CLARK, Circuit Judge.
This action is upon a surety bond in the penal sum of $2,000 securing the faithful performance of his duties by one Welge, a clerk in the Post Office at Essex, Connecticut. It was dated October 26, 1935, and had no stated period of duration. Its condition was “that if the said employee shall, on and after October 26, 1935, faithfully discharge all the duties and trusts imposed on him as such heretofore designated employee * * * then this obligation shall be void; otherwise, of force.” The bond also contained a statement that “the premium of this bond is $0.65 per $1,000,” with the “total premium charged $1.30.1 Each year thereafter the employee paid a like amount for renewal of the bond until November 27, 1944, when it was discovered that he had been guilty of a series of embezzlements beginning in 1935. These amounted to $7,949.72, but, after deducting certain recoveries effectuated from him, amounted in net sum to $3,865.97, dating from 1938. The defalcation in any one year never exceeded $2,000. Defendant as surety admitted its liability for $2,000 as the face amount of the bond as originally written and tendered payment of that amount. The district court, however, in a reasoned opinion, D.C.Conn., 77 F.Supp. 318, sustained the plaintiff’s contention for recovery of the full amount and gave judgment for it with interest, amounting to a total of $4,610.17. This appeal followed.
The bond was on the form prescribed by the Post Office Department and was given pursuant to statutory law and postal regulations. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of its coverage or, to use the not wholly informative labels employed by the parties, the question whether the penalty is cumulative, as asserted by the plaintiff, or merely continuous, as contended by the defendant, remains one of some difficulty. No cases directly in point have been discovered and we must proceed in the light of the wording of the contract against its background, aided by the incomplete analogy of other cases involving bonds of comparable, but not exactly similar, wording. We are not helped by Connecticut law — to whatever extent it might be considered applicable — because in the only Connecticut case involving a similar provision the court found it unnecessary to consider its effect. Town of Enfield v. Hamilton, 112 Conn. 314, 152 A. 285.
Under the governing federal statute the Postmaster General may require that certain postal employees “shall, before en[137]*137tering upon the duties of their office, give bond to the United States with good and approved security, and in such penalty as the Postmaster General shall prescribe, conditioned for the faithful discharge of all duties and trusts imposed upon them.” 39 U.S.C.A. § 132. Postal Laws and Regulations § 473 provides that the bonds of all employees of first- and second-class post offices, in which group the employee here is included, shall be “in accordance with the forms prescribed by the department.” By express statute the liability of a surety on an official bond continues and covers “the period of service ensuing until the appointment and qualification of the successor of the principal.” 6 U.S.C.A. § 3; 26 Op. Atty.Gen. 70. True, a new bond.for the postal employee may be substituted under the procedure stated in 39 U.S.C.A. § 815; but when the substitution is accomplished the sureties in the prior bond are only released from responsibility for defaults of the principal committed “subsequent to the day such new bond becomes operative.” Hence liability for a default of this principal occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a renewal premium was paid for a later year. The strength of the plaintiff’s position lies in this fact, plus, of course, the generality of the language used in the bond and the absence of express limiting provisions. On defendant’s theory an embezzlement of $2,000 or more occurring in a single year would exhaust its coverage, notwithstanding the payment of later premiums and the existence of later defaults. Plaintiff contends that this could not have been intended and, referring incidentally to the premium charge for “this bond,” asserts that successive renewals constituted successive new agreements to the extent of $2,000 each.
Defendant’s first argument goes back to the statute cited providing for continuing liability upon official bonds. 6 U. S.C.A. § 3. In its original form it required that such bonds be renewed at least every four years; but it was amended in 1928 at the instance of the Post Office Department to provide that “the payment and acceptance of the annual premium on corporate surety bonds furnished by postal officers and employees * * * shall be a compliance with the requirement for the renewal of such bonds” within the statutory meaning. 45 Stat. 247. This amendment was designed to eliminate the uneconomical and unnecessary renewal procedure for bonds written by Treasury-supervised surety companies.2 The Department retained the power, under the statute, to require renewal where it thought such action necessary. There seems no reason to assume that this provision, so obviously in line with administrative convenience generally, particularly in the case of bonds of small amount, was intended to limit drastically the coverage which the Government had otherwise had for-its employees. It would thus have forfeited entirely even the verv definite effect of the previous quadrennial renewals of all bonds. We think the change should be considered limited to its stated purpose.
Defendant’s next argument is based upon the permission accorded Government employees, in lieu of filing a fidelity bond, of depositing Government securities “in a sum equal at their par value to the amount of such penal bond required to be furnished.” 6 U.S.C.A. § 15. Its claim is that, since presumably a cumulating deposit of security would not be required, so the alternative-provision for an annual premium provision cannot have been intended to make the security in the bond cumulative. But the deposit provision exists side by side in the statutes with the original quadrennial renewal provision, and it seems particularly unlikely that Congress would have meant not to protect the Government by annual premiums paid to the same insurer, when protection could have been obtained merely by application to another surety company. We are told by counsel for -the Government that no deposits of securities have ever been made, and hence there is no administrative practice to offer the light of experience. Whatever may turn out to be the proper interpretation of the deposit provision, we think it cannot be held to [138]*138limit the force of the requirement for an annual additional premium.
