United States v. Ausencio Martinez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2026
• Docket: 24-1890
• Status: Published
• Author: Kirschdissents

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-1890 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

AUSENCIO MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 21-cr-20066-001 — Colin S. Bruce, Chief Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 3, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2026 ____________________

Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PRYOR, Circuit Judge. In the early morning hours of Octo- ber 7, 2021, Illinois State Police Trooper Anthony Muzzillo re- ceived a tip that a semitruck was hauling a large amount of narcotics north on Interstate 57. Muzzillo, a K9 handler, en- listed help from another K9 state trooper and they waited on the side of the highway for the truck to pass. Upon spotting the semitruck, Muzzillo pulled the vehicle over to conduct an administrative inspection pursuant to Illinois’s commercial 2 No. 24-1890

trucking regulatory scheme. As the stop unfolded, Muzzillo eventually conducted a dog sniff, which resulted in a search and discovery of narcotics. The driver of the semitruck, Ausencio Martinez, was placed under arrest. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Martinez entered a con- ditional plea to possessing with intent to distribute five kilo- grams or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). On appeal, Martinez challenges the constitutionality of the traffic stop, arguing it was a pretextual administrative inspec- tion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Early in the morning of October 7, 2021, Illinois State Po- lice Trooper Anthony Muzzillo was called out to assist an- other (unspecified) law enforcement agency about a semi- truck transporting narcotics. Muzzillo, a K9 handler, was not on routine patrol that night, so he enlisted support from Trooper Krol, another K9 handler with the Illinois State Po- lice. Based on the law enforcement tip, the two K9 troopers staked out a spot on Interstate 57 for at least thirty minutes waiting for the semitruck. At 3:16 a.m., Muzzillo located Mar- tinez’s semitruck driving north on the interstate in Kankakee County, Illinois and pulled it over. Muzzillo testified that he decided to stop this particular semitruck because it was “pos- sibly carrying large-load narcotics.” The stated purpose of the stop was to conduct a Level 3 administrative inspection, which entailed checking Martinez’s driver’s license, the No. 24-1890 3

truck’s logbooks, insurance documents, and registration doc- uments. When approaching the truck, Muzzillo noticed an “over- whelming odor of air freshener,” which he understood to be commonly used to mask odor from narcotics. He asked Mar- tinez to follow him to his squad car for questioning while he reviewed Martinez’s documents. As they spoke in the squad car, Muzzillo perceived Martinez as being “extremely nerv- ous,” having “dry mouth,” and breathing “heav[ily].” From the logbooks, Muzzillo learned that Martinez took a 300- to 400-mile detour from his delivery route. Martinez ex- plained that his company had rerouted him but then decided against the new route. Muzzillo also noticed that the semi- truck’s bill of lading indicated the load Martinez was hauling had been sealed previously, but that seal had since been re- moved; this created the risk that the shipment’s receiver would reject it. Finding these observations suspicious, Muz- zillo conducted an exterior dog sniff of Martinez’s semitruck. The K9 alerted Muzzillo to an area near the driver’s door. Muzzillo then communicated the alert to a member of the law enforcement agency that had provided the tip and who was also present at the stop. In response, law enforcement re- quested Muzzillo search Martinez’s semitruck based on the K9 alert. During the search, Muzzillo discovered a duffel bag filled with suspected narcotics. Muzzillo then handed the criminal investigation off to the originating law enforcement agency. B. Procedural Background A grand jury returned an indictment charging Martinez with possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or 4 No. 24-1890

more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Martinez moved to suppress the evidence derived from the warrantless search of his semitruck. Relevant here, he argued Muzzillo vi- olated his Fourth Amendment rights by using the Illinois ad- ministrative inspection statute as pretext to investigate al- leged criminal activity and by unreasonably prolonging the stop to conduct a dog sniff. In response to the suppression motion, the government argued that Muzzillo’s subjective in- tent was irrelevant to whether he lawfully stopped Martinez for an administrative inspection. The government also con- tended that Muzzillo had independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for a dog sniff. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the sup- pression motion. Muzzillo testified at the hearing. The court also admitted multiple explanatory exhibits and a video of the traffic stop. Following the hearing and after reviewing the parties’ post-hearing briefing, the district court denied Martinez’s suppression motion. It rejected Martinez’s contention that the stop’s constitutionality turned on Muzzillo’s subjective in- tent. The district court recognized that under City of Indianap- olis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–48 (2000), an administrative stop could be challenged on the basis that the administrative program itself was enacted with a pretextual programmatic purpose of aiding criminal investigations. But, the court rea- soned, Edmond and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983), barred defendants from contest- ing the constitutionality of that programmatic stop by chal- lenging the subjective intent of the individual officer who con- ducted the inspection. From this, the district court concluded the stop was justified at its inception because there was no No. 24-1890 5

dispute that Illinois law authorized Muzzillo to conduct an administrative inspection. The district court also rejected Martinez’s argument that the dog sniff unreasonably pro- longed the stop. Martinez conditionally pled guilty to possessing with in- tent to distribute cocaine, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced Martinez to 120 months’ imprisonment. Martinez now ap- peals. II. ANALYSIS Because a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of fact and law, we review factual determinations for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Avila, 106 F.4th 684, 692 (7th Cir. 2024). On appeal, Martinez maintains his contention that the traf- fic stop of his semitruck exceeded the constitutional bounds of an administrative inspection because it was mere pretext to conduct a criminal investigation, and thus the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 1 A. Purpose for the Stop The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their per- sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea- sonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-

