Mr. Justice McKenna,
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the findings as thus made the parties to the action base opposing contentions. The Government asserts that the Government’s liability is "limited to the land actually taken and all other damages are consequential. In other words, that the appropriation of the land and the erection of the Leland Dike put the Government in the position of owner of the land with the rights and liabilities of owner, and that besides it had the rights of government to improve navigable waters. There was concession or some concession of the contention by the Court of Claims in its opinion. The court, through Mr. Justice Barney, said:
“In the decision of this case it may be admitted that if the Government had owned the site of the Leland Dike at the time of its erection, or if it had been owned by a stranger to this suit, and hence had made no invasion upon the lands of the plaintiff, it would not have been [128]*128liable for the destruction thereby inflicted, under the ruling in the Bedford Case.” [192 U. S. 217.]
But it was further said: “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court in all cases of this character, it is the invasion upon the lands and the actual and visible possession which constitutes the taking, and when thus taken all of the consequences incident to such invasion necessarily follow, among which is the liability to pay for the, damage thereby occurring to the balance of the tract to which the land thus taken belongs.” Citing United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180.
Claimants concede the power of the Government over the river and that they “do not base their claim upon any raising of the flood levels of the Mississippi River, although it is stated by them and was found as a fact by the lower court that the high-water flood level of the Mississippi River had been raised six feet by the completion of the general levee system.”
They “recognize the fact that the right of the United States Government to complete the levee system and maintain the same'is indisputable, and that any purely incidental injury which might have resulted to them solely from raising the flood level would be a damnum absque injuria. They claim nothing by reason of said fact, adducing the same merely by way of inducement as showing that the ruin, which would inevitably have come to their plantation from the deflecting thereon of the flood waters by the construction of Leland Dike, was merely accelerated and expedited but not caused by the raising of the flood level.
“Their claim is that the deposit of sand and gravel and the destruction of their lands thereby were a direct and immediate result of the construction of the dike which was búilt on their plantation, using a part of it for the base thereof and the material thereof, and constructing the same without any condemnation of their lands and [129]*129ouster of them therefrom, which with the destruction constituted the taking of their lands within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and entitled them to compensation therefor.”
And they rely on United. States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180, and other cases, and distinguish the Jackson Case, 230 U. S. 1, and the Hughes Case, 230 U. S.. 24.
A serious proposition of law is hence presented by the contentions and controversy arises, as we have seen, whether an appropriation of the land without condemnation proceedings can have different legal results from its appropriation by such proceedings. In other words, whether compensation for the land appropriated in .either case would be the only measure of relief, and its payment or recovery transfer ownership of the land and the rights of ownership.
But before reaching decision on this proposition questions of fact confront us. It will be observed that the findings are somewhat involved, mixing statement with inference, indeed, it may be said, even with prophecy. And it may be said again (we say “may be said” to avoid the expression of a definite judgment at this time) that there are effects caused by the United States and effects caused by the State which are not distinguished. We think there should be more precision. Great problems confronted the National and state governments, great and uncertain natural forces were to be subdued or controlled, great disasters were to be averted; great benefits acquired. There might be liability to the individual; if so, the liability should be clear, the cause of it direct and certain. This.we explained in Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, and in Hughes v. United States, Id., 24. There is an effort in the present case to satisfy these conditions, but we do not think it goes far enough.
The finding which recites the effects upon claimants’ property is as follows: “In addition to the danger which [130]*130threatened the levee [that is, by the concentration of the current and during seasons of high water], said current, impinging upon the banks of the stream and the neck bf land adjoining Point Chicot to the mainland, cutting into it, threatened to and would have, if permitted to continue, cut through said neck of land, thus straightening the channel and making Point Chicot plantation an island.” In other words, it is found that but for the dike the river would have cut through the neck of land. Or, to express it another way, the dike kept the river in its channel. But, as We have seen, many forces were at work, and if the conditions at claimants’ plantation were arti-ficiar they were the result of the lawful exercise of power over navigable rivers.
