United States v. Aristotle White

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-5347
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0019n.06

Case No. 24-5347

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jan 16, 2025 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff - Appellee, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ) ARISTOTLE WHITE, EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ) Defendant - Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: THAPAR, NALBANDIAN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

RITZ, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Aristotle White of possessing methamphetamine

with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of that drug crime. White appeals

his conviction and sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

On May 11, 2022, a law enforcement officer saw a car owned by Aaron Tyler Welch parked

at a gas station in Kentucky. The officer knew that Welch was a drug trafficker. But Welch was

not there; instead, Aristotle White was driving the car. Officers followed White and eventually

pulled him over for speeding. There was an active warrant for White’s arrest. After arresting

White, the officers searched the car and found a handgun between the driver’s seat and the center

console, $2,569 in cash in the center console, an AR-15 rifle in the trunk, and a backpack

containing 289 grams of methamphetamine in small bags behind the driver’s seat.

The government charged White with possessing at least 50 grams of methamphetamine

with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. No. 24-5347, United States v. White

At trial, White’s defense was that he bought the car from Welch and did not know about the AR-

15 or the backpack containing methamphetamine. The government called several witnesses,

including Welch, Welch’s girlfriend Samantha Daniels, and Davon Blackford, a local drug dealer.

Welch, Daniels, and Blackford all testified about White’s past drug dealing and firearm

possession. Welch testified that he sold his car to White for $2,000 and two ounces of

methamphetamine. Welch and Daniels also said that they bought methamphetamine and Xanax

from White the night before his arrest. According to Welch, White was carrying “a handgun and

an AR” that night. RE 77, Trial Tr., Page ID 483.

Blackford said he sold “ounces” and “pounds” of methamphetamine to White “practically

every day” in the month before White was arrested. RE 78, Trial Tr., Page ID 526-27. White

resold the methamphetamine. Sometimes, the two men would sell methamphetamine together.

During their interactions, Blackford saw White carry a gun “[s]o he wouldn’t get robbed.” Id. at

527.

White did not object to any of the above testimony. The district court instructed the jurors

that they could only consider the three witnesses’ testimony “as it relates to . . . the defendant’s

intent and knowledge,” and “not . . . for any other purpose.” RE 61, Jury Instrs., Page ID 154.

The jury found White guilty on both counts. After trial but before sentencing, White helped

smuggle contraband into the detention center where he was in custody. As a result, several inmates

were hospitalized.

At White’s sentencing, the district court calculated the guidelines range as 121 to 151

months imprisonment for the possession offense, plus a consecutive 60 months for the firearm

offense. Citing the smuggling incident, the district court declined to impose a sentence below

White’s guidelines range. But noting mitigating factors like White’s age and work history, the

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district court sentenced him to 181 months in prison—the guidelines minimum. As a condition of

White’s supervised release, the district court gave the probation office the authority to search

White’s “person, house, residence, office, vehicle, papers, computers,” and other electronic

devices. RE 83, J., Page ID 740. To invoke this authority, a probation officer would need

“reasonable suspicion” that White violated a condition of his supervised release and the property

searched would “contain evidence of the suspected violation(s).” Id. White objected to his

sentence and the supervised release condition.

II. Analysis

White appeals the district court’s admission of testimony about his prior drug sales and

firearm possession. He also challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable and attacks the

supervised release search condition.

A. Evidentiary Challenge

White argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it

admitted the testimony of Welch, Daniels, and Blackford. Rule 404(b) bars the use of “[e]vidence

of any other crime, wrong, or act . . . to prove a person’s character” and show that “the person

acted in accordance with [that] character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible

for other reasons, like “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. at 404(b)(2).

We review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for plain error when the challenging

party did not object at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157 (6th

Cir. 1996). A plain error is (1) “an error” that is (2) “plain” and (3) “affects ‘substantial rights.’”

Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 (2021) (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585

U.S. 129, 134 (2018)). An error affects a party’s substantial rights when there is a reasonable

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probability that it changed the outcome of the case. Id. at 507-08. Relief is appropriate only when

“the error had a serious effect on ‘the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.’” Id. at 508 (quoting Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 135).