1 Martinez also argues that even if the initial basis for the stop was lawful, Muzzillo unreasonably prolonged the stop by conducting a dog sniff with- out reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. But for the reasons ex- plained below, we need not reach this argument. 6 No. 24-1890

lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma- tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is “thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The essential purpose of the “reasonableness” stand- ard is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions” by law enforcement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be “justified at its in- ception.” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citation and quotation omitted); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (collecting cases “recogniz[ing] the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although ‘reasonable,’ do not rise to the level of probable cause”). Typically, assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “is predominantly an objective inquiry.” Ash- croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47). Under that usual assessment, where the objec- tively viewed circumstances justify the initial stop based on individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, the Su- preme Court instructs that action is reasonable “whatever the subjective intent” motivating the relevant officials. Id. (em- phasis in original) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 814). In this case, however, the government does not seek to jus- tify the initial stop of Martinez’s semitruck based on the ob- servation of a traffic violation or probable cause of criminal No. 24-1890 7

activity. Instead, the government argues Muzzillo’s actions were justified by Illinois’s commercial trucking regulatory scheme, which permits warrantless administrative inspec- tions by troopers for purposes of determining a truck’s com- pliance with these regulations. A warrantless administrative inspection does not per se vi- olate the Fourth Amendment. 2 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2015). The Supreme Court has explained that “in ‘closely regulated’ industries—namely, those which have long been subject to close supervision and inspection— the privacy interests of business owners may be so attenuated, and the government’s interest in regulating the particular in- dustry so strong, that a warrantless inspection of the commer- cial premises might be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1978)). In these industries, an individual’s “reasona- ble expectations of privacy are diminished because an indi- vidual who ‘embarks upon such a business … has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.’” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S.

2 The history of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does, how- ever, provide insight into why the Framers looked skeptically upon war- rantless searches and seizures. Indeed, “[i]t is familiar history that indis- criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adop- tion of the Fourth Amendment.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). “The Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance that granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (citation modified). 8 No. 24-1890

Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 893 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mar- shall, 436 U.S. at 313). Thus, “unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be rea- sonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commer- cial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amend- ment.” Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), and Colonnade Ca- tering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)). These regula- tory schemes can be permissible under the Fourth Amend- ment when the government’s regulation of that industry is “pervasive.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700–02 (1987). We have held that the commercial trucking industry is a per- vasively regulated industry. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, 840 F.3d at 893. The Fourth Amendment, though, still imposes constraints on warrantless inspections in pervasively regulated indus- tries, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 699–703, so these inspections “must still be reasonable,” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, 840 F.3d at 893 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). Importantly, an administrative inspection must not be used as pretext for gathering evidence of criminal activity. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 716– 17 n.27). An administrative inspection, unlike penal laws, serves a primary purpose distinguishable from a govern- ment’s general interest in crime control. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 420. Thus, in the context of warrantless administrative inspec- tions, an officer’s subjective intent may factor into whether the inspection was pretextual. Indeed, an officer’s “actual moti- vations” for conducting the inspection can invalidate the of- No. 24-1890 9

ficer’s otherwise objectively justifiable behavior. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)). Put differently, the administrative inspection context is one of two limited exceptions where the Supreme Court has recognized that officers’ “actual motivations” do matter. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 122). 3 That recognition takes root in decades of Supreme Court precedent. In Whren, for example, the Court explained that it has “never held, outside the context of inventory search or admin- istrative inspection … , that an officer’s motive invalidates ob- jectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.” 4 517 U.S. at 812 (emphasis added). The administrative inspec- tion case on which the Court relied for this proposition was

3 The other exception recognized by the Supreme Court is the “special needs” doctrine. “A judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where [a] search or seizure is justified by special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, such as the need to deter drug use in public schools, or the need to ensure that railroad employees engaged in train operations are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and where the search or seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant authorizing, for example, an inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause, or an inspection of residential premises to ensure compliance with a housing code.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified). 4 “An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and de- tained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 n.1 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)). In the inventory search context, courts assess whether officers followed “standardized procedures” and whether they “acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). 10 No. 24-1890

New York v. Burger. There, the Supreme Court developed a test to assess the “reasonableness” of warrantless administrative inspection schemes, and in that case, upheld an administra- tive scheme in New York regulating automobile junkyards. 5 Burger, 482 U.S. at 708. In doing so, the Court also evaluated pretext on two levels. Id. at 716–17 n.27. First, it concluded “the New York Legisla- ture had proper regulatory purposes for enacting the admin- istrative scheme and was not using it as a ‘pretext’ to enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations.” Id. At the second level, the Court evaluated whether the officers’ administrative inspection was “truly” made pursuant to the administrative scheme. The Supreme Court noted there was “no reason to believe that the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws. It is undisputed that the inspection was made solely pursuant to the administra- tive scheme.” Id. The throughline of these cases is the Supreme Court’s con- cern that administrative inspections will be used as a pretext to investigate criminal activity. Given that concern, it makes sense that courts can interrogate an individual officer’s pur- pose for undertaking a warrantless administrative inspection. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736–37.

5 Burger’s three-part test assesses: (1) whether a substantial government interest informs the regulatory scheme; (2) whether warrantless inspec- tions are necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) whether the scheme affords a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03. No. 24-1890 11

That conclusion finds further support in many of our sister circuits’ decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding, in a case posing nearly identical factual circumstances, that “it does not matter that the Nevada administrative scheme was valid on its face, where the objective evidence … establishes beyond doubt that this stop was a pretext for a stop to investigate information of suspected criminal activity short of that necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion”); Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1239, 1242–43 & n.19 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing Burger “rejected the idea that an administrative inspection may be used to gather evidence as part of what is, in reality, a criminal investiga- tion,” and noting officer’s testimony about his intent could be “evidence of illegal pretext” (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 691, 716 n.27)); United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1993) (an administrative inspection is a sham where it is “a pretext solely to gather evidence of criminal activity”); cf. United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2018) (Paez, J., concurring) (collecting cases from six circuits showing “a police officer’s subjective motive is relevant” in assessing an inventory search’s constitutionality). In short, when assessing the second level of the Burger pre- text inquiry, if there’s sufficient evidence that an officer’s pur- pose for undertaking the administrative inspection is not to “further the regulatory scheme,” but pretext for the sole pur- pose of investigating criminal activity, then the administra- tive inspection exception to the warrant requirement would not apply. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27 (citation modi- fied). 12 No. 24-1890