The finding seems to be definite, but it is .too broad in its inference. It may indeed be a just inference, but the elements'are wanting upon which a judgment can be with assurap.ee pronounced. Besides' there were two agencies at work,- National and state, in the construction of the levees. There is no distribution of liability; all.the results to claimants’ , plantation are assigned to the Government. Yet it is found that the claimants at one time conceived that the local authorities were the offenders, that is, the Board of Levee Inspectors of Arkansas was alone responsible, and brought an action against the Board. In passing upon the ground of action and its sufficiency challenged by demurrer the court said that the action “was instituted to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him [Archer] by reason of the trespass of the defendant [the Board of Levee Inspectors], who unlawfully, with force and arms, entered upon his premises — a plantation in the county of Chicot — and built a levee thereon, without having made compensation therefor.” The demurrer was. overruled, the court expressing the view that the action could be ■ maintained and intimated an opinion that an injunction might have been granted to enjoin the [131]*131trespass but that Archer could elect an action for damages.
The action was discontinued. We are not informed by the findings for what reason.
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Mr. Justice McKenna,
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the findings as thus made the parties to the action base opposing contentions. The Government asserts that the Government’s liability is "limited to the land actually taken and all other damages are consequential. In other words, that the appropriation of the land and the erection of the Leland Dike put the Government in the position of owner of the land with the rights and liabilities of owner, and that besides it had the rights of government to improve navigable waters. There was concession or some concession of the contention by the Court of Claims in its opinion. The court, through Mr. Justice Barney, said:
“In the decision of this case it may be admitted that if the Government had owned the site of the Leland Dike at the time of its erection, or if it had been owned by a stranger to this suit, and hence had made no invasion upon the lands of the plaintiff, it would not have been [128]*128liable for the destruction thereby inflicted, under the ruling in the Bedford Case.” [192 U. S. 217.]
But it was further said: “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court in all cases of this character, it is the invasion upon the lands and the actual and visible possession which constitutes the taking, and when thus taken all of the consequences incident to such invasion necessarily follow, among which is the liability to pay for the, damage thereby occurring to the balance of the tract to which the land thus taken belongs.” Citing United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180.
Claimants concede the power of the Government over the river and that they “do not base their claim upon any raising of the flood levels of the Mississippi River, although it is stated by them and was found as a fact by the lower court that the high-water flood level of the Mississippi River had been raised six feet by the completion of the general levee system.”
They “recognize the fact that the right of the United States Government to complete the levee system and maintain the same'is indisputable, and that any purely incidental injury which might have resulted to them solely from raising the flood level would be a damnum absque injuria. They claim nothing by reason of said fact, adducing the same merely by way of inducement as showing that the ruin, which would inevitably have come to their plantation from the deflecting thereon of the flood waters by the construction of Leland Dike, was merely accelerated and expedited but not caused by the raising of the flood level.
“Their claim is that the deposit of sand and gravel and the destruction of their lands thereby were a direct and immediate result of the construction of the dike which was búilt on their plantation, using a part of it for the base thereof and the material thereof, and constructing the same without any condemnation of their lands and [129]*129ouster of them therefrom, which with the destruction constituted the taking of their lands within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and entitled them to compensation therefor.”
And they rely on United. States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180, and other cases, and distinguish the Jackson Case, 230 U. S. 1, and the Hughes Case, 230 U. S.. 24.
A serious proposition of law is hence presented by the contentions and controversy arises, as we have seen, whether an appropriation of the land without condemnation proceedings can have different legal results from its appropriation by such proceedings. In other words, whether compensation for the land appropriated in .either case would be the only measure of relief, and its payment or recovery transfer ownership of the land and the rights of ownership.
But before reaching decision on this proposition questions of fact confront us. It will be observed that the findings are somewhat involved, mixing statement with inference, indeed, it may be said, even with prophecy. And it may be said again (we say “may be said” to avoid the expression of a definite judgment at this time) that there are effects caused by the United States and effects caused by the State which are not distinguished. We think there should be more precision. Great problems confronted the National and state governments, great and uncertain natural forces were to be subdued or controlled, great disasters were to be averted; great benefits acquired. There might be liability to the individual; if so, the liability should be clear, the cause of it direct and certain. This.we explained in Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, and in Hughes v. United States, Id., 24. There is an effort in the present case to satisfy these conditions, but we do not think it goes far enough.
