United States v. Anthony Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 22-2064
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 22-2064 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTHONY JONES a/k/a EARS, Appellant _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00193-003) District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro _______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 9, 2025

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 16, 2025)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Anthony Jones appeals his convictions for several counts of sex

trafficking and conspiracy to do the same. We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Between 2012 and 2017, Anthony Jones joined his brother, Kristian Jones, and

Dkyle Bridges to traffic several minors and adults in Delaware and Pennsylvania. As

relevant to this case, Jones, Bridges, and Kristian Jones trafficked three victims, B.T.,

N.G., and L.C., beginning when they were minors. All three victims were recovered by

undercover agents posing as customers, after which Jones, Bridges, and Kristian Jones

were arrested.

A grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a superseding

indictment charging Jones with one count of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) (Count One); one count of sex trafficking by force,

threats of force, fraud, or coercion and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Three); and three counts (one for each of

B.T., N.G., and L.C.) of sex trafficking of a minor and aiding and abetting, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts Four, Five, and

Six). 1 The three were jointly tried and the jury convicted Jones on Counts One, Four,

1 Count Two of the indictment charged Bridges with a separate count of sex trafficking with force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 2 Five, and Six, and acquitted him on Count Three. 2 Jones timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION 3

Jones challenges his convictions on several bases. We disagree with each.

A. Grand Jury Testimony

First, Jones contends on appeal that the Government knowingly presented false

testimony to the grand jury. But Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) requires a

defendant to raise any “error in the grand-jury proceeding or preliminary hearing” in a

“pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the motion

can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Thus, when a defendant fails to raise a

challenge to the grand jury proceedings in a pretrial motion, we may review his claim

only where he demonstrates “good cause” for the delay. 4 United States v. Sok, 115 F.4th

251, 259 (3d Cir. 2024).

While “good cause” is “a flexible standard,” its flexibility is not limitless, and

Jones does not satisfy it here. Id. at 263. He makes only conclusory arguments that his

2 The jury also convicted Bridges and Kristian Jones, whose convictions we later affirmed. See United States v. Bridges, No. 21-1679, 2022 WL 4244276 (3d Cir. Sep. 15, 2022). 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 The Government urges that if we reach the merits of Jones’s unpreserved claims despite Rule 12’s timeliness requirements, “it is the defendant’s burden to establish plain error, as the claim was not presented to the district court.” Answering Br. 24. But we have explained that Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard yields to Rule 12’s good-cause standard in this context because “[n]othing in the text of Rule 12 . . . supplants its good-cause standard of review in favor of Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard.” United States v. Sok, 115 F.4th 251, 261 (3d Cir. 2024). Thus, an untimely challenge under Rule 12 does not require a defendant to establish good cause for his tardiness and surmount the plain-error standard. 3 counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), in an attempt to establish “good cause.” But ineffective assistance rarely is a

viable claim on direct appeal because the record is not adequately developed as to either

counsel’s ineffectiveness or prejudice to the defendant. See Massaro v. United States,

538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003). Such is the case here. Thus, even assuming ineffective

assistance of counsel may be a sufficient basis to excuse an untimely Rule 12 challenge, 5

Jones’s contentions lack sufficient development or support to demonstrate “good cause,”

and we cannot address that challenge to the grand jury proceedings in this posture.

B. Sufficiency of the Indictment

Jones next argues that the superseding indictment is insufficient on its face as to

Count One (conspiracy to commit sex trafficking) because it does not identify a specific

person whom the conspiracy targeted. Once again, however, Jones brings this challenge

too late. As with grand jury proceedings, Rule 12(b)(3) requires that any “defect in the

indictment or information,” including “lack of specificity” or “failure to state an offense,”

must “be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available

and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Jones offers no

5 Our Court has not yet determined whether ineffective assistance of counsel suffices to demonstrate “good case” under Rule 12. See Sok, 115 F.4th at 263 n.9 (“[W]e do not address whether ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute ‘good cause’ to satisfy Rule 12.”). 4 satisfactory basis for the failure to move to dismiss Count One before trial, 6 so this

challenge too is beyond the scope of direct appeal.

C. Evidentiary Objections

Jones next raises three objections to the introduction of evidence, but none is

persuasive.

First, Jones objects to the District Court’s admission of (1) testimony from a law

enforcement officer observing him and Kristian Jones outside a motel during the

investigation of an unrelated prostitution offense, and (2) messages from B.T. suggesting

Jones was operating the sex-trafficking scheme. In his view, admitting that evidence

violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs the admissibility of character

evidence and other acts. But Rule 404(b) does not apply to intrinsic evidence, i.e.,

evidence that “is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the charged offense,” United States v.

Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923,

927 (D.C. Cir. 2000)), because such evidence is “part and parcel of the charged offense,”

United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 357 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.

Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2010)). The two pieces of evidence at issue here are

6 To the extent Jones again invokes ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse his delay, the record is inadequately developed to address his argument, so we leave that question for collateral review. See United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should ordinarily be raised in a collateral proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.”). 5 intrinsic because they tend to support Jones’s participation in the conspiracy. Thus, the

District Court did not violate Rule 404(b) by admitting them. 7

Second, Jones contends that the District Court incorrectly admitted text messages

to customers found in B.T.’s cell phone to prove Jones trafficked B.T. in July 2017. But

B.T.’s instructions to customers are not hearsay “because they are not declarations of fact

and therefore are not capable of being true or false.” United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d

1396, 1410 (3d Cir. 1994). And even if they were, because Jones did not preserve his

objection, we review for plain error, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731

(1993), and Jones has not carried that burden. So this argument fails too. 8

Third, Jones maintains that the District Court erroneously admitted hearsay

statements in the form of certain Facebook messages between Jones and unindicted co-

conspirator T.D. He contemporaneously objected to this evidence, so we review for

abuse of discretion, United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002), but Jones

cannot demonstrate prejudicial error.

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) makes statements by co-conspirators in

furtherance of the conspiracy non-hearsay. Here, the District Court admitted a handful of

7 Jones also asserts that admitting this evidence violated the District Court’s earlier ruling excluding evidence relating to those witnesses. But that ruling only prevented victims not named in the indictment from testifying to their own status, which did not happen here. 8 To the extent Jones challenges the admission of this (and other) evidence as violations of the Confrontation Clause, he is mistaken. None of this evidence is testimonial under the Sixth Amendment because it was not “made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Williams v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 112 F.4th 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005)). 6 statements from co-conspirator T.D. after careful review of the relevant evidence. Thus,

as statements of a co-conspirator, T.D.’s statements are non-hearsay, and the District

Court did not err in admitting them. But even if the statements were hearsay, any error

was harmless given the vanishingly small part this testimony played in Jones’s fourteen-

day trial. See United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 776 (3d Cir. 2016).

D. Knowingly Presenting a False Theory

Jones also asserts that the Government knowingly presented a false theory at trial

with respect to Count Four because it allegedly knew B.T. was responsible for her own

prostitution on a relevant occasion. His contention rests on allegedly false testimony

given by one of the Government’s witnesses, Newark Police Corporal Odom, regarding

evidence obtained from an interview with B.T. in November 2016 following her arrest

for prostitution, and a subsequent search of and data extraction from her phone. But this

argument fails too.

To succeed on a claim that the prosecution knowingly advanced a false theory of

guilt, “the defendant[] must show: ‘(1) [the government’s witness] committed perjury; (2)

the government knew or should have known of his perjury; (3) the testimony went

uncorrected; and (4) there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have

affected the verdict.’” United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004)) (second alteration in

original). Here, Jones alleges that the Government knowingly presented evidence that

Jones trafficked B.T. when she was arrested on November 23, 2016. But Jones cannot

demonstrate that the evidence introduced was false, nor does he meaningfully contend

7 that it was. Rather, as the trial transcript shows, this testimony was introduced to connect

B.T. to Jones’s co-conspirator, Bridges. Thus, the Government introduced the testimony

to connect a co-conspirator to a trafficking victim—not to knowingly pursue a false

theory against Jones.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jones next argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on any count.

When reviewing a jury’s finding of guilt, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). That standard is “highly deferential, and we will

overturn a verdict only ‘if no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to

support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United

States v. Carballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting

United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)).

Here, ample evidence supports Jones’s convictions. Viewed as a whole, we

cannot say that the record lacks the “minimum quantum of evidence” necessary to sustain

his convictions. Washington v. Gilmore, 124 F.4th 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting

Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995)). Indeed,

Jones does not appear to contest that determination. Rather, he merely attacks the

credibility of the Government’s witnesses and maintains that individual pieces of

evidence, taken in isolation, fail to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But

assessing witness credibility is the province of juries, not appellate judges. See Carballo-

8 Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430. And we must consider the entire record when assessing the

sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, not take each piece of evidence bit-by-

bit. See United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2015). Accordingly,

Jones’s arguments fall well short of the requisite threshold to vacate his conviction. 9

F. Constructive Amendment of Counts Four, Five, and Six

Next, Jones argues that Counts Four, Five, and Six were constructively amended

by the District Court’s jury instruction. While we review for plain error because he did

not contemporaneously object to the instruction, see Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, Jones cannot

prevail even under de novo review. “The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty

verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, . . . the verdict stands if

the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Turner v. United

States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970). That is what occurred here—the superseding

indictment charged Jones in the conjunctive, and the petit jury convicted him on one of

those acts. Thus, Jones’s constructive-amendment argument fails.

G. Cumulative Error

Finally, Jones asks us to vacate his convictions because cumulative errors led to

erroneous convictions on all counts. But vacating a conviction for cumulative error is

9 Jones contends in passing that the Government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material to the case. United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). The evidence Jones contends was wrongfully withheld—certain data extracted from B.T.’s cell phone—was made available to the defense before trial and Jones’s counsel elected not to review it. Thus, his Brady claim also fails. 9 appropriate only in two circumstances: when (1) related errors have a “synergistic effect”

to “amplify each other in relation to a key contested issue in the case”; and (2)

accumulated unrelated errors “sufficiently undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 154 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotations

omitted). As neither pertains here, the District Court did not err. And even if it did, the

“remaining evidence of [Jones’s] guilt was ‘overwhelming,’” so vacatur on cumulative-

error grounds would not be warranted. Id. (quoting United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535,

547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994)).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.