The government resists this conclusion, arguing that two Supreme Court cases foreclose an officer-level pretext in- quiry. The first is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Supreme Court held that the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program allowing police to stop cars without some measure of individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. 531 U.S. at 34, 48. Looking to the programmatic purpose, the Court concluded the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal activity without any indicia of individualized wrongdoing, which contravened the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 40–42. Distinguishing the unconstitutional narcotic-checkpoint program from the traffic stop in Whren, the Court explained that “an individual officer’s subjective intentions are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic stop that is justified objectively by probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 45 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). Turning back to the facts of the narcotics-checkpoint program, the Court then warned that inquiries into the purpose of these checkpoints should “be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.” Id. at 48 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). Then in Brigham City v. Stuart, the second case offered by the government, the Supreme Court built upon Edmond’s warning and held that an officer’s subjective intent is irrele- vant to determining whether the warrant requirement’s exi- gency exception applies. 547 U.S. at 404–05. In doing so, the Court drew a contrast with the programmatic inquiry ap- No. 24-1890 13

proved by Edmond, explaining that this inquiry also “has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the indi- vidual officer conducting the search.” Id. at 405 (citing Ed- mond, 531 U.S. at 44). In light of Edmond and Brigham City, the government, in essence, argues that where the Supreme Court has permitted “purpose” inquiries, that permission is limited to the “pro- grammatic” level and not the subjective intent of the officers. Relying on these two cases and extrapolating to the adminis- trative inspection context, the government contends Muz- zillo’s “subjective” motivation for conducting the administra- tive inspection is irrelevant. But that contention is misplaced. Edmond and Brigham City did not involve special-needs or ad- ministrative inspections, both of which are “limited excep- tions” to the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness inquiry. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified). Edmond was, at bottom, a checkpoint case divorced from policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. The Court found the narcotics-checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. Much of the Court’s reasoning contrasted Indianapolis’s drug-interdiction checkpoint with other fixed highway checkpoints with limited officer discretion previously approved by the Court. Id. at 40–44; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–64 (1976) (checkpoint to intercept undocumented immigrants); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–55 (1990) (checkpoint to combat drunk driving); see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (suggesting that the “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops” to check motorists’ driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations may be permissible). The Court in Edmond 14 No. 24-1890

clarified that its holding did “nothing to alter the constitutional status of the sobriety and border checkpoints that [it] approved in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, or the type of traffic checkpoint that [it] suggested would be lawful in Prouse.” 531 U.S. at 47. Beyond that, the Court in Edmond went to great lengths to emphasize the limited reach of its reasoning: Our holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like air- ports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute. Nor does our opinion speak to other intrusions aimed primarily at pur- poses beyond the general interest in crime control. Our holding also does not impair the ability of police officers to act appropriately upon infor- mation that they properly learn during a check- point stop justified by a lawful primary pur- pose, even where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to that purpose. Finally, we caution that the pur- pose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an in- vitation to probe the minds of individual offic- ers acting at the scene. Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added). As this shows, by its own terms Edmond was not a doctri- nal sea change. Indeed, because that case didn’t “speak to other intrusions aimed primarily at purposes beyond the gen- eral interest in crime control,” id. at 48, it disclaimed any in- No. 24-1890 15

tention to modify the Court’s previous administrative inspec- tion jurisprudence. And its admonition to conduct purpose inquiries at only the programmatic level was cabined to in- quiries “in this context”—i.e., in the context of assessing whether a vehicle checkpoint program’s drug trafficking pur- pose is distinguishable from general crime control. See id. Brigham City is even further afield from the administrative inspection context than criminal-checkpoint programs. In Brigham City, the Court was addressing the constitutional lim- its of the “exigent circumstances” warrant exception to the Fourth Amendment. In that case, the Supreme Court did not discuss or modify the “intent” inquiry of administrative in- spections. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. As the Court explains, in the context of exigent circumstances, the touchstone of the warrant exception to the Fourth Amendment is whether “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the war- rantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. (citation omit- ted). The Court also went on to explain that when the nature of the “exigent circumstances” is challenged, the inquiry is objective and “has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.” Id. at 405 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48). Brigham City doesn’t add anything new to the “pretext” detour of challenges to an ad- ministrative inspection. So, when put in proper context, Edmond and Brigham City do not prohibit individual officer-level pretext inquiries in the limited area of administrative inspections. Without more spe- cific guidance from the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely to us that those cases upended the Court’s prior precedent per- mitting those inquiries. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12; Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27. 16 No. 24-1890

Further support for that conclusion can be found in the Supreme Court’s decisions after Edmond and Brigham City. These decisions continue to demonstrate the enduring vitality of officer-level pretext inquiries in “limited” circumstances. For example, the Court in al-Kidd reiterated that the adminis- trative inspection context is an area where officers’ “actual motivations” do matter. 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified). And the Court has pressed that same point in subsequent cases. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Indeed, we have never held, outside limited contexts such as an ‘inven- tory search or administrative inspection … , that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, and then citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405)); Fernandez v. Califor- nia, 571 U.S. 292, 302 (2014) (quoting this passage from King). Put simply, we are not persuaded that Edmond or Brigham City—cases outside the administrative inspection context— modified the framework for assessing administrative inspec- tions in the way the government contends. The government also relies on United States v. Villamonte- Marquez, a case decided before Burger, for the proposition that an administrative inspection is not rendered unconstitutional simply because it is accompanied by some suspicion of wrongdoing. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. But such reliance fails to account for crucial differences in the scheme at issue in Villamonte-Marquez and the unique inter- ests at stake in the maritime context. In Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute permitting Customs of- ficers to board seafaring vessels located in waters with ready access to the open seas and review those vessels’ documenta- No. 24-1890 17

