United States v. Barrett

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 24-3546
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3546 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:22-cr-00213-JAM-BAM-1 v. MEMORANDUM*

CHARLES BARRETT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 20, 2025 San Jose, California

Before: SCHROEDER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER, District Judge.**

Charles Barrett appeals his jury conviction and sentence for two counts of

aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) and one count of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b). He was sentenced to

life imprisonment. We affirm.

1. Barrett’s challenges are principally evidentiary. He first contends that the

district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence from three different

witnesses of uncharged sexual assaults. Specifically, Barrett argues there was a

lack of similarity between the prior acts and the charged conduct with respect to

the victim, K.G. Subject to the limitations of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a

party may admit evidence of sexual assault under Rule 413 to prove that the

defendant has the propensity to commit another sexual assault. See United States

v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2010).

The district court carefully considered the applicable factors outlined in our

decision in United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). The

record supports the district court’s determination that the prior uncharged

allegations were sufficiently similar to K.G.’s testimony as to the charged conduct.

Because the remaining LeMay factors also weigh in favor of admissibility, the

district court did not abuse its discretion and appropriately admitted the evidence

under Rules 413 and 403.

2. Barrett also contends that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting evidence of uncharged witness intimidation and threats, asserting that

such evidence was unduly prejudicial. However, Barrett failed to demonstrate that

2 24-3546 admission of this evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative.

There was no abuse of discretion under Rule 403.

3. Barrett next argues that because three of his prior convictions were

sustained after the instant offense, the district court erred when it assigned criminal

history points for them. At sentencing, the district court included in Barrett’s

criminal history calculation several convictions that occurred after the commission

of the charged offenses, but before he was sentenced in this case. Because Barrett

was already sentenced for all three prior convictions, all three fall squarely within

the meaning of “prior sentence” as defined by the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.1 (“A sentence imposed after the defendant’s commencement of the

instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if

it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense.”).

4. Barrett objects to the district court’s imposition of a sentencing

enhancement for obstruction of justice, stressing that he merely discussed

fabricating evidence. But the fabrication need not have actually occurred for the

conduct to constitute a direct or indirect attempt to obstruct justice. See United

States v. Hong, 938 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019); see also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

cmt. n.4(A).

5. Barrett’s final contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support a

conviction on count two because he was intoxicated that day, so he lacked capacity

3 24-3546 to form the requisite intent to commit the offense. Barrett brought no motion under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, but even if he had, the evidence was

sufficient to convict him of abusive sexual contact. K.G. testified that Barrett

engaged in several actions requiring thought and awareness. Ultimately, whether

K.G.’s testimony was believable was a question for the jury to determine, and “[i]t

is well established that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Katakis, 800 F.3d 1017, 1028

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 783 (8th Cir.

1976)).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-3546