Finally to meet the point that the obligee, in cases where the bond penalty has already been exhausted by defaults, obtains nothing from the renewal, defendant urges that the continuous form of bond obviates the necessity of proving the particular period in which the defalcations took place. Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 4 Cir., 80 F.2d 205, 207. How important a practical consideration this may be is- not clear; one suspects it is more bookish than real in cases of substantial and proven embezzlements of postal clerks. But in any event, such a detail of proof can hardly offset the very real need of a right to collect the amount of the’ bond for eagh of the years in which a defalcation occurs.
Turning to the cases, those which contain language rather clearly negativing cumulative liability are not in point. Thus in Hack v.
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CLARK, Circuit Judge.
This action is upon a surety bond in the penal sum of $2,000 securing the faithful performance of his duties by one Welge, a clerk in the Post Office at Essex, Connecticut. It was dated October 26, 1935, and had no stated period of duration. Its condition was “that if the said employee shall, on and after October 26, 1935, faithfully discharge all the duties and trusts imposed on him as such heretofore designated employee * * * then this obligation shall be void; otherwise, of force.” The bond also contained a statement that “the premium of this bond is $0.65 per $1,000,” with the “total premium charged $1.30.1 Each year thereafter the employee paid a like amount for renewal of the bond until November 27, 1944, when it was discovered that he had been guilty of a series of embezzlements beginning in 1935. These amounted to $7,949.72, but, after deducting certain recoveries effectuated from him, amounted in net sum to $3,865.97, dating from 1938. The defalcation in any one year never exceeded $2,000. Defendant as surety admitted its liability for $2,000 as the face amount of the bond as originally written and tendered payment of that amount. The district court, however, in a reasoned opinion, D.C.Conn., 77 F.Supp. 318, sustained the plaintiff’s contention for recovery of the full amount and gave judgment for it with interest, amounting to a total of $4,610.17. This appeal followed.
The bond was on the form prescribed by the Post Office Department and was given pursuant to statutory law and postal regulations. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of its coverage or, to use the not wholly informative labels employed by the parties, the question whether the penalty is cumulative, as asserted by the plaintiff, or merely continuous, as contended by the defendant, remains one of some difficulty. No cases directly in point have been discovered and we must proceed in the light of the wording of the contract against its background, aided by the incomplete analogy of other cases involving bonds of comparable, but not exactly similar, wording. We are not helped by Connecticut law — to whatever extent it might be considered applicable — because in the only Connecticut case involving a similar provision the court found it unnecessary to consider its effect. Town of Enfield v. Hamilton, 112 Conn. 314, 152 A. 285.
Under the governing federal statute the Postmaster General may require that certain postal employees “shall, before en[137]*137tering upon the duties of their office, give bond to the United States with good and approved security, and in such penalty as the Postmaster General shall prescribe, conditioned for the faithful discharge of all duties and trusts imposed upon them.” 39 U.S.C.A. § 132. Postal Laws and Regulations § 473 provides that the bonds of all employees of first- and second-class post offices, in which group the employee here is included, shall be “in accordance with the forms prescribed by the department.” By express statute the liability of a surety on an official bond continues and covers “the period of service ensuing until the appointment and qualification of the successor of the principal.” 6 U.S.C.A. § 3; 26 Op. Atty.Gen. 70. True, a new bond.for the postal employee may be substituted under the procedure stated in 39 U.S.C.A. § 815; but when the substitution is accomplished the sureties in the prior bond are only released from responsibility for defaults of the principal committed “subsequent to the day such new bond becomes operative.” Hence liability for a default of this principal occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a renewal premium was paid for a later year. The strength of the plaintiff’s position lies in this fact, plus, of course, the generality of the language used in the bond and the absence of express limiting provisions. On defendant’s theory an embezzlement of $2,000 or more occurring in a single year would exhaust its coverage, notwithstanding the payment of later premiums and the existence of later defaults. Plaintiff contends that this could not have been intended and, referring incidentally to the premium charge for “this bond,” asserts that successive renewals constituted successive new agreements to the extent of $2,000 each.
Defendant’s first argument goes back to the statute cited providing for continuing liability upon official bonds. 6 U. S.C.A. § 3. In its original form it required that such bonds be renewed at least every four years; but it was amended in 1928 at the instance of the Post Office Department to provide that “the payment and acceptance of the annual premium on corporate surety bonds furnished by postal officers and employees * * * shall be a compliance with the requirement for the renewal of such bonds” within the statutory meaning. 45 Stat. 247. This amendment was designed to eliminate the uneconomical and unnecessary renewal procedure for bonds written by Treasury-supervised surety companies.2 The Department retained the power, under the statute, to require renewal where it thought such action necessary. There seems no reason to assume that this provision, so obviously in line with administrative convenience generally, particularly in the case of bonds of small amount, was intended to limit drastically the coverage which the Government had otherwise had for-its employees. It would thus have forfeited entirely even the verv definite effect of the previous quadrennial renewals of all bonds. We think the change should be considered limited to its stated purpose.
