CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Hector Alvarez appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distrib[880]*880ute and for conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress certain statements and physical evidence obtained after his war-rantless arrest by federal agents. We agree with Alvarez and reverse the conviction.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a conspiracy to smuggle cocaine into the United States. On January 29, 1983, narcotics officers from an interagency task force were engaged in surveillance of the vessel “Ciudad de Santa Marta,” which had been docked in San Pedro Harbor since its arrival from Colombia the day before. The officers had reliable information that the vessel was carrying a large quantity of cocaine. There was also information that the smugglers were armed with automatic weapons.
At approximately 10 a.m., officers saw a late-model, red Oldsmobile drive to the dock. An individual entered the vehicle, and it left the area. The car returned later in the day. Two persons got out of the vehicle empty-handed and boarded the Ciu-dad de Santa Marta. They were seen leaving the vessel about five minutes later carrying a large cardboard box. They placed the box in the trunk of the automobile and drove away.
A short time later, agents stopped the vehicle and arrested the occupants. A search of the cardboard box revealed approximately 42 pounds of 88-percent pure cocaine. The suspects were taken to the U.S. Customs Service patrol office, where they were interviewed. By 1:30 p.m., one of the suspects had told agents that he was to deliver the cocaine to a person known as “Mauricio,” who was staying in room 316 of the Holiday Inn in Long Beach. The suspect also told officers that a co-conspirator was in a sixth-floor room of the same motel.
Upon receiving this information, the officers in San Pedro contacted the Long Beach office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to request assistance with arrests at the Holiday Inn. Agent Don Clark of the Long Beach FBI office then called several other agents to help with the arrests, and by 2 p.m. the agents had arrived at the FBI office. As it turns out, that office is only about 30 yards from the Holiday Inn. Nonetheless, the FBI did not begin any surveillance of the suspects’ rooms at the Holiday Inn or of the area generally.
Although a U.S. magistrate is on duty at all times in the Central District of California, nothing in the record indicates that the agents even considered securing an arrest warrant either in person or by telephone, as permitted under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2). Agent Clark, however, did call the U.S. Attorney’s office. According to the testimony of the agents, the FBI was seeking the U.S. Attorney’s approval of the anticipated arrest. When an Assistant U.S. Attorney gave his approval, the agents proceeded without warrants across the street to the hotel, arriving there at about 3 p.m.
After stopping at the registration desk to verify the identities of the suspects, agents went to room 618. There, they arrested Leonicio Rodriquez as he was attempting to escape by way of the balcony. A short time later, officers arrived at room 316, where they placed appellant Alvarez, the “Mauricio” previously referred to, under arrest. Officers found incriminating physical evidence, and Alvarez later confessed to his role in the conspiracy.
Before trial, Alvarez moved to suppress the physical evidence and his post-arrest statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest. At the hearing on the matter, the government offered no evidence concerning its failure to seek an arrest warrant, even by telephone. Nonetheless, the district court denied the motion, accepting the government’s contention that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure in this case. With the evidence admitted, Alvarez was convicted on both charges and sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year prison [881]*881terms plus a special parole term of fifteen years.1 He is currently in custody.
DISCUSSION
The only issue in this appeal is whether the government sufficiently justified its failure to use a warrant when it arrested Alvarez. We conclude that it did not.
A warrantless arrest in a non-public place is presumptively unreasonable and violative of the fourth amendment. Pay-ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-89,100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380-81, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). There are exceptions to the warrant requirement, the most common of which is the “exigent circumstances” exception, in which we recognize that some situations present a compelling need for instant arrest, and that delay to seek a warrant will endanger life, limb, or overriding law enforcement interests. In these cases, our strong preference for use of a warrant must “give way to an urgent need for immediate action.” United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir.1980).
It must be emphasized, however, that the “exigent circumstances” exception is just that — an exception. Accordingly, we have held that “the government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that exceptional circumstances justified a departure from the normal procedure of obtaining a warrant.” United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir.1985). The government must produce “specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent circumstances.” Id. Although we review the district court’s finding of facts and determinations of credibility for clear error, a conclusion of exigent circumstances is reviewed de novo. United States v. Good, 780 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 920 (1986); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824,105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).
