United States v. Beadenkopf Co.

8 Ct. Cust. 283, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 10
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 8, 1918
DocketNo. 1840; No. 1841; No. 1842
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 8 Ct. Cust. 283 (United States v. Beadenkopf Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Beadenkopf Co., 8 Ct. Cust. 283, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 10 (ccpa 1918).

Opinion

Barber, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In G. A. 7878 (T. D. 36271), In re the protests of Wm. Beadenkopf Co. against an assessment by the collector of customs at the port of Philadelphia the Board of General Appraisers rendered an opinion relating to the'hair on certain skins therein referred to as “Cape Angora goatskins.”

No duty had been taken on the skins, but the growth thereon had been assessed at the rate of 15 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 305 of the tariff act of Í913.

■ In substance the board held that said paragraph 305, which reads “hair of the Angora goat,- alpaca, and other like animals, and all hair on the skin of such animals, 15 per centum ad valorem,” was not applicable to thy hair on the skins in that case. It appeared to the satisfaction of the board that while the hair showed traces of Angora goat hair, it was not in fact such within the paragraph; that it could not be used for any of the purposes for which such hair was ordinarily used;' that the skins were imported not for the growth upon them but to use the pelts in making leather; and that whatever part the hair thereon played in the business of the importers, it was incidental to the leather use of the skins. The protests claiming free entry under paragraphs 603, 604, or 650 of the act, were sustained. No appeal was taken by the Government.

Prior to the act of 1913 Angora goat hair, imported separately from the skins upon which it grew, .had been classified under the provision for wool in schedule K, while such skins with the hair on had generally been given free entry under other statutes then in force, and the board in view of the facts found by it was of opinion that Congress had not intended by the act of 1913 to change the long-continued custom of’ allowing free entry to such skins with hair on.

We understand that Wm. Beadenkopf Co., appellee here, was the importer in the above case. This may be hereinafter referred to as the “first Beadenkopf case.”

The protests now under consideration cover several entries and involve assessments made in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. [285]*285Those made in the name of W. N. Proctor 'Co. are really on behalf of Stone, Timlow & Co. (Inc.), the former being customs brokers for the latter. There were various hearings by the board at the three .places of importation and such proceedings had that the record in the first Beadenkopf case was incorporated in the record of one or more of the other cases, all were consolidated in one record, determined by the board in one opinion and come here as one appeal.

' In the cases before us the Board of General Appraisers, adhéring to its view expressed in the first Beadenkopf base, sustained all the protests. ■ Among other things, after quoting from its opinion in the first Beadenkopf case, it said:

It can not be said from the combined record now before us, as in the case cited, that the witnesses are agreed that the growth on the skins in question, “while it may ihow traces of Angora goat hair, is not in fact such hair and can not be used for any of the purposes for which such hair is ordinarily used,” for the Government has succeeded in producing-proof, which, if standing alone uncontradicted or unexplained, might lead to the conclusion that the growth on the skins in question when removed might be used for some of the purposes for which the true Angora hair is used. There is one point, however, upon which all the witnesses in the case at bar are agreed, namely, that the skins in issue are of the Cape Angora goat, .and that the animals from which such skins came were crosses between the Asiatic Angora goat and the Gape Colony common goat. Effort was made by the Government to establish by the testimony of some of the witnesses that there was a marked difference in the growth upon the skins covered by the Beadenkopf protests and those covered by the Stone, Timlow & Co. protests, and that the growth on the latter was much superior and of greater value than the other. Whether or not it may be said that the Government succeeded in establishing that the growth on the skins of Stone, Timlow & Co. was superior to that on the skins of Beadenkopf & Go. we do not think material, since it is quite clear that it is not established that the hah on any of the skins covered by the protests is the hah of the Angora goat. „
* * * * * * *'
As we pointed out in G. A. 7878, supra, the practice had been long continued of admitting such skins as these to free entry and we do not believe it was the intention of Congress in framing paragraph 305 to include the skins of degenerate Cape Angora goats.

■ It would seem from this quoted part of the board's opinion that inasmuch as the skins bearing the hair in issue were those of the Cape Angora goat and not the Asiatic, and as such goats were crosses between the Asiatic Angora goat and the common goat of Cape Colony, it was the board’s conclusion that the hair would not fall under paragraph 305, notwithstanding it appeared that such hair might be used for some of the purposes for which true angora goat hair was employed.

We are not able to give unqualified assent to this proposition.

The importers here claim, as they did in the first Beadenkopf case, that these skins as entireties are entitled to free entry under paragraphs 603, 604, or 650 of the act of 1913.

A review of preceding tariff acts, especially in connection with the hearings before the committee having charge of the preparation of the [286]*286present act considered in the light of what is known upon the subject of the Angora goat industry in this country, demonstrates that in the act of 1913 Congress undertook for the first time in many years to distinguish between hair of the Angora goat and other like animals on the one hand and the wool or hair of the sheep or other like animals on the other. The same intent as to the manufactures of the two products is equally apparent, for in addition to the provisions of paragraph 305, it provided in those immediately following for various named manufactures of the hair of the Angora goat, alpaca, and other like animals, and in paragraph 308 for “all manufactures of every description made by any process” wholly or in chief value of such hair.

A like intent is manifested, and indeed emphasized, by the change made in paragraph 395 of the act of 1909 as reenacted in paragraph 304 of the act of 1913. ' In the former it was declared that the word “wool” when used in connection with manufactured articles should include the “wool or hair of the sheep, camel, goat, alpaca, or other animal,” while in the latter the provision is for “wool or hair of the sheep, camel, or other like animals.”

The view that the provision for hair of other like animals in paragraph 305 refers to the growth on their skins rather than to their physical characteristics has already been adopted by this court. Crimmins & Pierce et al. v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 137; T. D. 35392); Bloomingdale Bros. v. United States (8 Ct. Cust. Appls., 104; T. D. 37221).

In view of the radical change in the statute, we do not think the earlier decisions granting, or administrative practice allowing, free entry to Angora goatskins with the hair on are controlling.

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8 Ct. Cust. 283, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-beadenkopf-co-ccpa-1918.