United States v. Antonio Royal

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-15130 17-15131 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00118-CW-1 v. D.C. No. 4:08-cr-00405-CW-1

ANTONIO ROYAL, AKA Tone Royal, AKA Antonio Royale, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2019**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated appeals, Antonio Royal appeals from the district

court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Reves, 774 F.3d

562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Royal contends that, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), his conviction for assault with a firearm, in

violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(2) (2005), is not a crime of violence.

In Appeal No. 17-15130, he argues that, therefore, he is not a “violent felon” for

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1) and that the district court improperly determined

his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). In Appeal No. 17-15131, he

argues that the district court erred in its calculation of the Guidelines range. All of

Royal’s arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez, 901 F.3d

1060, 1065-68 (9th Cir. 2018), which held that a conviction under section 245(a) is

a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). See Vasquez-Gonzalez,

901 F.3d at 1068; see also United States v. Werle, 877 F.3d 879, 883-84 (9th Cir.

2017) (stating that the language of section 16(a) “largely mirrors” the language of

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)).

In light of this disposition, we do not reach the parties’ remaining

arguments.

AFFIRMED.

2 17-15130 & 17-15131