United States v. Allis

73 F. 165, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2992
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Kansas
DecidedDecember 8, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 73 F. 165 (United States v. Allis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Allis, 73 F. 165, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2992 (circtdks 1893).

Opinion

SANBORN, Circuit Judge

(charging jury). One of the chief characteristics of a good government is the sure and speedy administration of justice. No government can long endure, or ought long to endure, under which the criminal is not speedily and certainly punished, and the innocent as speedily and certainly acquitted and protected. Laws are enacted for the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the citizen. Penalties are prescribed for their violation, that this protection may be insured. Every good citizen withholds Ms own hand from the infliction of punishment, and appeals to the courts Ms government has established to right Ms wrongs and to enforce the laws enacted for Ms protection. Hor is the action of the government or its officers, in prosecuting those that they honestly believe to be guilty, properly subject to any adverse criticism or animadversion; nor has there been, so far as I have observed, anything in their conduct in this case that has even savored of persecution or unfairness. If the government has money and officers at its command, and uses them to properly gather and present the evidence against one whom its officers believe to be guilty of a violation of our laws, we ought not, on that account, to be resentful or prejudiced against it; but we should be grateful that we live under a government that has the power and disposition to punish the guilty, for it is only by the punishment of the guilty that the lives, liberty, and property of innocent citizens are preserved. If the .courts and juries discharge the duties the law imposes upon them, if with courage and impartiality they punish the guilty and acquit the innocent, contentment and satisfaction and domestic peace prevail. But if they fail in the discharge of these duties; if criminals escape their just punishment, and the innocent are needlessly imperiled; if the property, lives, and liberty of the citizens go unprotected, because the laws are not enforced by juries and the courts, — every man, despairing of obtaining justice through [167]*167diera, will feel disposed to avenge Ids own wrongs, and domestic violence and the barbaric rule of the strongest will soon again prevail.

We now come, gentlemen of the jury, to the discharge of one of "die most important duties that will ever devolve upon us as citizens. We must determine whether the prisoner at the bar is guilty or innocent oí a violation of the laws of this land. We have all, court and jury alike, taken a solemn oath to discharge this duty without fear or favor, according to the law and the evidence. In ¡he discharge of this duty, the court and the jury have different parts to perforin; but the honest and faithful discharge of their duties, and the attainment of a jnut result from this trial, demand of the court the same courage, integrity, impartiality, and zealous determination to do exact justice, regardless oí the consequences to (he parties, which I have no doubt animate the jury, and will inspire and direct their action. It is the duty of the court to declare to you the law by which this case must be determined, and it is your duty to be governed by that declaration. H is your exclusive province and duty to determine the issues of fact here presented, and the weight: and credibility of the testimony of the witnesses, and by your determination of these questions the court will be bound. If, in the course of what the court may say to you, any expression of opinion should drop as to the disputed issues oí fact, or the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses, you are not bound by any such expression; but it is your privilege to adopt or disregard it as you may see lit. You are, I repeal, the sole judge® of the disputed questions of fact yet to be decided.

The defendant is charged by the government with the commission of heinous crimes. He is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved. The burden is on the government to prove the charges k has made. Yot only this, bui before the defendant can' be found guilty of any offense, that offense must be proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt founded on a consideration of all the testimony, and based on reason, — such a doubt as would deter a reasonably prudent man from acting or deciding in the most important matters involving his personal interests. If you have such a doubt of the guilt of the defendant under any of the counts of this indictment, after carefully considering all (he evidence, you should acquit him of the offense charged in that count; but if you have no such doubt, but are morally certain he is guilty of the offense charged In any count of the indictment, you should fearlessly declare him guilty, it is not necessary, however, that you should be satislied beyond all possibility or suspicion oí doubt that the defendant was guilty before you can convict. Doubts that are not based upon a reasonable and careful consideration of all the evidence, but are purely imaginary, or born of sympathy alone, or of the ingenious suggestions of counsel merely, ought not to be considered, and should not influence your verdict. Possible, imaginary, and sympathetic doubts haw: no proper place in your deliberations; and if, in your opinion, the offense charged in any count in the indictment is proved beyond [168]*168a reasonable doubt, you should return a verdict in favor of the government on that count, regardless of all other doubts.

In a more primitive state of society, men generally kept their money and personal property in their own possession; but in our day it has long been the habit of men of all classes to intrust their money and securities to others for safe-keeping. Banks have been established in the large cities, protected by an efficient police and by secure vaults against the stealth of the thief and the force of the robber, and in these the moneys and securities of the business man and of the capitalist, and the surplus money of the farmer, the mechanic, and the laborer are alike deposited, in the faith that their directors and officers will faithfully preserve and honestly return these deposits, or their equivalent, when called for. A portion of the moneys thus deposited is, in the usual course of business, used to discount commercial paper of the customers of the bank, or to loan to them upon their promissory notes, while a sufficient balance is kept on hand to pay depositors as they call. It is obvious that, under this system, the security of the moneys of the depositors, the interests of the stockholders and the creditors of any bank, and its very existence must depend almost entirely upon the honesty, integrity, care, and prudence of its officers. As the money is in their hands, they can, by a breach of trust and honor, appropriate it to their own use, or to the use of their friends, or, by carelessness and imprudence, they may loan it to worthless borrowers, until it is irrevocably lost. To prevent the possibility of such crimes and misfortunes, as far as possible, is one of the objects of the existence of the national banking law. It is well to note here that no part of that law requires any citizen to become a president or officer of a national bank. No man is compelled by that law to discharge any of the duties prescribed, or to put himself in a place where he can be liable to any of the penalties denounced by that law. But, if he voluntarily assumes the position of a president of a national bank, if he voluntarily takes the control and management of the .funds invested in the stock and deposited in the vaults of a national bank, the law requires of him the faithful, honest, and exact performance of the duties it imposes upon such an officer, and imposes proper penalties for its violation.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
73 F. 165, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2992, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-allis-circtdks-1893.