NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3996 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:22-cr-00066-YGR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOHN RUSSELL BELLHOUSE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2026 San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
John Bellhouse (“Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual
abuse of a ward, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b), and three counts of abusive sexual contact,
18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(4), for his receipt of oral sex and his sexual touching of two
inmates in an all-female federal correctional institution. Defendant was sentenced
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. to sixty-three months of incarceration and five years of supervised release and
ordered to pay $25,000 under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. Defendant
now appeals his conviction and associated sentence.
Defendant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when
it: (1) allowed the Government to introduce at trial the uncharged sexual-act
testimony of the two victims and three other witnesses pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence (“Rule”) 403 and 413; and (2) failed to fully and properly instruct the jury
on how to consider the uncharged-act testimony of four of the five women who
testified as to uncharged acts. Defendant further argues on appeal that the district
court clearly erred when it: (1) applied the vulnerable victim enhancement under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(b)(1) as to one of the victims; and (2) found
Defendant non-indigent and applied a special assessment under the Justice for
Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3014. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court’s admission
of the evidence of uncharged sexual acts. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d
965, 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
Rule 413 states that “[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other
sexual assault.” Fed. R. Evid. 413(a). Rule 413 evidence remains subject to the
2 23-3996 limitations of Rule 403. United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1119–20 (9th
Cir. 2010). To determine whether to admit evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of
sexual misconduct, district courts must evaluate the following factors (the “LeMay
factors”): “(1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, (2) the closeness in
time of the prior acts to the acts charged, (3) the frequency of the prior acts, (4) the
presence or lack of intervening circumstances, and (5) the necessity of the evidence
beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.” United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d
1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232
F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court properly evaluated the proposed testimony
under Rule 403 and the LeMay factors, and thus did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence of the uncharged sexual acts. The district court found “that
the uncharged sexual conduct was similar to the other acts charged, close in time,
frequent, and necessary corroboration given the lack of physical evidence in the
case.” “Prior acts evidence need not be absolutely necessary to the prosecution’s
case in order to be introduced; it must simply be helpful or practically necessary.”
LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1029. Here, the testimony of the victims and other inmates
regarding Defendant’s uncharged sexual acts was practically necessary. As the
district court explained, the case would “largely boil down to who the jury believes,
a federal officer or incarcerated felons . . . . [so] the uncharged sexual abuse is more
3 23-3996 probative than cumulative.”
To the extent that some of the uncharged acts were noticed late, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them, both because there was good
cause for the late notice and because admission of the evidence was not prejudicial
given how much time remained before trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 413(b) (permitting a
court to admit evidence noticed after the 15-day pretrial deadline when “good cause”
exists for the late disclosure); see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420,
436–37 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the district court did not err in admitting
evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that was
noticed late because late disclosure was not prejudicial).
2. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court’s jury
instructions as to the uncharged-acts testimony. See United States v. Cortes, 757
F.3d 850, 857 (9th Cir. 2014).
Defendant argues that the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider
the uncharged-acts testimony of four of the five witnesses because the district court
did not provide the limiting jury instruction before each of the women’s testimony
and named only one of the five women as having provided uncharged-acts testimony
in the final jury instruction. However, the district court carefully instructed the jury
“as to the limited purpose for which the evidence [was] admitted.” See United States
v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978). Before two of the witnesses
4 23-3996 testified as to uncharged sexual acts, the district court gave Ninth Circuit Model
Instruction 2.11 regarding the introduction of evidence that a defendant may have
committed a similar offense of sexual assault. Although the district court did not
give a similar instruction before or during the testimony of the two victims and the
third witness, the district court did direct the jurors in the final jury instructions to
determine only whether Defendant was guilty or not guilty of the charges in the
indictment, and not the other uncharged sexual conduct.
The court presumes that the jury followed the district court’s limiting
instruction. United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1995). Based on
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
3.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3996 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:22-cr-00066-YGR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOHN RUSSELL BELLHOUSE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2026 San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
John Bellhouse (“Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual
abuse of a ward, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b), and three counts of abusive sexual contact,
18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(4), for his receipt of oral sex and his sexual touching of two
inmates in an all-female federal correctional institution. Defendant was sentenced
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. to sixty-three months of incarceration and five years of supervised release and
ordered to pay $25,000 under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. Defendant
now appeals his conviction and associated sentence.