In this case, it is undisputed that between 90 minutes and two hours had elapsed from the time government agents learned where Alvarez was waiting until the time they actually arrested him at that location.2 Although some of this time was [882]*882required to assemble a team to effect the arrests and to brief the agents involved, the government agents found sufficient time to contact the U.S. Attorney’s office and await “approval” for the arrest operation. During the one hour period when they were assembled at the FBI office, the agents made no attempt to secure the Holiday Inn or to monitor the suspect’s movements, despite warnings from the suspects already under arrest that Alvarez would become suspicious if the cocaine were not delivered on time. The agent’s actions in this case were thus fundamentally inconsistent with any true exigency.
But even if, as Judge Lucas found, “time was of the essence” for the agents that day, we could not conclude that the government had satisfied its burden in this case. In United States v. Manfredi,
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CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Hector Alvarez appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distrib[880]*880ute and for conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress certain statements and physical evidence obtained after his war-rantless arrest by federal agents. We agree with Alvarez and reverse the conviction.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a conspiracy to smuggle cocaine into the United States. On January 29, 1983, narcotics officers from an interagency task force were engaged in surveillance of the vessel “Ciudad de Santa Marta,” which had been docked in San Pedro Harbor since its arrival from Colombia the day before. The officers had reliable information that the vessel was carrying a large quantity of cocaine. There was also information that the smugglers were armed with automatic weapons.
At approximately 10 a.m., officers saw a late-model, red Oldsmobile drive to the dock. An individual entered the vehicle, and it left the area. The car returned later in the day. Two persons got out of the vehicle empty-handed and boarded the Ciu-dad de Santa Marta. They were seen leaving the vessel about five minutes later carrying a large cardboard box. They placed the box in the trunk of the automobile and drove away.
A short time later, agents stopped the vehicle and arrested the occupants. A search of the cardboard box revealed approximately 42 pounds of 88-percent pure cocaine. The suspects were taken to the U.S. Customs Service patrol office, where they were interviewed. By 1:30 p.m., one of the suspects had told agents that he was to deliver the cocaine to a person known as “Mauricio,” who was staying in room 316 of the Holiday Inn in Long Beach. The suspect also told officers that a co-conspirator was in a sixth-floor room of the same motel.
Upon receiving this information, the officers in San Pedro contacted the Long Beach office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to request assistance with arrests at the Holiday Inn. Agent Don Clark of the Long Beach FBI office then called several other agents to help with the arrests, and by 2 p.m. the agents had arrived at the FBI office. As it turns out, that office is only about 30 yards from the Holiday Inn. Nonetheless, the FBI did not begin any surveillance of the suspects’ rooms at the Holiday Inn or of the area generally.
Although a U.S. magistrate is on duty at all times in the Central District of California, nothing in the record indicates that the agents even considered securing an arrest warrant either in person or by telephone, as permitted under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2). Agent Clark, however, did call the U.S. Attorney’s office. According to the testimony of the agents, the FBI was seeking the U.S. Attorney’s approval of the anticipated arrest. When an Assistant U.S. Attorney gave his approval, the agents proceeded without warrants across the street to the hotel, arriving there at about 3 p.m.
After stopping at the registration desk to verify the identities of the suspects, agents went to room 618. There, they arrested Leonicio Rodriquez as he was attempting to escape by way of the balcony. A short time later, officers arrived at room 316, where they placed appellant Alvarez, the “Mauricio” previously referred to, under arrest. Officers found incriminating physical evidence, and Alvarez later confessed to his role in the conspiracy.
Before trial, Alvarez moved to suppress the physical evidence and his post-arrest statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest. At the hearing on the matter, the government offered no evidence concerning its failure to seek an arrest warrant, even by telephone. Nonetheless, the district court denied the motion, accepting the government’s contention that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure in this case. With the evidence admitted, Alvarez was convicted on both charges and sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year prison [881]*881terms plus a special parole term of fifteen years.1 He is currently in custody.
DISCUSSION
The only issue in this appeal is whether the government sufficiently justified its failure to use a warrant when it arrested Alvarez. We conclude that it did not.
A warrantless arrest in a non-public place is presumptively unreasonable and violative of the fourth amendment. Pay-ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-89,100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380-81, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). There are exceptions to the warrant requirement, the most common of which is the “exigent circumstances” exception, in which we recognize that some situations present a compelling need for instant arrest, and that delay to seek a warrant will endanger life, limb, or overriding law enforcement interests. In these cases, our strong preference for use of a warrant must “give way to an urgent need for immediate action.” United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir.1980).
