United States v. Bobb

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: 23-3748
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3748 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:21-cr-02005-MKD-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JEREMIAH BOBB,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Mary K. Dimke, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 28, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Following a four-day trial featuring testimony from multiple minor victims,

a jury convicted Jeremiah Bobb of one count of sexual abuse of a minor in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2243(a), and one count of aggravated sexual abuse

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c). As the parties are familiar

with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly denied Bobb’s motion to strike a juror for

cause. That juror, a sexual assault survivor, was not actually biased. While she

acknowledged the possibility of an emotional trigger, she “commit[ted] to lay aside

[any] feelings and reach a verdict based on the evidence presented and the court’s

instructions.” United States v. Kechedzian, 902 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). Nor is this an “extreme” or “extraordinary” case warranting a

presumption of bias. United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted). No categorical presumption exists for sexual assault

survivors. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 1997) (in

child sex abuse case, district court did not abuse discretion by declining to excuse

jurors who were victims of child molestation). And this juror’s experiences did not

“resemble[] the fact pattern.” United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th

Cir. 2000). She was not personally affected, directly or indirectly, by Bobb’s

crimes; she was not a child at the time of the assaults, which occurred over twenty

years before her jury service; she did not know any child sexual assault victims;

and there are no details suggesting the assaults were factually similar to the ones

Bobb committed.

2 23-3748 2. We reject Bobb’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his conviction

for aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Bobb’s conduct satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)’s “sexual act” element

based on Minor 2’s testimony that (1) she saw Bobb sexually assault Minor 1 “by

putting his private part in hers,” and (2) Bobb did “something like that” to her. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (sufficiency standard); 18 U.S.C.

§ 2246(2)(D) (defining a “sexual act” as “the intentional touching, not through the

clothing, of the genitalia of another person . . . with an intent to abuse, humiliate,

harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”).

3. Bobb’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. We need not

reach the issue of prejudice because counsel’s actions were within “the wide range

of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

690 (1984). Bobb challenges counsel’s decision not to call an FBI agent or recall

Minor 2 to elicit testimony that Minor 2 had previously disclosed abuse by other

individuals but not Bobb. Counsel did so after learning the court would admit such

testimony but allow the Government to introduce prior consistent statements,

including Minor 2 describing Bobb “[p]utting hits [sic] private part in [hers]” after

he pulled down her pants and underwear. Such “[s]trategic choices made after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

3 23-3748 unchallengeable.” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

AFFIRMED.

4 23-3748