Crimmins v. United States

6 Ct. Cust. 137, 1915 WL 20728, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 59
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 3, 1915
DocketNo. 1488; No. 1514
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 6 Ct. Cust. 137 (Crimmins v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crimmins v. United States, 6 Ct. Cust. 137, 1915 WL 20728, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 59 (ccpa 1915).

Opinion

De Vries, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court;

Two appeals from two decisions of the Board of General Appraisers. In United States v. A. H. Ringk & Co. the merchandise was returned [138]*138as consisting of “short pieces of mohair waste from slivers and are picked and carded again for further use.” In Crimmins & Pierce et al. v. United States the merchandise was returned as “mohair noils.” In each case they were assessed by the collector for duty as “waste not specially provided for” under the provisions of paragraph 384 of the tariff act of 1913, reading—

384. Waste, not specially provided for in this section, 10 per centum ad valorem.

They are claimed by the importers to be entitled to free entry under the provisions of paragraph 651, which reads:

651. Wool wastes: All noils, top waste, card waste, slubbing waste, roving waste, ring waste, yarn waste, bur waste, thread waste, garnetted waste, shoddies, mungo, flocks, wool extract, carbonized wool, carbonized noils, and all other wastes not specially provided for in this section. This paragraph shall be effective on and after the first day of December, nineteen hundred and thirteen, until which time the rates of duty now provided- by Schedule K of the existing law shall remain in full force and effect.

In Crimmins & Pierce et al. v. United States the Board of General Appraisers overruled the protest upon the ground that the record disclosed nothing that would warrant a disturbance of the collector’s action, which was presumptively correct. There were, however, before the board samples of the merchandise and the return of the appraiser, leaving no doubt as to their character being that of mohair noils and which, in our view of the case, are sufficient to raise the legal issues here submitted for decision.

In United States v. A. H. Ringk & Co. the Board of General Appraisers sustained the protest.

In the former case the importers are the appellants, in the latter the Government. The legal considerations appertaining to each are the same, and the controlling question is, whether or not, as used in the tariff act of 1913, mohair or the hair of the angora goat is a wool?

An initial question arises as to whether or not wool noils are a waste. It would seem that the statute (par. 651) concludes this question. It opens with the words “wool wastes,” predicated of which the wool wastes are enumerated, the first included being that: of “all noils” and the last “all other wastes not specially provided for in this section.” It seems to us that the enumerations are all predicated of the words “wool waste,” and that all the enumerations within the paragraph in order to' be included therewithin must be deemed first, wool, and, second, wastes.

An essentially similar case arose in Hormann, Schutte & Co. v. United States (153 Fed., 868). In that case paragraph 414 of the tariff act of 1897 began with a provision for buttons, parts of buttons, button molds, and blanks, the provision being followed by a colon. Thereupon appeared an enumeration of various kinds of buttons with [139]*139different rates of duty attached. Notwithstanding the fact that in the last part of the paragraph the word “buttons” alone was used, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that each of the classes in the last part of the paragraph, by virtue of the terms with which the paragraph began, must be considered as covering not only buttons, but all parts of buttons, button molds, and blanks.

The case here is a much stronger one, for it reads into the paragraph no words, but confines itself to the language employed by Congress and gives effect to the title words of the paragraph in their natural, grammatical, and logical sense. This relation of words in the statute in our opinion concludes the question of whether or not wool noils are to be considered wool waste. This seems too plain for discussion. Likewise, this consideration makes the difference between the wool waste in one case and the wool noils in the other unimportant.

The more seriously controverted question in the case is whether or not. the hair of the angora goat is a “wool” within the meaning and as used in the tariff act of 1913. Preliminarily, the mind becomes in ajmóre receptive condition in reaching a conclusion in the affirmative by bearing in mind the fact that all wool is in fact hair and so defined by all lexicographic authorities. The difference between the two is the condition of the fiber, as will hereinafter be shown by quoted and uniformly accepted definitions. There is no claim here of commercial designation, and we are therefore left to the ordinary meaning of the term.

There has been much said in the briefs of the legislative classifications made of the hair of the alpaca goat and much as to the departmental and judicial construction put upon the terms. While this field of investigation and source of light available to the court is fruitful and we think would conduce to the same conclusion herein reached, in view of the uniform trend of the lexicographic authorities, aside from the other phases of the case herein discussed by the court we deem an extended review of the legislative classifications and the departmental and judicial constructions placed upon the term an unnecessary extension of this opinion. The lexicographers thus declare the ordinary understanding upon the subject:

Webster’s Dictionary:

Mohair. — The long, silky hair or wool of the Angora goat, * * *.
Wool. — 1. That soft, curled, or crisped species of hair which grows on sheep and some other animals, * * *.

Worcester’s Dictionary:

Mohair. — 1. The soft, fine hair or wool of the Angora goat, of which camlets and • other costly stuffs are made. * * *
Wool. — 1. The soft hair or fleecy covering of sheep, goats, and some -other animals. * * *

[140]*140Standard Dictionary, Twentieth Century Edition:

Mohair. — 1. The hair of the Angora goat of Asia Minor. * * *
Wool. — 1. The soft and more or less long, curly, or crisped hair obtained from sheep and some allied animals, and used chiefly in the manufacture of clothing. * * Among commercial wools of importance are those obtained from the alpaca * * • *, the llama, the Angora goat, the camel, and from the Oashmere goat of the Himalayas. * * *

The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia:

Mohair. — 1. The hair of the Angora goat, a native of Asia Minor. — 2. * * *; also, an imitation of the real mohair made of wool and cotton, much used for women’s dress.
Wool. — The fine, soft, curly hair which forms the fleece or fleecy coat of the sheep and some other animals, as the goat and alpaca, in fineness approaching fur. * * * 4. — * -x- * Angora wool, the wool of the Angora goat. * * *

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition:

Mohair.

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6 Ct. Cust. 137, 1915 WL 20728, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crimmins-v-united-states-ccpa-1915.