United States v. Beckett

889 F. Supp. 152, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595, 1995 WL 367091
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJune 16, 1995
DocketCrim. A. 95-16-SLR
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 889 F. Supp. 152 (United States v. Beckett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Beckett, 889 F. Supp. 152, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595, 1995 WL 367091 (D. Del. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants are charged with several counts of distribution/aiding distribution of cocaine or cocaine base and conspiracy to distribute cocaine or cocaine base. Presently before the court is defendant Beckett’s motion for the production of Brady materials and defendant Williamson’s consolidated pretrial motion. (D.I. 45, 50) The issues have been briefed and are ripe for decision.

II. DISCUSSION

Both motions before the court seek to compel the government to disclose certain information about the confidential informants involved in the prosecution of this case. The *154 government has agreed to provide much of the information requested, but several requests remain unfulfilled. Whether the government should reveal the following must be determined by the court: 1) the name and address of the informants; 2) a list of cases the informants worked on for both the state of Delaware and the federal government, and the role played by said informants; 3) the informants’ criminal record; 4) any agreements between the informants and the government; 5) a list of all sums of money paid the informants by both the state of Delaware and the federal government; and 6) any statements made by the informants which relate to the above mentioned requests. (D.I. 45 at ¶ 7; 50 at ¶ 1)

Defendants have no constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Specifically, the government has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential informant from disclosure. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The purpose of this privilege “is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.” Id. at 59, 77 S.Ct. at 627. However, the government is under a duty to volunteer evidence favorable to an accused or “obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Cir.1987). The United States Supreme Court has articulated the following balancing test to dictate when the government must make such a disclosure.

We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare one’s defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.

Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further emphasized that protecting an informant’s identity serves an important public interest in that it encourages citizens to supply the government with information concerning criminal activity. Id. at 59, 77 S.Ct. at 627; United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679 (3d Cir.), cert denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 615, 126 L.Ed.2d 579 (1993). A defendant may satisfy his burden and overcome the privilege by demonstrating that the informant is a material witness or that his or her testimony in crucial to his case. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64-65, 77 S.Ct. at 629-30; United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1012-13 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 971, 112 S.Ct. 1585, 118 L.Ed.2d 304 (1992).

Identity of Informants

Defendants request the name and address of the informants at issue. (D.I. 45 at ¶ 7(a); 50 at ¶ 3A) Beckett contends that this information should be discoverable because “[t]hese witness’s [sic] credibility will play a major role in this case ... [such evidence will] assist and prepare his defense.... The informants were active participants in the transactions which form the basis for the charges against defendant_[and] [t]he informants are accordingly material witnesses to the acts allegedly committed by the defen-dant_” (D.I. 45 at ¶¶ 3-4, 6; see also 50 at 1) Williamson adds that the informants possess exculpatory information, but does not elaborate on this alleged information. (D.I. 50 at ¶ 2)

The government intends the informants to testify at trial. (D.I. 49 at ¶ 6; 52 at ¶ 1) However, it disputes Beckett’s representation that their credibility is critical to the case given that two of the three transactions at issue were filmed on videotape. (Id.) Moreover, the government adds that because defendant Williamson has a long criminal history including convictions for assault, and is facing a maximum sentence of life in prison, the safety of the informants is at risk if such identifying information is revealed.

*155 Defendants correctly indicate that the informants were active participants in the transactions at issue and not simply “tipsters” without relevant information. However, defendants have offered no specifies as to the alleged materiality of the informants’ statements or the exculpatory information held by these alleged witnesses. Simply repeating the relevant test applicable to this case, without offering more, is insufficient to meet defendants’ burden. Brown, 3 F.3d at 679 (“A defendant who merely hopes (without showing a likelihood) that disclosure will lead to evidence ... has not shown that disclosure will be relevant and helpful to the defense.... ”). Moreover, the authority offered by defendant Williamson for the proposition that, because the informants were not only “tipsters” but actual participants in the transaction, the revelation of their identity is required, is misplaced. While defendants correctly note that such a factor is important to the court’s review, in the cases cited by the defendants the informants were not going to be called by the government to testify nor was the government going to provide any impeachment information to defendants. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623,1 L.Ed.2d 639; McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, reh’g denied, 386 U.S. 1042, 87 S.Ct. 1474, 18 L.Ed.2d 616 (1967). Thus, defendants were precluded from examining the informants in any form, and the only other witness to the transaction was a government agent.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
889 F. Supp. 152, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595, 1995 WL 367091, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-beckett-ded-1995.