The courts have, however, made orders granting to the defendant an opportunity no inspect impounded documents belonging to him, United States v. B. Goedde & Co., D.C.E.D.Ill., 40 F.Supp. 523, 534. The rule is a restatement of this procedure. In addition, it permits the procedure to be invoked in cases of objects and documents obtained from others by seizure or by process, on the theory that such evidential matter would probably have been accessible to the defendant if it had not previously been seized by the prosecution. The entire matter is left within the discretion of the court.”

Considering the history of Rule 16, which shows the evolution from the broad terms of its first draft to its final restrictive and limited terms, it is difficult to believe that the framers of the rule intended to authorize discovery and inspection of broad scope under Rule 17(c) pertaining to subpoena which was expressly prohibited by Rule 16 which is the rule intended to cover discovery and inspection. It does not make sense to have created in one rule a privilege of discovery limited to documents and papers belonging to the defendant or taken from others by seizure or process and at the same time to create in Rule 17(c) an almost unlimited right of discovery by use of the subpoena provisions.

In United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n, Inc., et al., D.C., 9 F.R.D. 509, the defendants endeavored to obtain a subpoena duces tecum which required the government to produce all documents which it had obtained from any person not a party to the proceeding, whether by process or not. Judge Holtzoff denied the request and it is of significance that Judge Holtzoff was a member of the Advisory Committee which drafted the criminal rules. Judge Holtzoff stated in 9 F.R. D. at page 510:

“The purpose of this provision is a limited one. It is to make it possible to require the production before the trial of documents subpoenaed for use at the trial. Its purpose is merely to shorten the trial. It is not intended as a discovery provision.

“In this case the proposed subpoena duces tecum is not intended to be used to secure evidence to be introduced at the trial, but is intended to be employed as a broad discovery for the purposes of inspecting all the documentary evidence in possession of the Government and which the Government intends to use at the trial.

“It is well settled that in a criminal case, unlike a civil action, such a right of broad discovery does not exist. As I said before, Rule 17(c) was not intended to be a discovery provision, but merely a means to make a subpoena duces tecum returnable prior to the trial in order that time at the trial may be saved while documents are being examined and inspected.”

In United States v. Brumfield, D.C., 85 F.Supp. 696, which was a conspiracy case, the defendant sought, under Rules 16 and 17, to have produced a voluntary statement of a co-defendant. The court said, 85 F.Supp. at page 707, that Rule 17(c) “is simply complementary to Rule 16 in providing for subpoena addressed to the party having possession of the documerits, to produce them.” It was the holding of the court that since the document had not been obtained by seizure or process, it was beyond the reach of subpoena issued under Rule 17(c). The court did indicate that if the co-defendant were a witness at the trial, the statement might be used for impeachment purposes.

In United States v. Hiss, D.C., 9 F.R.D. 515, the defendant endeavored to obtain papers from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. The court said, 9 F.R.D. at page 516: “To permit the subpoena and the ex parte order to stand would, it seems to the Court, set a precedent whereby defendants could promiscuously seek subpoenas under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure * * * which the Clerk issues without question * *

The only case called to our attention holding to the contrary is United States v. Bondy, 2 Cir., 171 F.2d 642, a per curiam decision. The court there said, 171 F.2d at page 644: “ * * * So much of the order as directs production of the documents designated in the subpoena is authorized by Rule 17(c). * * * ”

The real holding in that case was that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the mandamus petition. In spite of the language used the opinion cannot be construed as a considered determination as to the character of documents which a subpoena may include or the purposes for which it may issue.

Although the language of Rule 17(c) is broad, the rule is only one in an integrated group for the regulation of procedure in criminal cases in federal courts. It must be read with the other rules in mind, and particularly Rule 16. It should not be construed so that the carefully drawn limitations in Rule 16 become meaningless. It is our view that Rule 17(c) provides for the traditional type of trial subpoena, although as a matter of convenience it may be made returnable before the actual date of trial. However, it may not be converted into an unrestricted pre-trial discovery device.

The government’s motion to quash the subpoena and to set aside the order which directed compliance therewith should have been granted. The order adjudging Willis L. Hotchkiss to be in contempt must be and hereby is

Reversed.

1 . “Rule 16. Discovery And Inspection.

Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated hooks, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

“Bule 17. Subpoena.

“(a) For attendance of Witnesses; Forms; Issuance. A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk * * * and shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein. The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served. * * *

“(c) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.”