The finding which recites the effects upon claimants’ property is as follows: “In addition to the danger which [130]*130threatened the levee [that is, by the concentration of the current and during seasons of high water], said current, impinging upon the banks of the stream and the neck bf land adjoining Point Chicot to the mainland, cutting into it, threatened to and would have, if permitted to continue, cut through said neck of land, thus straightening the channel and making Point Chicot plantation an island.” In other words, it is found that but for the dike the river would have cut through the neck of land. Or, to express it another way, the dike kept the river in its channel. But, as We have seen, many forces were at work, and if the conditions at claimants’ plantation were arti-ficiar they were the result of the lawful exercise of power over navigable rivers.
The finding seems to be definite, but it is .too broad in its inference. It may indeed be a just inference, but the elements'are wanting upon which a judgment can be with assurap.ee pronounced. Besides' there were two agencies at work,- National and state, in the construction of the levees. There is no distribution of liability; all.the results to claimants’ , plantation are assigned to the Government. Yet it is found that the claimants at one time conceived that the local authorities were the offenders, that is, the Board of Levee Inspectors of Arkansas was alone responsible, and brought an action against the Board. In passing upon the ground of action and its sufficiency challenged by demurrer the court said that the action “was instituted to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him [Archer] by reason of the trespass of the defendant [the Board of Levee Inspectors], who unlawfully, with force and arms, entered upon his premises — a plantation in the county of Chicot — and built a levee thereon, without having made compensation therefor.” The demurrer was. overruled, the court expressing the view that the action could be ■ maintained and intimated an opinion that an injunction might have been granted to enjoin the [131]*131trespass but that Archer could elect an action for damages.
The action was discontinued. We are not informed by the findings for what reason. It may have been for good reason; we make no intimation to the' contrary, but its commencement and subsequent discontinuance suggest some questions which may lead to answers pertinent to be considered. In that action the trespass upon claimants’ plantation by the construction of the Leland Dike was attributed to the local levee board; in the action at bar it is ascribed exclusively to the officers of the United States and it is averred that the encroachment of the trespass was at different times, and to a greater extent the second than the first time. Did claimants object at either time? And if not, why not? Upon the answer may depend a serious legal question. Or, if they were silent, why were they silent? What were the local conditions which called for judgment, not only the general conditions to Which we have adverted and the findings describe, but the exact conditions as to claimants’ property? Did danger threaten it before the erection of the dike as well as threaten the levees? As we have said, great forces were in operation and a judgment or prediction of their effect might have been difficult and uncertain, and claimants have regarded the dike as a protection to their plantation as well as to the levees.
The flow of the river is towards the Gulf and necessarily the water is always higher on the upper side of the reaches or bends such as exist at claimants’ plantation. It may be inferred, therefore, that the pressuré of the water, compounded of its velocity and volume, is greatest at the recesses or apices of the bends, has its first effect there, but necessarily extends along the whole concave shore. At first, of course, there would be a break at the neck or narrowest part, but would it not successively extend until the whole mass would crumble and a wide breach be [132]*132formed through which the river would pour with its full eroding force? And that such might be the effect we gather from the report of the United States engineers, of which we take judicial notice. . It certainly may be questioned, therefore, whether the river breaking through at the neck would have confined itself to a narrow channel, "making Point Chicot plantation an island,” and would not have permanently submerged it or swept it away. The Leland Dike prevented a demonstration of experience but it would seem that examples elsewhere on the river could give testimony of what would have occurred if the dike had not been constructed. It may be they were adduced, it may be expert testimony was heard and all pertinent facts exhibited to the court, and its finding is a true deduction from the testimony and the facts. We think, however, as we have already said, it is too broad in its inference, and that therefore, the case should be remanded to the court for more particular findings on the testimony in the case or, in the discretion of the court, upon further testimony to be taken; and the case should be given such dispatch as may be consistent with such purposes.
In wha,t we have said no opinion is intended to be expressed of the case as it is presented or may be presented, and all questions of law are reserved.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.