United States v. Bd. of Public Instru. of St. Lucie County

977 F. Supp. 1202, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14268, 1997 WL 586740
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 10, 1997
Docket70-1017-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 977 F. Supp. 1202 (United States v. Bd. of Public Instru. of St. Lucie County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Bd. of Public Instru. of St. Lucie County, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14268, 1997 WL 586740 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

Opinion

FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ATKINS, Senior District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court following a public hearing at the Fort Pierce Federal Courthouse, Room 106, 300 South 6th Street, Fort Pierce, Florida on August 15, 1997 at 10:30 a.m., to consider whether to grant the Motion of the Defendant School District (“The District”) of St. Lucie County, Florida for Unitary Status (“Unitary Status Motion”). Pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court makes the findings of fact and conclusions of law which shall support the judgment, to be issued forthwith.

I. INTRODUCTION

27 years ago, in September 1970, under the imprimatur of Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), this Court found that Defendant Board of Education for St. Lucie County (“The District”) was operating a dual, segregated school system. This finding immediately imposed on the District the affirmative duty to take all necessary steps to remedy the violation by eliminating all vestiges of segregation in its schools. See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693-94, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). Under guiding Supreme Court principles, the District was ordered to adopt a plan that “promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.” Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694.

Since 1970, the District and Plaintiff United States, along with the cooperation and aid of the Plaintiff Intervenors, have submitted various plans with the aim of creating a unitary system. To this end, the matter now before the Court is the above motion. In the Motion, the District asks the Court to “grant the District’s motion for unitary status, relinquish oversight of this matter, and dismiss these proceedings with prejudice ...,” and:

(1) to declare that the District has met its burden of showing that it has (a) complied with the desegregation decree for a rea *1205 sonable period of time, and has (b) eliminated the vestiges of past segregation in the District to the extent practicable, and to release the District from court supervision in this matter....

Unitary Status Motion at 1, 3 (2/20/96).

As above recited, the School District asks the Court to declare it unitary, and thereby to relinquish the continuing jurisdiction and oversight this Court has exercised the previous 27 years.

As directed by the most recent teachings of the Supreme Court, the issue before the Court is whether the efforts of the District have, “to the extent practicable,” eliminated the vestiges of the past dual and segregated school system. Further, as fully expressed by many members of the public at the hearing held on August 15, 1997, a corollary issue is whether the district “can be trusted” not to return to its segregated past.

To resolve these seminal issues, a vast evidentiary record, including live testimony from various expert and fact witnesses, the reports of various experts, testimony from concerned residents of St. Lucie County, the entire file in this ease, as well as a filed Joint Stipulation (as joined by all counsel in this cause), and all other evidence adduced for and against the motion have been considered by the Court.

The Court also appointed as an expert witness, Dr. Gordon Foster, former director of the Southeastern Desegregation Assistance Center at Miami, Florida. Dr. Foster filed a Preliminary and Supplementary report, described as “Analysis Assessing the Unitary Compliance of the St. Lucie County School District.”

II. APPROVAL OF THE STIPULATION

As to the Joint Stipulation, the Court is presented with a case in which all parties agree the Motion for Unitary Status should be granted. In reviewing the Motion and Joint Stipulation, the Court is mindful of the general principles that govern the acceptance or rejection of “consent orders,” in c^ses like these.

Accordingly, the Court, with the full and active support of the parties, adopted a policy of review pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e). Recognizing this action is not class-certified, the Court nevertheless felt it appropriate to hold a hearing so that interested members of the community might come forward and be heard on the subject whether to grant or deny the District’s motion.

To this end, a Notice of Fairness Hearing was scheduled for August 15, 1997 at 10:30 a.m. at the Federal Courthouse, Room 106, 300 South 6th Street in Fort Pierce, Florida. Notices were published in the Florida Courier and The Tribune (both local papers) for five consecutive weeks preceding the hearing. As well, notices of the fairness hearing were posted at various official locations and copies of the Joint Stipulation were available for review. The hearing received extensive coverage in the community, and the turnout at the hearing was substantially larger than even the Courthouse could hold.

Although the proposed Joint Stipulation is not a settlement, per se, the Court has examined the document in the same way it would examine any proposed consent decree or settlement in a class action. To determine whether to approve the Stipulation, and thereby adopt the stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law as the Court’s own, the Court has considered factors relevant to cases involving class actions:

1. The likelihood Plaintiff or Plaintiff Intervenors would succeed at trial if they opposed the motion;

2. The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation, and the stage of proceedings and amount of discovery completed;

3. The judgment of experienced trial counsel who have evaluated the strength of the ease; and

4. Any objections raised by the public.

Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d 734 (1976).

In examining the Joint Stipulation, the Court was careful to determine that it was executed by all parties at “arm’s length” and without collusion or other improper motive. The Court finds the Joint Stipulation was *1206 not reached as a result of these impermissible motives.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has considered whether adoption of the stipulation would be in the public interest. In considering this element, the Court must always be careful of the extent of its jurisdiction in a case such as here as set out by the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit.

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Related

Raines v. State of Fla.
987 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. Florida, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
977 F. Supp. 1202, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14268, 1997 WL 586740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bd-of-public-instru-of-st-lucie-county-flsd-1997.