United States v. Andre Cooper

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 24-2778
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

AMENDED CLD-066 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2778 ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANDRE COOPER, a/k/a DRE, Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Action No. 2:01-cr-00512-005) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ____________________________________

Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 January 16, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed February 26, 2025) _________

OPINION* _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Andre Cooper appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release. The

Government moves for summary affirmance. Because this appeal presents no substantial

question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, we grant the Government’s motion

and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

In 2006, Cooper was found guilty after a jury trial of three counts of murder in aid

of racketeering and numerous other charges. Cooper received three consecutive life

sentences for the murders and concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 30 years on

his other convictions. His most recent petition for a reduction of his sentence alleged that

a combination of factors create “extraordinary and compelling” reasons justifying his

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): that he was young when he committed the

crimes, that his sentence is out of step with similarly situated defendants around the

country, that his sentence is unusually long and there have been relevant changes in the

law, and that he has engaged in extensive rehabilitation since his incarceration. The

District Court disagreed, holding that his proffered reasons were not extraordinary and

compelling, and that even if they were, relief was not justified after consideration of the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Cooper timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s

denial of compassionate release for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb the

decision “unless there is a definite and firm conviction that [the District Court]

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the

2 relevant factors.” United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quotation marks omitted).

A district court has discretion to “reduce [a federal inmate’s] term of

imprisonment” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a

district court must also consider the sentencing factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

“to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, among

other things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1); the need for the sentence “to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment

for the offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C); and “the need to

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have

been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id. § 3553(a)(6).

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that, even if

Cooper had presented sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release,

consideration of the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) warranted his continued

incarceration. The District Court acknowledged Cooper’s “remorse and rehabilitation,” as

well as his exemplary disciplinary record while in prison, but emphasized that his “crimes

were particularly heinous” as he was “responsible for or involved in three murders,” and

3 determined that his release therefore would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense,

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or afford adequate deterrence to

criminal conduct.” Opinion at 14. It also distinguished between Cooper’s offenses and

those of defendants around the country convicted of similar crimes who have received

sentence reductions due in part to their youth, id. at 8-9, and determined that the disparity

between his sentence and those of his co-defendants was not “forbidden” because it was

“justified by legitimate considerations such as cooperation or acknowledgement of guilt.”

Id. at 10. Because the District Court clearly weighed all relevant factors and considered

Cooper’s arguments, this was not an abuse of discretion.1 See United States v. Rodriguez,

855 F.3d 526, 533 (3d Cir. 2017) (“This weighing and consideration of multiple factors,

expressly left to a court’s discretion, is exactly the type of reasoned appraisal to which we

defer on review.” (quotation marks omitted)).

We therefore grant the Government’s motion for summary action and will affirm

the District Court’s judgment.2

1 Though Cooper argues otherwise, our decision in United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024), has no bearing on the outcome of this case because our affirmance is based on the District Court’s application of the § 3553 factors, not an analysis of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction. 2 In light of this disposition, we also grant the Government’s request to be relieved of its obligation to file a brief.