Defendant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when
it: (1) allowed the Government to introduce at trial the uncharged sexual-act
testimony of the two victims and three other witnesses pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence (“Rule”) 403 and 413; and (2) failed to fully and properly instruct the jury
on how to consider the uncharged-act testimony of four of the five women who
testified as to uncharged acts. Defendant further argues on appeal that the district
court clearly erred when it: (1) applied the vulnerable victim enhancement under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(b)(1) as to one of the victims; and (2) found
Defendant non-indigent and applied a special assessment under the Justice for
Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3014. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court’s admission
of the evidence of uncharged sexual acts. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d
965, 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
Rule 413 states that “[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other
sexual assault.” Fed. R. Evid. 413(a). Rule 413 evidence remains subject to the
2 23-3996 limitations of Rule 403. United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1119–20 (9th
Cir. 2010). To determine whether to admit evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of
sexual misconduct, district courts must evaluate the following factors (the “LeMay
factors”): “(1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, (2) the closeness in
time of the prior acts to the acts charged, (3) the frequency of the prior acts, (4) the
presence or lack of intervening circumstances, and (5) the necessity of the evidence
beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.” United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d
1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232
F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court properly evaluated the proposed testimony
under Rule 403 and the LeMay factors, and thus did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence of the uncharged sexual acts. The district court found “that
the uncharged sexual conduct was similar to the other acts charged, close in time,
frequent, and necessary corroboration given the lack of physical evidence in the
case.” “Prior acts evidence need not be absolutely necessary to the prosecution’s
case in order to be introduced; it must simply be helpful or practically necessary.”
LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1029. Here, the testimony of the victims and other inmates
regarding Defendant’s uncharged sexual acts was practically necessary. As the
district court explained, the case would “largely boil down to who the jury believes,
a federal officer or incarcerated felons . . . . [so] the uncharged sexual abuse is more
3 23-3996 probative than cumulative.”
To the extent that some of the uncharged acts were noticed late, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them, both because there was good
cause for the late notice and because admission of the evidence was not prejudicial
given how much time remained before trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 413(b) (permitting a
court to admit evidence noticed after the 15-day pretrial deadline when “good cause”
exists for the late disclosure); see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420,
436–37 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the district court did not err in admitting
evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that was
noticed late because late disclosure was not prejudicial).
2. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court’s jury
instructions as to the uncharged-acts testimony. See United States v. Cortes, 757
F.3d 850, 857 (9th Cir. 2014).
Defendant argues that the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider
the uncharged-acts testimony of four of the five witnesses because the district court
did not provide the limiting jury instruction before each of the women’s testimony
and named only one of the five women as having provided uncharged-acts testimony
in the final jury instruction. However, the district court carefully instructed the jury
“as to the limited purpose for which the evidence [was] admitted.” See United States
v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978). Before two of the witnesses
4 23-3996 testified as to uncharged sexual acts, the district court gave Ninth Circuit Model
Instruction 2.11 regarding the introduction of evidence that a defendant may have
committed a similar offense of sexual assault. Although the district court did not
give a similar instruction before or during the testimony of the two victims and the
third witness, the district court did direct the jurors in the final jury instructions to
determine only whether Defendant was guilty or not guilty of the charges in the
indictment, and not the other uncharged sexual conduct.
The court presumes that the jury followed the district court’s limiting
instruction. United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1995). Based on
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
3. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court’s application
of the vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
§ 3A1.1(b)(1). See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.
2017).
A vulnerable victim is a person “who is unusually vulnerable due to age,
physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the
criminal conduct.” Id. at cmt. n.2. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found
that it was appropriate to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement to one of the
victims because the victim had limited English and was an undocumented
immigrant. The district court, after completion of trial, concluded based on the
5 23-3996 testimony of the victim and the victim’s friend that: (1) undocumented inmates were
treated differently, (2) they were particularly concerned about their immigration
status, and (3) Defendant knew or should have known that. The district court gave
sound reasoning for its determination. See United States v. Mendoza, 262 F.3d 957,
962 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement where
the defendant knew or should have known about the victims’ language limitations
because the defendant knew the victims personally). Based on these facts, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the vulnerable victim
enhancement.
4. Finally, the district court did not clearly err in finding Defendant non-
indigent and applying a special assessment under the Justice for Victims of
Trafficking Act (“JVTA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3014. See United States v. Orlando, 553
F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court’s finding of whether a defendant
is able to pay the fine [under U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 5E1.2(a)] is
reviewed for clear error.” (citation omitted)).
The JVTA requires district courts to “assess an amount of $5,000 on any non-
indigent person or entity convicted of an offense under . . . (2) chapter 109A (relating
to sexual abuse).” 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a). The defendant bears the burden of proving
he is indigent, or unable to pay the fine. Orlando, 553 F.3d at 1240. Here, the
district court did not commit clear error by concluding that Defendant was not
6 23-3996 indigent because, based on the record before the court, Defendant had a current
ability to pay the assessed amount.
AFFIRMED.
7 23-3996