United States v. Beckley

715 F. Supp. 2d 743, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19849, 2010 WL 779275
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 6, 2010
DocketCase 08-20621
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 715 F. Supp. 2d 743 (United States v. Beckley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Beckley, 715 F. Supp. 2d 743, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19849, 2010 WL 779275 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR., District Judge.

On February 4, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment which charged the Defendant, Arthur Beckley, with conspiring with other persons to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). On August 18, 2009, he filed a motion 1 which sought to obtain a judicial determination that the guideline status of benzylpiperazine, 2 also known as BZP, is most closely related to methylphenidate. The Government opposes such a conclusion, asserting that inasmuch as the challenged narcotic in this case is actually a combination of BZP and l-(3-trifluoromethylphenyl)-piperazine (“TFMPP”), the Court should declare the most closely re *745 lated controlled substance to be methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA),” more commonly known as ecstasy.

On November 10, 2009, Dr. Laureen Marinetti 3 was appointed by the Court to assist it in serving as an independent forensic science expert who would be able to assist it in resolving the contested issues in this case. On December 16, 2009, the Court convened an evidentiary hearing which was designed to address Beckley’s motion of August 8th. 4 During this hearing, the Court.(1) permitted the parties, through their counsel, to explore the veracity of Dr. Marinetti’s testimony as well as the qualities of her opinions, and (2) authorized the admission of her December 8th report, as well as Bono’s report into evidence. 5 At the conclusion of the December 16th hearing, the motion was taken under advisement, with a directive to the parties to file post-hearing briefs and address specific questions from the Court.

I.

According to the Government, Beckley recruited his cousin, Shantell Johnson, and her friend, Albany Cooper, 6 to travel to Canada where they were instructed to pick up approximately five thousand (5,000) ecstasy pills, and smuggle them into the United States. Johnson and Cooper were arrested by federal authorities when they attempted to cross the Ambassador Bridge from Canada into the United States. Thereafter, these two women — after agreeing to cooperate with the Government with the aid of recording devices— called Beckley and another Defendant, Craig Thomas 7 with whom they made arrangements for the delivery of the contraband. When Beckley joined the two women in their motor vehicle at a designated parking lot in the United States, he was arrested by the federal agents and immediately placed under custody. A field test *746 of the pills by a border patrol officer produced a positive result for ecstasy. 8

On November 25, 2008, Beckley was officially accused by a grand jury of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1); namely, conspiring with other persons to distribute MDMA. However, with an apparent recognition that a subsequent analysis of the confiscated “ecstasy” pills by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) revealed that they actually contained a combination of other chemicals (i.e., BZP, TFMPP, and caffeine), the Government subsequently filed a superseding indictment in which Beckley was accused of having conspired with other persons to distribute BZP.

II.

In support of his motion, Beckley initially argues that, inasmuch as the superseding indictment charges him with conspiring to distribute BZP, the Court should be constrained to consider this drug only when attempting to identify the most closely related controlled substance. The Government counters by submitting that the Court is permitted to consider facts outside of the indictment when determining the appropriate punishment for a defendant as long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.

Nearly a decade ago, the Supreme Court reiterated — according to long-standing common law history — that a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to due process of law, a speedy and public trial, and an impartial jury of his peers were at stake when determining the charges in an indictment which must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Nevertheless, the Court explained that “nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion — taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender — in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Indeed, as stated recently by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,

[adjustments to the base-offense level routinely depend upon facts found by sentencing judges by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court has sanctioned judicial factfinding, even fact-finding that enhances rather than reduces a defendant’s sentence, so long as the factfinding does not result in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.

United States v. Thompson, 515 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir.2008); see also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir.2008) (“So long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling set by the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge the defendant’s right to a jury trial by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct, when selecting a sentence within that statutory range.”); United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir.2008) (“the maximum statutory penalty that the district court could impose was determined by the statute of conviction, rather than by a Guidelines range calculated using only jury findings.”) Furthermore, such a judicial fact-finding effort should be conducted pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence standard. Sexton, 512 F.3d at 330.

The laws of the United States succinctly state that a person who conspires to commit an offense under Section 846 of Title 21, United States Code, is subject to the same penalties as the individual who actually commits the criminal offense. Under *747

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Related

United States v. Figueroa
647 F.3d 466 (Second Circuit, 2011)
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639 F.3d 583 (Second Circuit, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
715 F. Supp. 2d 743, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19849, 2010 WL 779275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-beckley-mied-2010.