United States v. Armstrong

185 F. Supp. 3d 332, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61008, 2016 WL 2643041
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 9, 2016
Docket11-cr-681
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 185 F. Supp. 3d 332 (United States v. Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Armstrong, 185 F. Supp. 3d 332, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61008, 2016 WL 2643041 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

NINA GERSHON, United States District Judge

The New York Daily News (the “Daily News”) requests that I unseal two letters filed by the government in connection with the sentencing of George Armstrong. Both the government and the defendant seek to keep the letters sealed. For the reasons below, I deny the Daily News’ request and order that the letters remain sealed.

I. Background

On October 21, 2015, I sentenced George Armstrong to five years of probation for racketeering, mail fraud, and money laundering related to a bribery scheme operating through the New York City Department of Housing Presentation and Development (“HPD”). Armstrong had pleaded guilty to those charges in October of 2011. Both before and after his guilty plea, Armstrong offered substantial assistance to the government as it investigated and prosecuted other participants in the scheme.

Armstrong has received threats as a result of his cooperation, some of which were discussed at his sentencing, and the more recent of which are detailed in the parties’ sealed letters submitted in response to the Daily News’ application.1 As early as 2011, there was some media speculation that Armstrong was a government cooperator. Official confirmation of Armstrong’s cooperation came during the trial of Stevenson Dunn, Lee Hymowitz, and Michael Freeman (the “Dunn trial”), who had been charged with participating in aspects of the same HPD bribery scheme as Armstrong. The Dunn trial spanned 13 days in March and April of 2014. Although Armstrong did not testify, during that trial the nature and extent of Armstrong’s role in criminal conduct related to the HPD scheme and his cooperation with the government were discussed by others in open court. Similarly, during Armstrong’s sentencing, held in open court, his cooperation was discussed in significant detail. At that sentencing, I described at length the reasoning behind my decision to sentence Armstrong to five years’ probation.

II. Discussion

A. Qualified First Amendment Right to Access

The expressly guaranteed freedoms of the First Amendment “share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (quotations omitted). These express freedoms imply that the press and the general public have a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, so that the “constitutionally protected discussion of government affairs is an informed one.” Id. at 604-05, 102 S.Ct. 2613; see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-77, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). The qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal trials encompasses a qualified [335]*335right to ■ attend sentencing proceedings. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir.2005).

Open proceedings “enhance [ ] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system” by “assuring] that established procedures aré being followed and that deviations will become known.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press-Enterprise ”). Access to sentencing proceedings allows the public to understand the reasons behind a given sentence, a value reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which states-that sentencing shall be held in open court, in part to “enable the public to learn why defendant received a particular sentence.” Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 206 (quotations omitted). Open sentencing proceedings are a safeguard against corruption,. provide “community therapeutic value,” and offer an opportunity for the public to see and reflect-upon the “effect of laws that expand or contract the discretion of judges in imposing sentences.” . Id. at 198-99 (quotations omitted).

The public also has a qualified First Amendment right to access judicial documents if they are “derived from or are a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend [] proceedings,” or if “logic and experience” support such access — that is, if access “plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question” and the documents “have historically been open to the press or general public.” Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92-93 (2d Cir.2004) (quotations omitted) (finding a qualified First Amendment right to access criminal docket sheets); see also United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir.1995) (discussing common law presumption of access to documents concerning cooperation and noting that, “[w]here filing with the court is unusual or is generally under seal,” presumption of access is weaker).

The Daily News asserts that “sentencing memos are universally filed publicly in the spirit of transparency that is the bedrock of the U.S. court system.” This is simply incorrect; whether or not they are later subject to unsealing, sentencing memoranda that implicate cooperation are often filed under seal. As noted in a recent national survey of district judges, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, federal defenders, Criminal Justice Act district panel representative’s offices, and chief probation and pretrial services offices:

“The most common action taken by the district courts [to protect cooperators] has been, at the request of parties, to seal documents containing cooperation information!.] ... Nearly half of the respondents also reported that their district seals, sua sponte, documents containing cooperation information[.]”)

Margaret S. Williams, Donna Stienstra, Marvin Astrada, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Survey of Harm to Cooperators 27 (2016) (“Survey of Harm to Cooperators ”). Whether or not the government’s letters in this case are a “necessary corollary” of the right to attend sentencing proceedings, “logic and experience” do not dictate access to them.

Nevertheless, I assume for the purposes of my analysis here that a First Amendment presumption of access applies to the government’s letters. The Second' Circuit has not explicitly established whether such a presumption applies to sentencing mem-oranda or to government applications under § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for the consideration of cooperation in sentencing, but courts in this district, considering similar requests, have found such presumption. See e.g. United States v. Naf[336]*336is, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134399, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2013).2

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
185 F. Supp. 3d 332, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61008, 2016 WL 2643041, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-armstrong-nyed-2016.