1. Evidence of prior methamphetamine distribution

Welch, Daniels, and Blackford all testified that White dealt methamphetamine in the month

before his arrest. Their testimony was admissible to show that White intended to distribute the

methamphetamine found in his car.

We have held that “when a defendant is charged with a specific intent crime, such as

possession with intent to distribute, 404(b) evidence is admissible to prove intent” so long as the

evidence is more probative than prejudicial. United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir.

2004). Evidence of past drug dealing is probative of intent to distribute when it is “substantially

similar” and “reasonably near in time to the specific intent offense at issue.” United States v.

Cordero, 973 F.3d 603, 621 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 151

(6th Cir. 2011)).

White’s past distributions were substantially similar to the drug crime charged in this case.

Welch, Daniels, and Blackford all testified that White sold drugs in ounce quantities. Moreover,

the backpack found in the backseat of White’s car contained bags of methamphetamine all

weighing about one ounce.

White’s past drug deals were also close in time to his arrest. In fact, Welch and Daniels

bought drugs from White the night before, and Blackford saw White sell methamphetamine a

month earlier. See United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 476 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that

uncharged conduct occurring three years prior was “reasonably near in time to the charged

conduct”). Thus, the testimony was probative of intent because it suggested a “larger scheme” to

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distribute methamphetamine. Id. at 475. The testimony was also not more prejudicial than it was

probative because the district court’s “strong cautionary instruction” adequately mitigated any

prejudicial effect. Lattner, 385 F.3d. at 958.

For these reasons, the district court did not err in admitting the witnesses’ testimony under

Rule 404(b)(2). And even if the district court erred, White cannot show a reasonable probability

that the admission of the evidence changed the outcome of the case. Because “[i]ntent to distribute

may be inferred from a large quantity of drugs,” the government likely would have proved White’s

intent without the witnesses’ testimony. United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1107 (6th Cir. 2022).

2. Evidence of prior firearm possession

White also challenges the admission of evidence of his prior firearm possession. Welch

testified that White had an “AR” the night before he was arrested. RE 77, Trial Tr., Page ID 483.

Blackford said that he saw White carry a firearm “a couple times” when the two dealt

methamphetamine together. RE 78, Trial Tr., Page ID 527. The district court properly admitted

this testimony because it suggested that White knew about the AR-15 found in the trunk of his car.

Evidence of knowledge is admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) “when the defendant claims he

was unaware that he was committing a criminal act.” United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186,

1194 (6th Cir. 1994). As with intent, evidence showing knowledge must be more probative than

prejudicial. Id. at 1193.

This case is similar to United States v. Davis, 415 F. App’x 709 (6th Cir. 2011). There, the

defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after his parole officer

discovered a gun in the defendant’s dresser. Id. at 710. At trial, the defendant claimed that he did

not know about the gun. Id. at 710-11. To combat this defense, the government introduced

evidence that the defendant had previously bought a gun for a girlfriend. Id. at 711. We agreed

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with the district court that the evidence of prior gun possession “had substantial probative value.”

Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The same is true here. The evidence that White possessed a firearm during prior drug deals

and an AR-style rifle the night before he was arrested was probative of his knowledge that there

was an AR-15 in his trunk. White cannot show any error, much less plain error, in the admission

of this testimony.

B. Sentencing Challenge

White next argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. A defendant’s

substantive reasonableness claim asserts that the district court unreasonably weighed the

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), resulting in a sentence that is too long. United States v.

Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019). We review for abuse of discretion and presume that

a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591, 602

(6th Cir. 2023).

White argues that the district court over-emphasized his post-conviction conduct during

sentencing. The record demonstrates otherwise. Before sentencing White, the district court

described the seriousness of the offense and White’s criminal history. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),

(a)(2)(A). The court considered White’s risk to the public and the sentence’s effect on deterrence

and rehabilitation. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). The court also reviewed the guidelines range, the

need for consistency, and the need for restitution. See id. § 3553(a)(3)-(4), (a)(6). And the court

looked at mitigating factors, see id. § 3553(b)(1), noting that White had a work history, supported

his family, and struggled with addiction and mental health issues. Finally, the district court opined

that White’s decision to smuggle contraband into jail was “a discouraging sign.” RE 93,

Sentencing Tr., Page ID 940.

