United States v. Barbara Kay Mullins

638 F.2d 1151, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 1119
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 4, 1981
Docket80-1723
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 638 F.2d 1151 (United States v. Barbara Kay Mullins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Barbara Kay Mullins, 638 F.2d 1151, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 1119 (8th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Barbara Kay Mullins appeals from the district court’s 1 judgment sentencing her to a six-year term of imprisonment and a four-year special parole term after a jury convicted her of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (heroin). Appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting real evidence (a heroin sample) without proper authentication under Fed.R.Evid. 901. We affirm.

Appellant argues in this court that the chain of custody of the heroin sample was not established because of various discrepancies and omissions in the testimony and records relating to the handling of the sample. For example, appellant urges that the *1152 weight of the sample varied as measured by various government officials at different times, that the government failed to identify adequately who possessed the sample at various times after police obtained it, and that the sample was not well enough identified by marks on its container or by notes or records of those who handled it. Of course, these matters are within the discretion of the district court and our review is limited to whether that discretion has been abused. United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find it amply supportive of the district court’s decision to admit the evidence in question. While the evidence may have raised questions about the handling of the sample, it did not suggest any real basis for establishing the sample to be different from the one taken from the package sent to appellant. There was direct testimony that steps were taken to prevent misidentification of the sample, and the necessary inference from the evidence is some sloppiness in measurement or recording of the sample, not that different samples were confused. Therefore, we have no reason to disturb the district court’s ruling. Further discussion would have little precedential value.

Affirmed. See 8th CIR. R. 14.

1

. The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Frederick Douglas
964 F.2d 738 (Eighth Circuit, 1992)
El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Carrasquillo Morales
123 P.R. Dec. 690 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1989)
Martin v. State
554 A.2d 429 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1989)
United States v. Dewey Sylvester Rans
851 F.2d 1111 (Eighth Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Edmundo Howard-Arias
679 F.2d 363 (Fourth Circuit, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
638 F.2d 1151, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 1119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-barbara-kay-mullins-ca8-1981.