Defendant’s next argument is based upon the permission accorded Government employees, in lieu of filing a fidelity bond, of depositing Government securities “in a sum equal at their par value to the amount of such penal bond required to be furnished.” 6 U.S.C.A. § 15. Its claim is that, since presumably a cumulating deposit of security would not be required, so the alternative-provision for an annual premium provision cannot have been intended to make the security in the bond cumulative. But the deposit provision exists side by side in the statutes with the original quadrennial renewal provision, and it seems particularly unlikely that Congress would have meant not to protect the Government by annual premiums paid to the same insurer, when protection could have been obtained merely by application to another surety company. We are told by counsel for -the Government that no deposits of securities have ever been made, and hence there is no administrative practice to offer the light of experience. Whatever may turn out to be the proper interpretation of the deposit provision, we think it cannot be held to [138]*138limit the force of the requirement for an annual additional premium.
Finally to meet the point that the obligee, in cases where the bond penalty has already been exhausted by defaults, obtains nothing from the renewal, defendant urges that the continuous form of bond obviates the necessity of proving the particular period in which the defalcations took place. Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 4 Cir., 80 F.2d 205, 207. How important a practical consideration this may be is- not clear; one suspects it is more bookish than real in cases of substantial and proven embezzlements of postal clerks. But in any event, such a detail of proof can hardly offset the very real need of a right to collect the amount of the’ bond for eagh of the years in which a defalcation occurs.
Turning to the cases, those which contain language rather clearly negativing cumulative liability are not in point. Thus in Hack v. American Surety Co. of New York, 7 Cir., 96 F.2d 939, 948, certiorari denied 305 U.S. 631, 59 S.Ct. 95, 83 L.Ed. 435, the bond declared that “in no- event” should the surety’s aggregate liability for any one or more defaults of the principal during any one or more years exceed the amount stated in the bond. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Weatherly, Pa., 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 977, the surety’s liability was to “continue in the amounts scheduled” until the insurance was terminated. In Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, the surety was liable only for losses discovered within two years after the termination of the bond, thus showing an intent against cumulative responsibility. In Brulatour v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 2 Cir., 80 F.2d 834, there was evidence in the subsequent actions of the parties that they regarded the liability as continuous, and when one of -the annual schedules filed with the bond explicitly provided that the renewal premium would not create cumulative liability, the obligee voiced-no objection. None of these cases is thus particularly helpful.
Where the language of the bond is more general, the courts appear to be in disagreement. Tho§e.that find continuous, rather than cumulative, liability stress the absence of specific provisions for -termination and
renewal and the fact that the bond is stated to be for an indefinite term. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 7 Cir., 162 F.2d 264. Thus the bond has been likened to a term life insurance policy, Fourth & First Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 153 Tenn. 176, 281 S.W. 785, 45 A.L.R. 610, though the analogy seems unpersuasive; a man has only one life, while a postal clerk may be guilty of many embezzlements.
On the other hand, the courts which find cumulative liability seem to be more impressed by practical considerations. “We are -the more persuaded to this view by the improbability that a practical business concern * * * would pay one company two premiums for a single right of recovery if it could by payment of the same sum to two separate insurance carriers procure recoverable insurance for two periods.” Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Collingdale State Bank, 3 Cir., 85 F.2d 375, 376. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commercial State Bank of Rantoul, D.C.E.D.Ill., 13 F.2d 474, 476, reversed on other grounds, 7 Cir., 19 F.2d 969, the court asks the pertinent question, “What did he [the obligee] buy the second year?” and concludes that he must have bought a new contract of insurance. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Montgomery, Ala., 5 Cir., 246 F. 892, 900, certiorari denied 246 U.S. 670, 38 S.Ct. 345, 62 L.Ed. 931, the court points out that the renewal premium was equal in amount to the initial premium, and that therefore it should provide equal coverage, without diminishing the coverage for undiscovered defalcations in the previous period.
We agree with Judge Smith in regarding these considerations as persuasive. It does not seem rational to believe that the United States would require a contract from a surety of so little practical value or that a company in business as a paid surety would be justified in contemplating that it had promised so little. Other considerations, such as that the premium was paid by the clerk, not by the Government, and that the bond was required by it as a condition of the employment, do not militate against ■this conclusion. Such considerations may concern and affect the compensation for the [139]*139office; they can hardly be employed to limit or nullify the conditions themselves. Nor does the fact that the bond was on a Government form suggest enough doubt to call for construction against the obligee. The substantial and controlling point is that an annual premium was required and paid in the expectation of the obvious protection which that should afford.
Affirmed.