Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge HAMILTON wrote an opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON and Judges WILKINS, NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING joined. Judge LUTTIG wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ joined.
OPINION
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
On October 31, 1997, Trooper Jackie Lynn Lawson (Trooper Lawson) of the South Carolina Highway Patrol discovered approximately eight kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of heroin in a vehicle driven by Aexis Brugal (Brugal) and occupied by Henry Adames (Adames) and Reyna DeJesus (DeJesus). Trooper Lawson discovered the drugs during events immediately following a stop at a checkpoint on an exit ramp off Interstate 95 in South Carolina.
On November 20, 1997, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of South Carolina returned a two-count indictment charging Brugal, Adames, and DeJesus with conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, see id. § 841(a)(1). In January 1998, Brugal, Adames, and DeJesus each moved to suppress the drugs seized by Trooper Lawson. On February 26, 1998, the district court granted the motions, and the government appealed.
On July 19, 1999, a panel of this court affirmed. See United States v. Brugal, 185 F.3d 205 (4th Cir.1999). On September 20, 1999, a majority of the active circuit judges voted to rehear this case en banc. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motions to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
On October 31, 1997, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Brugal, Adames, and DeJesus were traveling northbound on Interstate [355]*35595 near Ridgeland, South Carolina. Bru-gal was driving, and Adames and DeJesus were passengers. As they approached Exit 22, they passed two signs, illuminated by safety flares and reflective lettering, reading “DRUG CHECKPOINT AHEAD.” The first sign was placed 1000 feet before Exit 22, and the second sign was placed 500 feet before the exit.
There was no drug checkpoint on Interstate 95. Instead, at the direction of Sergeant John Hunnicut of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, Trooper Lawson and Officer Larry Shoemaker of the Ridgeland Police Department, established a checkpoint on Exit 22’s exit ramp. The checkpoint was located at the end of the exit ramp just before the road forks. The checkpoint was established to verify the driver’s license and vehicle registration of every motorist that got off at Exit 22. According to Trooper Lawson, the decoy drug checkpoint signs were placed on the interstate in hopes “that people carrying narcotics will become erratic, exit off the interstate, throw the narcotics out[, or ... ] cross the median and go back in the opposite direction.”
Exit 22 was selected by the officers because they considered it a “dead exit.” Unlike the exit preceding it, Exit 21, which has three well-lit twenty-four hour gas stations, the area around Exit 22 shows no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m. A traveler’s advisory sign for Exit 22 on Interstate 95 indicates that a gas station is located at that exit, but it is closed at night and cannot be seen from the interstate at night.
After passing the decoy drug checkpoint signs, Brugal exited Interstate 95 at Exit 22. On Exit 22’s exit ramp, Brugal was stopped at the checkpoint established by Trooper Lawson and Officer Shoemaker.1 Trooper Lawson approached Brugal’s vehicle and asked Brugal for his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Brugal produced a New York State driver’s license. In lieu of a vehicle registration, Brugal produced a rental agreement with Alamo Rent-A-Car indicating that the vehicle was rented by him in Miami, that he had a New York City address, and that the vehicle was to be returned to Miami on November 6, 1997.2 While reviewing Bru-gal’s driver’s license and rental agreement, Trooper Lawson asked Brugal why he had left the interstate and where he was headed. Brugal responded that he needed gas and was headed for Virginia Beach. During his questioning of Brugal, Trooper Lawson noticed that the vehicle had a quarter of a tank of gas and three pieces of luggage in the rear cargo area. Trooper Lawson also noticed that Brugal was in full compliance with the terms of the rental agreement. However, believing he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, namely, the transportation of drugs, Trooper Lawson retained Brugal’s rental agreement and instructed him to [356]*356pull over to the shoulder of the road.3 Approximately two minutes elapsed from the time Trooper Lawson initially approached Brugal’s vehicle and the time Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road.
After Brugal pulled his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, Trooper Lawson pulled his unmarked police cruiser behind Brugal’s vehicle and activated the video camera mounted on the dashboard. Trooper Lawson then approached Brugal’s vehicle and asked Brugal to “come out and talk to [him] for a minute.” Brugal immediately exited his vehicle and walked with Trooper Lawson to the back of his (Bru-gal’s) vehicle. Trooper Lawson momentarily returned to his cruiser to illuminate the cruiser’s headlights. After doing this, Trooper Lawson approached Brugal and, while examining the rental agreement, asked him if he rented the vehicle in Miami, and Brugal responded in the affirmative. Brugal also indicated that he had just moved there from New York City. Trooper Lawson asked Brugal if he had weapons, drugs, or anything illegal in his vehicle, and Brugal responded that he did not. Trooper Lawson then asked Brugal if he could search the vehicle, and Brugal responded “no problem.” Trooper Lawson repeated his request to search and, again, Brugal responded “no problem.” Approximately two minutes elapsed from the time Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road and the time Brugal gave his consent to search.