tion without a warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 580– 81. In answering this question, like its later analysis in Ed- mond, the Court assessed the “reasonableness” of the govern- ment’s intrusion by balancing the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the legitimate interests of the government. Id. at 588. Thus, to evaluate the statute’s consti- tutionality, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Cus- toms officers needed articulable suspicion to seize the vessel that is comparable to the suspicion required to stop automo- biles on the public highways near the border. Id. Relying on factual differences between those two contexts, the Supreme Court concluded the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness in- quiry demanded a different result. The Supreme Court started by evaluating the govern- ment’s interest in random maritime documentation checks. Id. at 589–91. The Court first observed the impracticality of establishing fixed checkpoints at various ports, explaining vessels coming from the open sea could evade those check- points and thereby reduce the government’s ability to ensure compliance with its documentation laws. Id. at 589–90. Next, the Supreme Court highlighted the difficulty of determining a vessel’s documentation compliance by merely examining its outward markings. Id. at 590. Then, the Supreme Court noted the panoply of complex statutes and regulations governing maritime documentation that served both public and govern- mental interests in numerous ways. Id. at 590–93. Some of these interests could be described as administrative, such as supporting the regulation of trades like “fishing, salvaging, towing, and dredging.” Id. at 591. But these documentation laws also served other law enforcement purposes, like pre- venting the entry of “controlled substances, illegal aliens, pro- hibited medicines, adulterated foods, dangerous chemicals, 18 No. 24-1890

prohibited agricultural products, diseased or prohibited ani- mals, and illegal weapons and explosives.” Id. In other words, these documentation laws furthered both administrative and criminal enforcement interests in the maritime context. Id. Recognizing the government’s “substantial” interests in random maritime documentation checks, the Supreme Court next examined this intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interest. Id. at 592–93. In assessing their reason- ableness, the Court observed these checks involved “only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public ar- eas of the vessel, and inspect documents,” resulting in a “lim- ited” interruption. Id. at 592. The Court concluded this consti- tuted only a modest intrusion. Id. Balancing this modest intrusion against the government’s “substantial” interests, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 593. From that, the Supreme Court concluded the Customs offi- cials’ suspicionless stopping and boarding of the vessel pur- suant to this federal statute was “reasonable” and not a viola- tion of the Fourth Amendment. Id. It’s against this backdrop that the Supreme Court consid- ered the defendants’ alternative argument in Villamonte- Marquez: the presence of state police and knowledge of a tip that a vessel in the shipping channel was carrying drugs un- dermined the Customs officers’ legal justification for board- ing the vessel. Id. at 584 n.3. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, reasoning there’s “little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). We have previously echoed similar rea- No. 24-1890 19

soning. See United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1166–67 (7th Cir. 1987). This is the portion of Villamonte-Marquez on which the government in this case relies. Such reliance, however, fails to account for the Supreme Court’s finding in Villamonte- Marquez that the maritime documentation law at issue there provided the legal justification for the Customs officials’ war- rantless boarding of the vessel. And that justification, the Court explained, found support both in civil and criminal law enforcement purposes. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 591. Here, the government failed to present evidence that the Illinois administrative inspection program at issue serves to support the state’s criminal investigatory interest. Indeed, there is no record support that this scheme was intended to support anything other than administrative, non-criminal in- terests. In this way, Villamonte-Marquez can be distinguished on the same basis as Edmond and Brigham City—the principles from those cases cannot be wrenched out of context and ap- plied to regulatory schemes justified by different Fourth Amendment interests and furthering only non-criminal regu- latory purposes. Rather, when the regulatory scheme at issue furthers only an administrative purpose, not a criminal inves- tigatory one, an administrative inspection undertaken solely to investigate criminal activity does not further that regula- tory scheme. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12 (“[T]he exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is ac- corded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or ad- ministrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes.”). 20 No. 24-1890

An allegation that an officer abused such a scheme in this manner is, by another name, attacking that administrative in- spection as pretextual. And given the risk of allowing admin- istrative inspections to become a pretext for crime control, it makes sense why Martinez has asked us to focus on that ques- tion here. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27 (assessing whether “the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws”); see also United States v. Knight, 306 F.3d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 2002) (recog- nizing the danger of allowing administrative inspections to become “pretexts for ‘crime control’” (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40)); Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1241 (“We share our sister circuits’ concern that the administrative search exception not be allowed to swallow whole the Fourth Amendment.” (cita- tion omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting Burger “did not endorse a scheme that would allow a warrantless search based on recently discov- ered evidence that criminal activity had occurred” (citation omitted)). We do not mean to say that pretext is irrelevant when an administrative scheme serves multiple goals. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 713–16 & n.27 (noting that inspection conducted pursuant to scheme serving administrative and penal ends was not pretextual). Instead, we merely observe that where an administrative scheme serves only non-criminal ends, an inspection under that scheme motivated only by the desire to find evidence of criminal activity is more obviously pre- textual. Applying these principles here, for the government to show Muzzillo’s traffic stop was justified in its inception un- der the administrative inspection exception to the warrant re- No. 24-1890 21

quirement, the government must demonstrate two things. See United States v. Dixon, 137 F.4th 592, 605 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting the government bears the burden of proving warrantless searches’ reasonableness). First, it must show that the State’s regulatory scheme is reasonable under Burger. And second, it must show that Muzzillo’s purpose for undertaking the ad- ministrative inspection was not “pretext.” If the government can prove both elements, then Muzzillo’s stop was justified in its inception. But if Muzzillo’s sole purpose for the traffic stop was to obtain evidence of Martinez’s involvement in criminal activity, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant exception for an administrative inspection would not apply. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27 (maintaining a pretextual administrative inspec- tion isn’t “truly” an administrative inspection). And because Muzzillo initiated the traffic stop without individualized sus- picion of wrongdoing, it would follow that the stop was un- reasonable and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1. Constitutionality of the Illinois Administrative Inspec- tion Statute The Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18b-100 et seq., regulates the operation of certain commercial vehicles, including semitrucks. This statute authorizes the Il- linois State Police “to stop and inspect any commercial motor vehicle or driver at any time for the purpose of determining compliance” with the administrative inspection statutory scheme and its implementing regulations. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18b-102(e); see also id. § 18b-101. The statute’s implementing regulations specify seven dif- ferent “levels” of “commercial vehicle inspections.” ILL. 22 No. 24-1890

ADMIN. CODE tit. 92 § 390.1020 (2016). 6 Each level allows for the administrative inspection of various items relating to the driver or her vehicle. Id. The levels vary in their intrusiveness. A Level 1 inspection, for example, calls for a review of the driver’s records and a full safety inspection of her truck. Id. A Level 3 inspection, by contrast, is less intrusive and entails checking the driver’s license, insurance and registration doc- uments, and the truck’s logbooks. Martinez does not attack the constitutionality of Illinois’s regulatory scheme permitting Illinois State Troopers to con- duct administrative inspections of commercial vehicles. We therefore accept, without deciding, that the Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law is reasonable under Burger. 2. Pretextual Administrative Inspection Martinez maintains, however, that the traffic stop of his semitruck was never a routine administrative inspection, ar- guing instead that Muzzillo undertook the stop as a criminal investigation into a tip that Martinez was transporting narcot- ics. This appeal is a challenge to whether the stop was justified in its inception as a true administrative inspection. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27. Martinez contends the troopers im- properly used Illinois’s motor vehicle regulatory scheme not for the dual purpose of conducting an administrative inspec- tion with knowledge of the tip, see Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3, but solely as pretext to investigate criminal activity, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27.

