United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.

781 F. Supp. 1400, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19118, 1991 WL 286373
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedDecember 10, 1991
DocketCiv. 83-51-D
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 781 F. Supp. 1400 (United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19118, 1991 WL 286373 (S.D. Iowa 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

VIETOR, Chief Judge.

This is an antitrust action brought by the United States of America (“government”). The government alleges that a long-term lease agreement entered into in 1982 by which defendant Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (“ADM”) leased two corn wet milling plants, one in Iowa and one in New York, from defendant Nabisco Brands, Inc. (“Nabisco”) is an acquisition that may substantially lessen competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and constitutes a contract, combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The line of commerce involved is the manufacture and sale of High Fructose Corn Syrup (“HFCS”), a nutrient sweetener made from corn that is used to sweeten soft drinks and food products.

Trial to the court was held only on the issue of liability.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25. Venue in this district is proper. Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). (See paragraph 10 of Findings of Fact, infra.)

OVERVIEW

The legal standards for an antitrust evaluation of an acquisition or merger are substantially the same under both the Clayton and Sherman Acts. As provided in section 7 of the Clayton Act, an acquisition is proscribed “where in any line of commerce * * * the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.” This statutory language requires proof of a causal connection between the acquisition and a reasonable probability of future injury to the competitive process, which is measured by the likelihood of the acquisition creating ability in the acquiring party to exercise market power in the future. Market power is the ability of a firm profitably to increase prices above competitive levels and to maintain such higher prices for a significant period of time.

In applying this legal standard, a four-part analysis is used: (1) definition of the relevant product market; (2) determination of the relevant geographic market; (3) evaluation of statistical data on concentration in the defined relevant market; and (4) consideration of “other factors” pertinent to whether the acquisition creates a reasonable probability of the exercise of market power in the future. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 94 S.Ct. 1186, 39 L.Ed.2d 530 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962); FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 700 (8th Cir.1979).

HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION

This lawsuit has been active for many years. The complaint was filed December 14, 1982, six months after defendants entered into the lease.

In the early stages of the litigation, defendants moved for summary judgment contending that the lease is not an “acquisition” within the meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act, and the government moved for partial summary judgment contending that the lease is an acquisition. (For a summary of the lease terms, see para *1403 graphs 4-7 of Findings of Fact, .infra.) I ruled that the lease is an acquisition. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 584 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D.Iowa 1984). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), I certified the question for immediate appeal, but in an unpublished order dated May 29, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to accept the interlocutory appeal.

After a substantial period of extensive discovery, both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment on the relevant product market issue. The government, in its motion, requested a ruling that the relevant product market is limited to HFCS alone as alleged in the complaint. Defendants, in their motion, contended that undisputed facts on cross-elasticity of demand between HFCS and sugar precluded the government from carrying its burden to prove that HFCS is the only sweetener in the relevant product market. On May 29, 1987,1 denied the government’s motion and granted defendants’ motion based on certain undisputed facts which led me to conclude that sugar and HFCS are in the same product market, and I ordered that the government’s complaint be dismissed. (It ■is undisputed that if both sugar and HFCS are in the relevant product market, there is no antitrust violation.) A memorandum opinion explaining the rulings and order of dismissal was filed on August 6, 1987. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 695 F.Supp. 1000 (S.D.Iowa 1987).

The government appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from the order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint, but did not appeal from the order denying the government’s motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit, in a 2-1 panel decision, held:

* * * that the district court erred in granting summary judgment that sugar is in the same relevant product market as HFCS. We, in turn, grant summary judgment to the appellant that sugar is not in the same relevant product market as HFCS. We therefore reverse and remand * * *.

United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 248 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S.Ct. 51, 107 L.Ed.2d 20 (1989) (“ADM”).

On remand, after more discovery and a tour by counsel and me of the leased plant in Clinton, Iowa, and, for comparison purposes, a much newer ADM corn wet milling plant in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the liability phase of this case was tried.

FINDINGS OF FACT

THE PARTIES

(1) The plaintiff is the United States of America, which is represented by attorneys from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.

(2) Defendant ADM is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Decatur, Illinois.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Federal Trade Commission v. CCC Holdings Inc.
605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., NV v. FTC
515 F.3d 447 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation
156 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (C.D. Illinois, 2001)
Federal Trade Commission v. Cardinal Health, Inc.
12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (District of Columbia, 1998)
United States v. Gregory Alan Kinder
64 F.3d 757 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Opinion Number
Louisiana Attorney General Reports, 1994

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
781 F. Supp. 1400, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19118, 1991 WL 286373, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-archer-daniels-midland-co-iasd-1991.