United States v. AT&T, Inc.

916 F.3d 1029
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedFebruary 26, 2019
Docket18-5214
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 916 F.3d 1029 (United States v. AT&T, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Opinion

Rogers, Circuit Judge:

*1031 On October 22, 2016, AT&T Inc. announced a proposed merger with Time Warner Inc. The government sued to enjoin this vertical merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 , and now appeals the denial of its request for a permanent injunction. United States v. AT & T Inc. , 310 F.Supp.3d 161 , 254 (D.D.C. 2018). Although it pursued three theories of antitrust violation in the district court, the government on appeal challenges only the district court's findings on its increased leverage theory whereby costs for Turner Broadcasting System's content would increase after the merger, principally through threats of long-term "blackouts" during affiliate negotiations.

At trial, the government presented expert opinion on the likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger on the video programming and distribution industry as forecast by economic principles and a quantitative model. It also presented statements by the defendants in administrative proceedings about the anticompetitive effects of a proposed vertical merger in the industry seven years earlier. The defendants responded with an expert's analysis of real-world data for prior vertical mergers in the industry that showed "no statistically significant effect on content prices." The government offered no comparable analysis of data and its expert opinion and modeling predicting such increases failed to take into account Turner Broadcasting System's post-litigation irrevocable offers of no-blackout arbitration agreements, which a government expert acknowledged would require a new model. Evidence also indicated that the industry had become *1032 dynamic in recent years with the emergence, for example, of Netflix and Hulu. In this evidentiary context, the government's objections that the district court misunderstood and misapplied economic principles and clearly erred in rejecting the quantitative model are unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers "where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition ." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added). Congress acted out of concern with "probabilities, not certainties" inasmuch as "statutes existed [only] for dealing with clear-cut menaces to competition .... Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed by [the Clayton Act]." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States , 370 U.S. 294 , 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502 , 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962). It left to the courts the difficult task of assessing probabilities in the commercial marketplace in the interest of "halting 'incipient monopolies and trade restraints outside the scope of the Sherman Act,' " Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc. , 792 F.2d 210 , 220 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown Shoe , 370 U.S. at 318 n.32, 82 S.Ct. 1502 ). Therefore, Section 7 "applies a much more stringent test than does the rule-of-reason analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. Although Section 7 requires more than a "mere possibility" of competitive harm, it does not require proof of certain harm. Brown Shoe , 370 U.S. at 323 n.39, 82 S.Ct. 1502 . Instead, the government must show that the proposed merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, which encompasses a concept of "reasonable probability." Id .

Neither the government nor the defendants challenge application of the burden-shifting framework in United States v. Baker Hughes , 908 F.2d 981 , 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990), for horizontal mergers that the district court applied to consider the effect of the proposed vertical merger of AT&T and Time Warner on competition. Under this framework, the government must first establish a prima facie case that the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition in the relevant market. United States v. Anthem , 855 F.3d 345 , 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But unlike horizontal mergers, the government cannot use a short cut to establish a presumption of anticompetitive effect through statistics about the change in market concentration, because vertical mergers produce no immediate change in the relevant market share. See Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0 (June 14, 1984) ("1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines"). Instead, the government must make a "fact-specific" showing that the proposed merger is "likely to be anticompetitive." Joint Statement on the Burden of Proof at Trial at 3-4. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence that the prima facie case "inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction's probable effect on future competition," Anthem , 855 F.3d at 349

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916 F.3d 1029, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-att-inc-cadc-2019.