25-583 United States v. Beardsley
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of June, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 25-583
MICHAEL J. MURPHY, a.k.a. Red, TYLER N. TEDESCO, MILLER HAGGA, a.k.a. Kido, KYLIE M. REEVES, GARLAND M. BEARDSLEY, a.k.a. Charlie Beardsley, AUSTIN GORDON, GISELLE BENNETT,
Defendants,
ROCCO A. BEARDSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant: PETER J. TOMAO, Garden City, NY.
For Appellee: CHARLES M. KRULY (Tiffany H. Lee, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (John L. Sinatra, Jr., Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the March 3, 2025 judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
Rocco A. Beardsley appeals his sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment
following his plea of guilty to (i) one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams
or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and
846; and (ii) one count of distribution of acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl causing
death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal,
2 Beardsley argues that the district court erred when it sentenced him without first
verifying that he had read his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR” or
“presentence report”). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to
which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
I. Background
Beardsley pleaded guilty in March 2024 pursuant to a plea agreement that
stipulated a sentencing range of 264 to 300 months’ imprisonment. By signing the
agreement, Beardsley also waived his right to appeal any sentence equal to or less
than life imprisonment. Counsel represented Beardsley at his plea, but after
Beardsley advised the district court in August that he no longer wished for his
attorneys to represent him, the court permitted him to proceed pro se.
On February 28, 2025, after multiple adjournments and a use-of-force order
to compel his appearance in court, Beardsley appeared for sentencing. During the
sentencing proceeding, the district court asked Beardsley whether he had received
and reviewed his presentence report. Beardsley replied that he had received the
PSR weeks before but admitted that it had been “sitting on [his] table” and he had
not read it. App’x at 387. When the court subsequently inquired as to whether he
had any objections to the PSR, Beardsley answered, “I have no clue what I’m
3 objecting to or looking for.” Id. at 390. Nevertheless, Beardsley made clear that he
wanted “no more postponements” to his sentencing and that he was ready to
proceed. Id. at 388–89.
After that, the district court calculated the applicable Sentencing Guidelines
range – which it found to be life imprisonment – and then discussed the objectives
of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court also heard from a family
member of the individual to whom Beardsley had sold a lethal dose of fentanyl,
and then from the government and from Beardsley, who apologized to the family
representative and to everyone else he had harmed by selling drugs. Beardsley
acknowledged that he was likely to receive a sentence of “25 years,” before again
apologizing. Id. at 405. The district court then sentenced Beardsley to a term of
imprisonment of 300 months (i.e., twenty-five years), followed by five years’
supervised release.
II. Discussion
Beardsley contends that the district court erred when it sentenced him after
he told the court that he had not read his PSR. He argues that such a sentence
violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), which requires that a
sentencing court “must verify that the defendant . . . ha[s] read . . . the presentence
report and any addendum to the report” before sentencing. We disagree.
4 While we generally review sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard, questions of law are reviewed de novo, United States v.
Ojeda, 946 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 2020), including interpretations of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States v. Bradley, 105 F.4th 26, 33 (2d Cir. 2024).
A sentencing court fails to comply with Rule 32 when it does not “verify” whether
the defendant and his counsel have read and discussed the PSR. United States v.
Gates, 84 F.4th 496, 506 (2d Cir. 2023). The Rule is thus calculated to ensure that a
defendant’s attorney discusses the contents of the report with him. Id.
(emphasizing Rule 32’s discussion requirement).
Here, of course, Beardsley did not have an attorney, since he had previously
chosen to represent himself for purposes of sentencing. So the district court asked
Beardsley himself whether he had read his PSR. Indeed, unlike the sentencing
court in Gates, which “ignored the government’s respectful suggestion that the
court inquire as to whether Gates and her counsel had read and discussed the
PSR,” id., the court here questioned Beardsley multiple times as to whether he had
read his presentence report, App’x at 386 (“[H]ave you received that report and
had a chance to study it?”; “Have you read this February 3, 2025, presentence
report, Mr. Beardsley?”). This case presents an altogether different challenge than
5 the one presented in Gates – namely, what is a district court to do with a pro se
defendant who has been given ample opportunity to read his PSR but refuses to
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25-583 United States v. Beardsley
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of June, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 25-583
MICHAEL J. MURPHY, a.k.a. Red, TYLER N. TEDESCO, MILLER HAGGA, a.k.a. Kido, KYLIE M. REEVES, GARLAND M. BEARDSLEY, a.k.a. Charlie Beardsley, AUSTIN GORDON, GISELLE BENNETT,
Defendants,
ROCCO A. BEARDSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant: PETER J. TOMAO, Garden City, NY.