It must be emphasized, however, that the “exigent circumstances” exception is just that — an exception. Accordingly, we have held that “the government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that exceptional circumstances justified a departure from the normal procedure of obtaining a warrant.” United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir.1985). The government must produce “specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent circumstances.” Id. Although we review the district court’s finding of facts and determinations of credibility for clear error, a conclusion of exigent circumstances is reviewed de novo. United States v. Good, 780 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 920 (1986); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824,105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).
In this case, it is undisputed that between 90 minutes and two hours had elapsed from the time government agents learned where Alvarez was waiting until the time they actually arrested him at that location.2 Although some of this time was [882]*882required to assemble a team to effect the arrests and to brief the agents involved, the government agents found sufficient time to contact the U.S. Attorney’s office and await “approval” for the arrest operation. During the one hour period when they were assembled at the FBI office, the agents made no attempt to secure the Holiday Inn or to monitor the suspect’s movements, despite warnings from the suspects already under arrest that Alvarez would become suspicious if the cocaine were not delivered on time. The agent’s actions in this case were thus fundamentally inconsistent with any true exigency.
But even if, as Judge Lucas found, “time was of the essence” for the agents that day, we could not conclude that the government had satisfied its burden in this case. In United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983), we stated that the government’s burden was not satisfied “unless the government demonstrates that a warrant could not have been obtained in time even by telephone under the procedure authorized by Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2).”3
In Manfredi, we upheld a warrantless entry of a hotel room. Despite our concern over the government’s “[i]nexplicabl[e]” failure to introduce evidence concerning the impracticability of obtaining a warrant by telephone, id. at 523, the facts demonstrated conclusively that time would not have permitted securing a warrant, even by telephone. See id. at 522-23. We accordingly upheld the police action.
As in Manfredi, the government here offered no evidence concerning its failure to seek a telephone warrant.4 Here, how[883]*883ever, we cannot excuse the government’s failure. The agents had a minimum of 90 minutes and sufficient time to discuss the case fully with personnel of the U.S. Attorney’s office; we cannot say conclusively that the agents or the Assistant U.S. Attorney could not have complied with Rule 41(c)(2).5 See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C.Cir.1981).
The government argues that obtaining a telephone warrant is not an easy task, and it points to our decision in United States v. Good, 780 F.2d at 775. But our decision here does not invariably require the government to have a telephone warrant before it moves in on a dangerous suspect. It simply requires the government either to attempt, in good faith, to secure a warrant6 or to present evidence explaining why a telephone warrant was unavailable or impractical. Id.
The telephone warrant requirement is no mere formality. As the Supreme Court has recognized, warrants interpose a neutral and detached magistrate between law enforcement officials and targets of searches and seizures before a search or seizure has occurred. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416-17, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). They are fundamental to the fourth amendment’s protection of individual privacy. “An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).7 Congress, by enacting Rule 41(c)(2), has stated its strong preference for the use of warrants as well. Indeed, when warrants are used, a defendant’s ability to challenge a search or seizure is severely limited; we accord great deference to a magistrate’s advance determination that probable cause supports a search or arrest. E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 5. Ct. at 3417; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2)(G) (precluding, in most cases, motions to suppress based on alleged misuse of telephone warrant procedure).
In cases where exigent circumstances truly exist, we recognize that the usual fourth amendment protection must give way. But because of the danger that ex[884]*884ceptions pose for fourth amendment guarantees, we are most unwilling to excuse the government’s failure to seek a warrant in cases where no necessity for “immediate action” can be demonstrated. See United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir.1980).
We are even less willing to ratify the government’s action where, as here, there has been not the slightest effort to comply with a clear, concise rule such as Rule 41(c)(2). Rule 41(c)(2) was designed to accommodate the needs of law enforcement while ensuring the preservation of constitutional rights. See Advisory Committee and Historical Notes to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 (1977 Amendment); see also McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1146-48 (reviewing legislative history). The action of the agents and the Assistant United States Attorney in ignoring the telephone warrant procedure totally frustrates the accommodation approved by Congress. It cannot be sanctioned by us. The arrest of Alvarez was unlawful.
Although an illegal arrest does not void a subsequent conviction, United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir.1986), physical evidence and statements obtained as a .result of such an arrest must be suppressed. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1249, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). As a result, Alvarez’s post-arrest statements as well as physical evidence seized from his hotel room should have been suppressed. The district court erred when it ruled otherwise.
Because this important evidence8 should have been suppressed, we are forced to reverse the conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.9 We recognize the serious consequences of reversal. They may be avoided in the future if law enforcement authorities will attempt in good faith to follow the procedures approved by Congress for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the fourth amendment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.