6 The most recent version of this regulation was recodified under a differ- ent section number. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92 § 3320.1020 (2025). No. 24-1890 23

As explained above, we are not asked to answer whether Illinois’s commercial trucking regulatory scheme permitted Muzzillo to conduct the Level 3 vehicle inspection. Instead, the question is whether the government exceeded this author- ity by utilizing this regulatory scheme to circumvent the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for criminal in- vestigations. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 420 (the administrative in- spection exception applies only “where the primary purpose of the searches is distinguishable from the general interest in crime control” (citation modified) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44)). Put another way, the legality of Muzzillo’s traffic stop of Martinez under the administrative inspection exception hinges on whether the stop was, in fact, pretextual. Whether an administrative inspection is pretext for a crim- inal investigation is a factual question. Johnson, 994 F.2d at 743 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 225–30 (1960)); see also Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1242 n.19. “We review the record as a whole to determine whether the district court’s apparent find- ing that the administrative search was not a pretext for a crim- inal investigation is supported by the evidence.” Johnson, 994 F.2d at 743. At the evidentiary hearing for the suppression motion, Muzzillo, a K9 handler, testified he was not on routine patrol the night of the stop. Instead, he was “called out to assist” an- other law enforcement agency with a tip that Martinez was hauling a large quantity of drugs in his semitruck. From there, Muzzillo enlisted support from Krol, another K9 trooper, and they waited for at least thirty minutes in the middle of the night in search of Martinez’s truck. Upon locating the vehicle around 3 a.m., Muzzillo initiated the administrative inspec- tion and conducted a dog sniff around the semitruck. After 24 No. 24-1890

the K9 alerted for drugs, a member of the law enforcement agency that provided the tip asked Muzzillo to search Mar- tinez’s semitruck. The search yielded narcotics, and Muzzillo handed the criminal investigation off to that agency member. These circumstances, viewed in their totality, reveal a coordi- nated law enforcement operation: two K9 handlers called out for a middle-of-the-night stakeout to assist in investigating a narcotics tip at the behest of another law enforcement agency. Muzzillo’s testimony at the suppression hearing lends further support for that conclusion. Muzzillo testified that he stopped Martinez’s semitruck because he “had received information” from another law enforcement agency that the semitruck “was possibly carrying large-load narcotics.” Nothing in the record suggests Muzzillo would have been out on patrol—let alone have stopped Martinez—but for the other law enforcement agency’s tip. Taking the stop’s circumstances and Muzzillo’s admission together, the record shows that Muzzillo’s sole motivation for stopping Martinez was to further a criminal investigation, not Illinois’s regulatory scheme. Moreover, at no point has the government presented any evidence or testimony identifying the administrative purpose of the traffic stop. Both at the hearing and on appeal, the gov- ernment has yet to present any delineation between the crim- inal investigation and the alleged state regulatory inspection. It has also failed to mitigate the significance of a K9 officer, not on routine patrol, called in to assist with an administrative inspection before the crack of dawn. See Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1244 (“Although a statute authorizing administrative searches may be constitutional, actual searches conducted under that authority may not.”). Respectfully, the dissent does not grap- No. 24-1890 25

ple with the government’s failure to meet this burden. There has been no presentation by the government to establish that Muzzillo’s stop was not pretextual. In sum, the government has not met its burden of demon- strating that Muzzillo’s stop was justified in its inception. Dixon, 137 F.4th at 605. The record evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that Muzzillo used the authority granted by Illinois’s administrative inspection scheme solely as a tool to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require- ment and to further a criminal investigation. Put simply, Muzzillo engaged in a pretextual administrative inspection. The district court’s apparent finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Outland, 993 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2021) (assessing whether district court “neces- sarily or implicitly” made a factual determination when deny- ing suppression motion). And because the factual finding of pretext requires “the legal conclusion of unconstitutional unreasonableness,” Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1242 n.19, the drug evidence obtained as the fruit of Muzzillo’s stop must be suppressed unless an excep- tion to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies. B. Exclusionary Rule The government argues that even if Muzzillo’s pretextual administrative inspection violated Martinez’s Fourth Amend- ment rights, the evidence seized from the search that followed still should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. That’s because, the government contends, Muzzillo relied in good faith on Illinois’s administrative inspection scheme and on binding appellate precedent when he decided to initiate the stop. 26 No. 24-1890

Although the government raised this argument below, the district court did not address it. But because we review de novo the legal determination of whether the exclusionary rule applies, United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2024), we can make that determination ourselves on the rec- ord before us, see United States v. Reyna, 165 F.4th 1056, 1060, 1062–65 (7th Cir. 2026) (concluding parties’ briefing supplied adequate record to decide legal question not answered by dis- trict court); cf. Janiga v. Questar Cap. Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2010) (resolving whether contract existed between parties because we review that issue de novo and “the record contain[ed] enough information to permit a decision” on the issue). “The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands[.]” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). But to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty” of- fered by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (citations omitted). “A defendant may invoke the rule to prevent tainted evidence from being used against him at trial, but the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, and its application exacts a heavy toll on both the judi- cial system and society at large.” United States v. Felton, 159 F.4th 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). That’s why the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if suppres- sion’s deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. Davis, 564 U.S. at 237. The Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with United States v. Leon, has calibrated its “cost-benefit analysis No. 24-1890 27

