United States v. Avalos

150 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167658, 2015 WL 8900836
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedDecember 15, 2015
DocketCASE NO. 14CR0560-LAB
StatusPublished

This text of 150 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (United States v. Avalos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Avalos, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167658, 2015 WL 8900836 (S.D. Cal. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c))

Honorable Larry Alan Burns, United States District Judge

Victor Hugo Avalos has filed a motion to reduce his 60-month sentence for import[1198]*1198ing methamphetamine into the United States, and government prosecutors support the motion. Although a federal sentence ordinarily can’t be changed after a judge imposes it, there is an exception. With the acquiescence of Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission is empowered to lower the sentencing ranges for offenses and apply the changes retroactively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). That’s what happened here. In November 2014, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782, which lowered the sentencing ranges under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “USSG”) by 2 levels for most drug' offenses. In a companion amendment— Amendment 782 — the Commission declared that the lowered ranges would be applied retroactively. Avalos was sentenced on October 6, 2014, before ■ the changes went into effect, so he can potentially benefit from them.

When the Sentencing Commission chooses to retroactively reduce the applicable range for a sentence, Congress has directed that “it shall specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(u). The Commission is required to make the rules clear via binding policy statements. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). The relevant policy statement for this change is found in § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines. That section explains who is eligible for a sentence reduction, and how the reduction must be calculated. District courts must follow applicable policy statements, Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821, 130 S.Ct 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010), and the instructions are central to the issue here — whether Avalos is eligible for a sentence reduction.

Under § 1B1.10(b)(1), the court must first determine the “amended Guidelines range’” that would have applied to the defendant if the retroactive changes were in effect at the time the defendant was initially sentenced.- 'At first blush, this seems like a simple task that can be accomplished by simply lowering the original Guidelines calculations by 2 levels to reflect the retroactive change. But it’s not so simple. The Commission has provided detailed policy guidance on how courts are to calculate the retroactively-amended sentencing range. To begin with, the Commission has directed that only the amended Guideline range — ie., the reduced starting Base Offense Level — may be substituted in place of the original higher level, while “all other Guideline application decisions” must be left unaffected. § 1B1.10(b)(1). What is meant by “all other Guidelines application decisions” are to be left unaffected? Should the court, for example, include departures and variances that were granted originally when determining a defendant’s amended Guidelines range? Or should the court calculate the amended Guideline range in the same manner as it did the original Guideline range, leaving discretionary decisions to depart or vary out of the range calculations? The answer is critical here because' when this court originally sentenced Avalos, it granted two departures. that substantially decreased his sentence from the Guidelines range — one for Substantial Assistance under § 5K1.1 and one for Fast Track under § 5K3.1, plus a 3-month variance. .

The Commentary to § 1B1.10 seemingly supplies the answer. It says that the Commission has determined that the amended Guideline range is to be determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” See USSG § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(A) (2011) (italics supplied); Unit[1199]*1199ed States v. Pleasant, 704 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir.2013) (adjusted Guideline range is derived “pre-departure and pre-variance.”). . While the Commentary admits of no exceptions to this prohibition, the text of § 1B1.10 nonetheless contains one. Under the heading “Limitation .and Prohibition on Extent of Reduction” in § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), which specifies that no changes should be made to the original Guidelines range except for the retroactive reduction to the base offense level, the very next subsection — § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)— declares “Exception for Substantial Assistance.” As advertised, subsection (b)(2)(B) creates ah exception to the general prohibition on including departures in the amended Guidelines calculation. It provides that if the court originally departed below the Guidelines sentencing range for substantial assistance, then a comparable adjustment to the amended Guideline range “may be appropriate.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that this provision authorizes a single exception for including and counting departures when determining the amended Guidelines range — for substantial assistance departures. See United States v. Davis, 739 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.2014) (Sentencing Commission sought to avoid complexity and litigation, promote uniformity in sentencing, and avoid possibility of a -windfall by restricting consideration of departures or variances except for Substantial Assistance); United States v. Tercero, 734 F.3d 979, 981-82 and n. 1 (9th Cir.2013) (noting that while former version of § 1B1.10 permitted reduction below amended Guidelines range in proportion to departures imposed originally, current version “carves out” a single exception for Substantial Assistance departures). Other circuits agree. See United States v. Hogan, 722 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir.2013); United States v. Erskine, 717 F.3d 131, 137 n. 6 (2d Cir.2013); United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir.2013); United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 518-19 (3d Cir.2012); United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585, 589 (8th Cir.2012).

Avalos argues that these cases misconstrue § 1B1.10 by mixing up “eligibility” for a sentence reduction with “authority” to grant one. The gist of his argument is that a defendant is eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c) if an amendment to the Guidelines has the effect of lowering his “applicable Guidelines range,” which Ava-los . maintains is the original Guidelines sentencing range, sans any departure or variance.

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Related

Dillon v. United States
560 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court, 2010)
United States v. Tadio
663 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Leo Anderson
686 F.3d 585 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Denroy Gayle
694 F.3d 514 (Third Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Robert Pleasant
704 F.3d 808 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Christina Elizabeth Colon
707 F.3d 1255 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Johnson
717 F.3d 131 (Second Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Hogan
722 F.3d 55 (First Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Teniah Tercero
734 F.3d 979 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Edmund Davis, Jr.
739 F.3d 1222 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Mayra Aragon-Rodriguez
624 F. App'x 542 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
150 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167658, 2015 WL 8900836, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-avalos-casd-2015.