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All of this was within the court’s discretion. True, the court cited White’s post-conviction

conduct to explain its refusal to vary below the guidelines range. But the court also relied on the

mitigators in giving White the lowest possible within-guidelines sentence. White’s claim is

ultimately that “the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently.” United

States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). That argument is beyond our

abuse-of-discretion review. Id.

C. Search Condition Challenge

Finally, White appeals the supervised release condition allowing searches of his person,

property, and electronic devices. We review the imposition of a special condition of supervised

release for abuse of discretion, considering both procedural and substantive dimensions. United

States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 235 (6th Cir. 2018).

White attacks the search condition as too broad. He also contends that the condition is

unrelated to his underlying offense because the charges originated from a traffic stop and did not

involve evidence of electronic communication.

A special condition of supervised release must meet three requirements. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1)-(3). First, the condition must “reasonably relate[]” to certain sentencing factors

described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Those factors are “the nature and

circumstances of the offense,” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for

the sentence” to “deter[] . . . criminal conduct,” “protect the public,” and “provide the defendant

with . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D).

Second, the condition must not restrict liberty more than is “reasonably necessary” to accomplish

the goals of deterrence, public safety, and correctional treatment for the defendant. Id.

§ 3583(d)(2). And third, the condition must be “consistent with any pertinent policy statements

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issued by the Sentencing Commission,” id. § 3583(d)(3). White’s challenge focuses on the first

two of these requirements.

The district court did not abuse its discretion because the special condition satisfied

§ 3583(d). To begin, the search condition reasonably relates to the pertinent sentencing factors.

As the district court explained at sentencing, White’s crime was “serious” and bore “insignia of

violence,” RE 93, Sentencing Tr., Page ID 928-29, which supports more restrictive supervision.

The court also noted White’s status as a repeat offender, indicating his difficulty “[l]iving within

the law.” Id. at 929. The search condition properly aims to curb White’s risk of recidivism through

probation office monitoring. The district court further observed that drug dealing causes public

harm. Id. at 893, 936. By ensuring that White does not reoffend, the search condition protects the

public from the effects of methamphetamine distribution. Finally, the search condition promotes

rehabilitation because it is tailored to prevent further involvement with narcotics.

Additionally, the search condition does not restrict White’s liberty more than is reasonably

necessary to accomplish the goals set out in § 3583(d)(2). The condition only allows a Probation

Officer to search White’s person, property, or electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion that

White violated a condition of his release. RE 83, J., Page ID 740. The district court noted that

one reason for allowing searches of White’s property or electronics was White’s “post-verdict

conduct, which includes arranging for contraband to be fervently introduced into the jail.” RE 93,

Sentencing Tr., Page ID 951. It was not unreasonable, especially considering this conduct and

White’s criminal history, for the district court to be concerned about White’s use of electronics or

other materials to conduct illegal activities.

Indeed, we have upheld similar search conditions for federal probationers whose “high risk

of reoffending . . . warrants close supervision,” noting that “supervised-release conditions do not

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have to be directly related to the defendant’s conviction and can instead be implemented in

response to a defendant’s history and characteristics that indicate a risk of dangerousness to the

public safety.” See United States v. Gholston, No. 24-5059, 2024 WL 4977139, at *4 (6th Cir.

Dec. 4, 2024) (citing United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 837-38 (6th Cir. 2001)). And in the

Fourth Amendment context, we have upheld as reasonable searches based on reasonable suspicion

that a probationer is violating the conditions of his release. United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603,

609 (6th Cir. 2005) (analyzing Kentucky’s probationary search policy in the context of a motion

to suppress). In light of this case law, White’s history and characteristics, and the limitations

embedded in the special condition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the

condition.

We affirm.

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