in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry on the ‘flagrancy of the police misconduct’ at issue” under what’s known as the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 238 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, 911). “The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)). The “deterrence rationale loses much of its force,” and thus “exclusion cannot ‘pay its way,’” id. (citation modified) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6, 919), when, for example, “the police act with an objectively reasonable good- faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence,” id. (citation modi- fied) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, and Herring, 555 U.S. at 137). But “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to out- weigh the resulting costs.” Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144). Leon and its progeny demonstrate how “the exclusion- ary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. And as the Supreme Court has expanded the good faith exception to other contexts since Leon, those cases “have sounded a similar theme.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 239. For example, in Illinois v. Krull, the Court applied the good faith exception to warrantless administrative inspections conducted by offic- ers reasonably relying on legislative statutes later invalidated, reasoning that “legislators, like judicial officers, are not the fo- cus of the [exclusionary] rule.” 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987). And more recently in Davis, the Court applied the good faith ex- ception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on bind- ing appellate precedent that is later overturned, reasoning an 28 No. 24-1890

officer conducting such a search “does no more than act as a reasonable officer would and should act under the circum- stances.” 564 U.S. at 241 (citation modified). The government, relying on Krull, argues Muzzillo was entitled to rely on Illinois’s administrative scheme. The Su- preme Court applied the good faith exception in Krull because excluding evidence “obtained by an officer acting in objec- tively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little de- terrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reli- ance on a warrant.” 480 U.S. at 349. The primary purpose of the judicially developed exclusionary rule was always to de- ter future police misconduct, not penalize officers for a mag- istrate or legislature’s mistake. Id. at 350. Krull has little force here, where, as discussed above, Muzzillo undertook the ad- ministrative inspection as pretext for an ongoing drug inves- tigation. Put another way, the relevant actors here are not Il- linois legislators, but police officers like Muzzillo “who con- cededly are ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” Id. at 360 n.17 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 7 The government failed to sufficiently rebut the conclusion that Muzzillo initiated the traffic stop with the sole purpose of furthering a criminal investigation. Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 915 n.13 (observing officers’ good faith reliance must be tested ob-

7 This is also why the Court in Krull declined “to recognize an exception for an officer who erroneously, but in good faith, believes he is acting within the scope of a statute.” 480 U.S. at 360 n.17. The Court reasoned that such an exception “does not follow inexorably from” its holding in that case, as the inquiry required for such an exception would center on the action of officers, not legislators or magistrates. Id. No. 24-1890 29

jectively to adequately guard against police abuse of discre- tion). It could have offered numerous types of evidence to do this. For example, the government offered no evidence that this stretch of highway commonly presented safety concerns for semitrucks or other motorists. Nor did the government demonstrate that it was routine for law enforcement to use K9 officers to conduct middle-of-the-night administrative inspec- tions. To fit within Krull, the government had to demonstrate that suppression stood only to punish Muzzillo for the mis- take of legislators. It didn’t do so. Given that, the benefits of deterring future police misconduct under these circumstances remain strong. The government also argues that under Davis, Muzzillo was entitled to rely on binding appellate precedent. That ar- gument, however, stumbles out of the gate. Davis guards against punishing officers for following “binding appellate precedent [that] specifically authorizes a particular police practice” and that precedent is overturned after the fact. 564 U.S. at 241 (emphasis omitted). But Davis also observed that “[r]esponsible law enforcement officers will take care to learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.” Id. (citation modified). As detailed above, decades of Supreme Court precedent has required officers to undertake warrant- less administrative inspections in furtherance of the adminis- trative scheme, not as a pretext for criminal investigation. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736; Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12; Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27. That’s why Davis offers no safe harbor to the government here—the good faith exception does not shield officers from the consequences of ignoring longstanding, binding precedent. 30 No. 24-1890

Finally, the government argues that even if the exclusion- ary rule applies here, the proper remedy would be to remand for another hearing to flesh out testimony about the pre- textual nature of Muzzillo’s actions. But we decline the gov- ernment’s invitation. As discussed above, the record before us was adequate to determine that the district court clearly erred in its apparent finding that Muzzillo didn’t engage in a pre- textual administrative inspection. Compare United States v. Combs, 222 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 2000) (explicit finding that police read suspect his Miranda rights not required where such a finding was implicit in court’s order), with Outland, 993 F.3d at 1023 (remanding because district court made no determination about Miranda rights waiver). And to the ex- tent the record could have been more developed on this point, the government shoulders the blame for that lack of develop- ment. This is because it argued both in its suppression motion papers and at the suppression hearing that Muzzillo’s traffic stop was justified at its inception, regardless of whether Muz- zillo harbored a pretextual subjective intent. That this argu- ment was incorrect does not justify giving the government a second chance to contest Martinez’s suppression motion. Taken all together, the good faith exception to the exclu- sionary rule does not apply here. That means the evidence seized without a warrant due to Muzzillo’s unlawful pre- textual administrative inspection must be suppressed. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we REVERSE the denial of the suppres- sion motion and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. No. 24-1890 31

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I disagree with my col- leagues that the evidence seized by Trooper Anthony Muz- zillo should be suppressed. That Trooper Muzzillo followed a tip from another law enforcement agency does not make an otherwise objectively reasonable seizure pursuant to a valid administrative scheme unconstitutional. And because there are no other reasons to exclude the cocaine seized by Trooper Muzzillo, I respectfully dissent. I Illinois State Police Trooper Anthony Muzzillo received a tip from another law enforcement agency that a semitruck might be transporting a large quantity of narcotics, so he drove down the interstate to intercept the truck. At 3:16 am, he pulled the truck over to perform a Level III regulatory in- spection, also sometimes called a paper inspection, under 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18b-102(e). That statute allows officers to “stop and inspect any commercial motor vehicle or driver at any time for the purpose of determining compliance with” the regulatory scheme. Id. Inspections involve examining the driver’s commercial driver’s license, insurance and registra- tion documents, and logbooks, which record the vehicle’s path, drive time, and rest time. Trooper Muzzillo approached the cab, where he found Ausencio Martinez. Trooper Muzzillo immediately con- fronted what he described as the “overwhelming odor of air freshener.” He requested Martinez’s papers and that Mar- tinez join him in his squad car while he inspected them. Mar- tinez agreed. During the paper inspection, Trooper Muzzillo noticed anomalies. For one, Martinez seemed extremely nervous. 32 No. 24-1890