For Appellee: CHARLES M. KRULY (Tiffany H. Lee, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (John L. Sinatra, Jr., Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the March 3, 2025 judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
Rocco A. Beardsley appeals his sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment
following his plea of guilty to (i) one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams
or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and
846; and (ii) one count of distribution of acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl causing
death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal,
2 Beardsley argues that the district court erred when it sentenced him without first
verifying that he had read his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR” or
“presentence report”). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to
which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
I. Background
Beardsley pleaded guilty in March 2024 pursuant to a plea agreement that
stipulated a sentencing range of 264 to 300 months’ imprisonment. By signing the
agreement, Beardsley also waived his right to appeal any sentence equal to or less
than life imprisonment. Counsel represented Beardsley at his plea, but after
Beardsley advised the district court in August that he no longer wished for his
attorneys to represent him, the court permitted him to proceed pro se.
On February 28, 2025, after multiple adjournments and a use-of-force order
to compel his appearance in court, Beardsley appeared for sentencing. During the
sentencing proceeding, the district court asked Beardsley whether he had received
and reviewed his presentence report. Beardsley replied that he had received the
PSR weeks before but admitted that it had been “sitting on [his] table” and he had
not read it. App’x at 387. When the court subsequently inquired as to whether he
had any objections to the PSR, Beardsley answered, “I have no clue what I’m
3 objecting to or looking for.” Id. at 390. Nevertheless, Beardsley made clear that he
wanted “no more postponements” to his sentencing and that he was ready to
proceed. Id. at 388–89.
After that, the district court calculated the applicable Sentencing Guidelines
range – which it found to be life imprisonment – and then discussed the objectives
of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court also heard from a family
member of the individual to whom Beardsley had sold a lethal dose of fentanyl,
and then from the government and from Beardsley, who apologized to the family
representative and to everyone else he had harmed by selling drugs. Beardsley
acknowledged that he was likely to receive a sentence of “25 years,” before again
apologizing. Id. at 405. The district court then sentenced Beardsley to a term of
imprisonment of 300 months (i.e., twenty-five years), followed by five years’
supervised release.
II. Discussion
Beardsley contends that the district court erred when it sentenced him after
he told the court that he had not read his PSR. He argues that such a sentence
violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), which requires that a
sentencing court “must verify that the defendant . . . ha[s] read . . . the presentence
report and any addendum to the report” before sentencing. We disagree.
4 While we generally review sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard, questions of law are reviewed de novo, United States v.
Ojeda, 946 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 2020), including interpretations of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States v. Bradley, 105 F.4th 26, 33 (2d Cir. 2024).
A sentencing court fails to comply with Rule 32 when it does not “verify” whether
the defendant and his counsel have read and discussed the PSR. United States v.
Gates, 84 F.4th 496, 506 (2d Cir. 2023). The Rule is thus calculated to ensure that a
defendant’s attorney discusses the contents of the report with him. Id.
(emphasizing Rule 32’s discussion requirement).
Here, of course, Beardsley did not have an attorney, since he had previously
chosen to represent himself for purposes of sentencing. So the district court asked
Beardsley himself whether he had read his PSR. Indeed, unlike the sentencing
court in Gates, which “ignored the government’s respectful suggestion that the
court inquire as to whether Gates and her counsel had read and discussed the
PSR,” id., the court here questioned Beardsley multiple times as to whether he had
read his presentence report, App’x at 386 (“[H]ave you received that report and
had a chance to study it?”; “Have you read this February 3, 2025, presentence
report, Mr. Beardsley?”). This case presents an altogether different challenge than
5 the one presented in Gates – namely, what is a district court to do with a pro se
defendant who has been given ample opportunity to read his PSR but refuses to
do so? Short of reading the PSR aloud in open court, it is difficult to imagine how
a district court can go about “verify[ing]” that such a defendant has “read . . . the
presentence report and any addendum to the report” before sentencing. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A).
Fortunately, we need not ponder this question for long, since even if it could
be argued that the district court failed to “verify” that Beardsley read his PSR
before sentencing, Beardsley “cannot complain of an [alleged] error that he himself
invited.” United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284, 290 (2d Cir. 2005). By
simultaneously refusing to read his PSR while affirmatively indicating that he
“[did]n’t want [any] more postponements” on the day of sentencing, App’x at 388–
89, Beardsley engineered the very crisis that he now asks us to repair. Our caselaw
is clear that we will not “provide relief on the basis of procedural errors that a
defendant himself invited or provoked the district court to commit.” United
States v. Bastian, 770 F.3d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 2014). Such is the case here.
6 * * *
We have considered Beardsley’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court