United States v. Board of Education of Clayton County, Georgia

331 F. Supp. 466, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12044
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedAugust 13, 1971
DocketCiv. A. No. 14709
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 331 F. Supp. 466 (United States v. Board of Education of Clayton County, Georgia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Board of Education of Clayton County, Georgia, 331 F. Supp. 466, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12044 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Opinion

ORDER

RICHARD C. FREEMAN, District Judge.

This is an action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States pursuant to Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants are the Board of Education of Clayton County, Georgia (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”); the Board’s individual members; and the Superintendent of the Clayton County School System. The court’s jurisdiction is invoked by 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6. By this action plaintiff seeks to have the court enjoin “defendants, and each of them, their officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with them from discriminating against black students attending the public schools in Clayton County on the basis of race and require them to take affirmative action to disestablish the dual system of schools based on race and to correct the effects of past discrimination based on race.” 1 Plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, and also made a motion for substitution of parties pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In order for plaintiff to prevail on his motion for summary judgment this court must determine whether, based on the uncontested facts, it can be held as a matter of law that the Board of Education of Clayton County is operating and maintaining a “dual system” by virtue of the existence of one school containing all black students and a predominantly black faculty. From the pleadings and the record the following facts are uncontested: the Clayton County School District is composed of thirty-one (31) schools attended by twenty-five thousand two hundred twenty (25,220) white students and one thousand four hundred seventy-nine (1,479) black students; 79% of the black students in the Clayton County School District attend fully integrated schools; attendance zones were created for every school in the Clayton County School District except for W. A. Fountain School which serves grades one through six; during the 1970-71 school year W. A. Fountain was attended by three hundred eleven (311) black students and no white students; some black students who live within the attendance zones of other schools attend W. A. Fountain; [468]*468the percentage of black teachers in the Clayton County School District is less than 6 % of the total number of teachers; the faculty at W. A. Fountain consists of thirteen (13) black teachers and three (3) white teachers; and the students attending W. A. Fountain have “freedom of choice” whereby they may transfer to a school in which the majority of students are white.

In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding that the constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in the community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), it can not be held on the facts before this court that Clayton County is operating and maintaining a “dual system.” The Supreme Court has also held that if there are reasonably available other ways promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary school system, “freedom of choice” must be held unacceptable, Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1967). Therefore, neither can it be held on the facts before this court that the Clayton County School District is a unitary school system rather than a dual system. Thus, there do not appear to be enough material facts at this time to enable the court to grant a summary judgment. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES

Plaintiff has moved to substitute certain individuals for certain other individual defendants who have been succeeded in office. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(d) (1) provides that:

When a public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and his successor is automatically substituted as a party * * * An order of substitution may be entered at any time * *■ *.

Therefore, plaintiffs motion for substitution of parties is granted.

PROPOSED PLANS

On June 4, 1971, this court held a status hearing at which both sides were represented by counsel. At the hearing counsel for the defendant advised the court that the Clayton County Board of Education had recommended that the W. A. Fountain School be converted to a junior high school, but because of the County’s failure to pass a school bond referendum, there existed a special physical problem of not being able to accommodate additional children in the remaining elementary schools. Therefore, the Board planned to convert W. A. Fountain into a junior high school serving grades 7, 8 and 9 for the school year beginning September, 1971. For that one school year, however, the Board also planned to retain grades one through six (consisting of approximately one hundred sixty (160) black students and no white students) at W. A. Fountain. Under this plan additional elementary schools would have been built by the school year commencing September, 1972, and the one hundred sixty (160) students in grades one through six at W. A. Fountain would all be transferred to predominantly white elementary schools. W. A. Fountain would then become an all junior high facility.

Counsel for the government advised the court that the government had no objection to the conversion of W. A. Fountain into a junior high school so long as the proper racial balance was maintained, but that the government did object to the retention of the all black grades one through six at that facility even for a one year period. At this time the court informed both sides that it would not accept the Board’s plan with respect to the retention of grades one through six (consisting of one hundred sixty (160) black students and no white students) at the W. A. Fountain School. [469]*469The court then advised the parties that some plan would have to be devised either immediately to convert W. A. Fountain into an all junior high facility or, in the alternative, to convert it into a fully integrated facility consisting of a combination junior high and grades one through six. The defendant Board then suggested that they could convert W. A. Fountain from an elementary to a junior high and that they would devise a plan detailing this and disbursing the grades one through six (now at W. A. Fountain) to other schools in the county.

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331 F. Supp. 466, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12044, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-board-of-education-of-clayton-county-georgia-gand-1971.