And the logbooks showed that Martinez had taken a long de- tour; though he was hauling air filters from Texas to Illinois, Martinez had driven 300 to 400 miles out of his way to the area near Nashville, Tennessee. Martinez justified his aber- rant path by explaining that his company had rerouted him and then changed its mind. Lastly, though the truck’s bill of lading said that the load had been sealed, when Trooper Muz- zillo went to the back of the truck to confirm the serial number from the bill of lading, he saw the seal had been removed, contrary to typical practice. At this point, Trooper Muzzillo prolonged the stop to con- duct a dog sniff. He asked Martinez for permission to do so, and the district court determined that Martinez consented. As Trooper Muzzillo walked his dog Maverick around the driver’s door, Maverick alerted. As a result, Trooper Muzzillo searched the cab, where he found 15 kilograms of cocaine in- side a black duffel bag. A grand jury charged Martinez with possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with an intent to distribute in vio- lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). Martinez moved to suppress the evidence. He did not dispute that the law au- thorized an administrative inspection, though he argued that Trooper Muzzillo’s stop was unlawfully pretextual. He also argued that Trooper Muzzillo lacked individualized suspi- cion, lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the inspection with a dog sniff, and that the dog’s alert did not provide prob- able cause to search the truck. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Muzzillo repeated what he had written in his police report: that the administra- tive inspection was “the reason … for the stop.” And Trooper Muzzillo explained that he selected Martinez’s truck because No. 24-1890 33

he had received information that the truck was “possibly car- rying large-load narcotics.” The district court rejected Martinez’s arguments and de- nied the motion to suppress. Martinez pled guilty but re- served the right to appeal the denial of his motion. He re- ceived the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison. Martinez appealed, and my colleagues are persuaded by the arguments the district court rejected. II My colleagues say that Trooper Muzzillo’s administrative inspection was invalid because he was acting on a tip and be- cause he conducted the inspection under 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18b-102(e), which supposedly has no criminal investigatory or deterrent purpose. Yet as I explain below, that Trooper Muzzillo was acting on a tip—his ulterior motive for the ad- ministrative inspection—does not make the search unreason- able under the Fourth Amendment. And the purpose of an administrative program such as 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18b- 102(e) is relevant only to determine the permissibility of the administrative program, not to whether Trooper Muzzillo’s subjective motivation for the search rendered it unconstitu- tional. A The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. To uphold that right, the Supreme Court has held that generally, evidence generated from an unreasonable search “shall not be used at all.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). Typically, when police don’t obtain a valid warrant from a neutral magistrate, 34 No. 24-1890

searches and seizures are “per se unreasonable.” Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981). But there are “a few specif- ically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the gen- eral warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Pertinent to this case, government officials can conduct warrantless administrative inspections of perva- sively regulated businesses or industries like commercial trucking. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 893 (7th Cir. 2016). That’s because when it comes to pervasively regulated businesses, “the privacy in- terests of the owner are weakened and the government inter- ests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). Courts are rightfully wary of allowing administrative in- spections to morph into the kinds of general warrants that our Founders forcefully opposed. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (“The deliberate use by the Government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts.”). Conse- quently, the Fourth Amendment protects against administra- tive inspections conducted for invalid purposes. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000). As my col- leagues explain, there are two levels at which we might con- duct the purpose inquiry: the programmatic level and the in- dividual officer level. Martinez never challenged Illinois’s regulatory scheme, so he waived any argument about its con- stitutionality. See United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017). As for the individual officer inquiry, the ma- jority asserts that Supreme Court cases, primarily Burger and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), instruct us to ex- amine the subjective purpose of the officer on the scene. And No. 24-1890 35

my colleagues write extensively about how two other cases, Edmond and Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), do not foreclose that officer-level inquiry. There is at least some rea- son to think that they are mistaken: in United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), for instance, a majority of the panel read Edmond and Brigham City to say that “an individual officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment, even when the programmatic motivation be- hind an administrative scheme might matter.” Id. at 1130 (O’Scannlain & Bea, JJ., concurring) (per curiam). But I need not address any dispute about what Edmond and Brigham City say, because even if the majority is right that we must con- sider the individual officer’s subjective purpose, the sole pur- pose test it proposes is satisfied here. My colleagues say that an officer’s subjective purpose for conducting an administrative inspection can invalidate the in- spection only if the officer’s sole purpose was impermissible (such as to investigate crime). In such contexts, searches and seizures are subject to the normal Fourth Amendment rules. That means, according to my colleagues’ test, that if there is at least one legal purpose for a seizure made pursuant to an administrative inspection, the officer’s ulterior motive doesn’t matter. Their test is satisfied here. Trooper Muzzillo didn’t act with the sole purpose of criminal investigation. Furthermore, I see no basis for the majority’s conclusion that the purpose of the administrative scheme is relevant to our evaluation of an officer’s ulterior motive. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Trooper Muzzillo had more than one purpose for the stop. He sought to follow up on the tip, as the majority emphasizes, but also to conduct a Level III inspection. Trooper Muzzillo’s 36 No. 24-1890

assertions, his behavior, and the discretion afforded to him by the Illinois statute (which is not contested) all support that he had more than one purpose for the seizure. First, he asserted a legal purpose for conducting the inspection. In his investi- gative report, Trooper Muzzillo specified that the purpose of the stop was to conduct a Level III commercial motor vehicle inspection. And at the suppression hearing, Trooper Muzzillo stated that the Level III inspection was “the reason, again, for the stop.” Second, his behavior suggests that the purpose of his stop was at least partially to legally conduct a Level III in- spection. He actually carried out that inspection and did so adhering to proper procedure. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of standardized procedures to the administrative inspection analysis). Indeed, Trooper Muzzillo would have only looked at Martinez’s log- books for the purpose of performing a Level III inspection. And he didn’t proceed beyond the paper inspection until he had developed more than sufficient suspicion to do so. Third, it is uncontested that the statute allowed Trooper Muzzillo to stop Martinez and search his papers since Martinez was op- erating a commercial motor vehicle. Therefore Trooper Muz- zillo, by his affirmations, his actions, and the statute’s text, had a valid administrative purpose distinct from his criminal investigatory motive. Surely Trooper Muzzillo was motivated to find what he described as “[t]he possibility of contraband.” But that was his primary, not his sole, purpose. We need only look at United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) to see how thin an officer’s administrative purpose may be without impacting the inspection’s constitu- tionality. That case concerned an administrative inspection of a sailboat. Id. at 584 n.3. Customs officers, “accompanied by a Louisiana State Policeman,” were “following an informant’s No. 24-1890 37

tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana,” when they approached a sailboat rocking in an- other ship’s wake and asked if the sailboat and crew were all right. Id. at 582–84 & n.3. After a man on the deck “shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive manner,” the officers boarded the sailboat “and asked to see the vessel’s documen- tation.” Id. at 583. The defendants argued that the authorizing statute could not have sustained the inspection because, among other rea- sons, the search followed an informant’s tip—that is to say, because it was pretextual. Id. at 584 n.3. And in fact, the offic- ers did have ulterior motives: as the Fifth Circuit made clear, the officers targeted the boat for a search precisely because an informant had told them that “there were two loads of mari- juana on two separate vessels” on their way to Louisiana. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1981). But the Supreme Court focused only on the fact that the officers boarded the sailboat “to see the vessel’s documenta- tion.” Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 583. The statute was enough to justify the inspection when the officers conducted it according to procedure, and the officers’ ulterior motive did not strip them of their administrative authority to do so. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12. The Supreme Court emphasized “[w]e would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers.” Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3 (quoting United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980)); see also United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t does rather turn the Fourth Amendment on its head to complain about not the dearth but the plethora of 38 No. 24-1890

grounds for believing that a [highly regulated business] that is to be inspected is involved in criminal activity.”). My colleagues appear to concede that the officers in Villamonte-Marquez acted with the same ulterior motive as did Trooper Muzzillo. They nonetheless attempt to write around Villamonte-Marquez, highlighting that in that case the statute had a criminal deterrent purpose and reasoning that “where an administrative scheme serves only non-criminal ends, an inspection under that scheme motivated only by the desire to find evidence of criminal activity is more obviously pretextual.” Ante at 20. But that does not distinguish this case. The Court’s conclusion that the search was not pretextual was not related to the authorizing statute’s criminal deterrent purpose; rather, the search wasn’t pretextual because the officers actually conducted a document inspection as permitted by the statute. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 583, 585. The same is true in Burger. * In that case, the state conceded that it chose to search a junk yard to look for evidence of crime. People v. Burger, 493 N.E.2d 926, 930 (N.Y. 1986). But the Court nevertheless held that there was “no reason” to think that the inspection was pretextual because the officers conducted the search according to procedure. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27 (referencing footnote 7 in the same opinion

*The majority emphasizes that Burger was decided after Villamonte- Marquez to distinguish Villamonte-Marquez. See ante at 16. But my col- leagues seem to ignore that Whren was decided after Burger, and Whren reaffirmed that in Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court “flatly dis- missed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 812. And, as I’ll explain, Burger supports my position. No. 24-1890 39

to show that a warrantless administrative inspection is illegal pretext when the officers could not have possibly relied on the authorizing statute). Just so here. We know why Trooper Muzzillo chose to con- duct an administrative inspection of Martinez’s truck. But we also know from Villamonte-Marquez and Burger that his ulte- rior motive for stopping the vehicle is not enough to invali- date the inspection because he was authorized to conduct the inspection and followed the proper procedure. There’s another reason that the majority’s attempt to dis- tinguish this case from Supreme Court precedent on the ground that the statutes in those cases were meant to deter crime is problematic: it ignores the Court’s warnings. Time and time again, the Court has warned about the encroach- ment of administrative inspection exceptions on Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g., Abel, 362 U.S. at 226. The majority concludes that individuals have less protection un- der the Fourth Amendment if the law authorizing a warrant- less administrative inspection is designed to further the state’s criminal investigatory or deterrent interest than if it isn’t. We do not know on this record whether the Illinois statute was meant to deter crime (although it probably was, at least in part). The majority faults the government, claiming that it “failed to present evidence that the Illinois administrative in- spection program at issue serves to support the state’s crimi- nal investigatory interest.” Ante at 19. But the government had no reason to present such evidence: it could not have an- ticipated the majority’s test, and the purpose of the Illinois ad- ministrative scheme was not at issue. To the extent that the purpose of the administrative scheme matters, it would be to 40 No. 24-1890

determine the scheme’s constitutionality, but Martinez did not challenge that. There was simply no reason for the gov- ernment to have submitted any of the evidence that the ma- jority faults it for omitting. In Nechy, we warned that because the motive to gather criminal evidence “will always be present” in any search, arguments about an officer’s subjective purpose are “disguised attacks on the constitutionality” of the underlying administrative regime. 827 F.2d at 1166. Here, the majority’s ruling is an example of that. The majority suggests that if the government had established that the purpose of the Illinois administrative scheme was in part to support the state’s criminal investigatory purpose, then Trooper Muzzillo’s pretextual search would have passed constitutional muster under Villamonte-Marquez. But as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the program’s purpose does not inform whether an officer may act with ulterior motives. B After finding the stop unconstitutional based on Trooper Muzzillo’s subjective motivations, the majority ended its analysis. But the initial stop was only the first step. The re- maining ones were plainly constitutional. Based on the log- books showing the truck had diverted hundreds of miles from its original route, the overwhelming smell of air freshener, Martinez’s nervousness, and the missing trailer seal, Trooper Muzzillo developed reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and walk Maverick around the truck. And only then, after the dog alerted, did Trooper Muzzillo search the cab. During that search, which Martinez doesn’t contest on appeal, Trooper Muzzillo found the duffel bag with 15 kilograms of cocaine. No. 24-1890 41

Because I do not think any part of the search and seizure was unconstitutional, I dissent.