Following Brugal’s consent to search, Trooper Lawson asked Adames and Dejesus to exit the vehicle, which they immediately did. A protective pat-down was performed on Brugal and Adames, and Dejesus was asked to expose her waistband to allow the officers to see if she had a weapon there. A search of the vehicle was then performed by Trooper Lawson. During the search, Trooper Lawson discovered two pieces of luggage that contained packages slightly larger than bricks. It was later discovered these two pieces of luggage contained approximately eight kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of heroin.
II
A
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Thus, stopping a vehicle at a checkpoint constitutes a seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).
Constitutional challenges to checkpoint seizures turn on whether the initial stop at the checkpoint was reasonable. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Whether particular checkpoint seizures are reasonable is determined by balancing the gravity of the public interest sought to be advanced and the degree to which the seizures do advance that interest against the extent of the resulting intrusion upon the liberty interests of those stopped. See id. at 449-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481.
Applying this balancing analysis, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of government checkpoints set up to [357]*357detect drunken drivers, see id. at 454, 110 S.Ct. 2481, and illegal immigrants, see Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-67, 96 S.Ct. 3074, so long as they involve no more than an "initial stop ... and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers." Sits, 496 U.S. at 450-51, 110 S.Ct. 2481. The seizure at the sobriety checkpoint upheld in Sits lasted approximately twenty-five seconds, see id. at 448, 110 S.Ct. 2481, and the seizures at the immigration checkpoint upheld in Martinez-Fuerte lasted three to five minutes, see 428 U.S. at 544-48, 96 S.Ct. 3074.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that a state has a substantial interest in enforcing licensing and registration laws, though that interest is not substantial enough to justify roving patrol stops as an enforcement mechanism. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-59, 99 S.Ct. 1391. But, the Court suggested in Prouse, albeit in dicta, that checkpoints to check driver's licenses would be permissible even in the absence of articulable and reasonable suspicion that a driver was unlicensed. See id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391; of Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting that the circumstances surrounding stop at driver's license roadblock gave "no suggestion that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of a narcotics violation might be uncovered in `plain view' in the course of a check for driver's licenses"). Drawing on these authorities, courts have concluded that a brief stop at a checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying a driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of motorists and their passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a motorist or passenger is engaged in illegal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gouzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir.1998) (brief detention of motorist to inspect driver's license, vehicle registration, and insurance information at an established license checkpoint comports with the Fourth Amendment); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1310-13 (D.C.Cir.1989) (same).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that an initially permissible checkpoint seizure may transform into an impermissible one by further intrusions not based upon individualized suspicion or consent. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); see also Sits, 496 U.S. at 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Thus, when an officer seeks to expand the investigation of a motorist beyond the reasons for the checkpoint, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the particular person seized is engaged in criminal activity, see Sits, 496 U.S. at 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, or obtain consent during the time period the defendant is lawfully seized, see Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574.
B
The district court analyzed this case as involving two seizures, the first occurring when Brugal's vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint; the second occurring when Trooper Lawson retained Brugal's rental agreement and instructed him to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road. With respect to the first seizure, the district court held that "Trooper Lawson's initial seizure accompanied by a brief detention and limited questioning did not offend the Fourth Amendment."4 With respect to the second seizure, the district court held that this seizure was constitutionally impermissible because, the purposes of the checkpoint-verification of a valid driver's license and vehicle regis[358]*358tration-having been fulfilled by the time Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, Trooper Lawson did not have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, namely, the transportation of drugs. In reaching its ruling on the constitutionality of the second seizure, the district court analyzed eleven factors, which Trooper Lawson testified he observed prior to his decision to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, ~and which made him suspicious of the defendants' activities.5 With respect to these eleven factors, the government argued they "collectively gave rise to Trooper Lawson's reasonable suspicion." The district court concluded that these eleven factors, in their totality, did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendants were transporting drugs. Rather, according to the district court, Trooper Lawson acted on a "hunch that these Defendants were 3 `mules' transporting drugs[;J[h]e pulled them over and discovered that he was right."
The district court erroneously analyzed this case as involving two seizures. When the defendants were stopped at the checkpoint, they were seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Sits, 496 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Although the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled at the time Trooper Lawson instructed Bru-gal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, the defendants were never "unseized," i.e., free to go, at that time because Trooper Lawson retained Brugal's rental agreement. See S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-1250 (requiring every motorist to possess a vehicle registration). Thus, from an analytical standpoint, instead of analyzing whether a second seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion, the district court should have analyzed whether the defendants' continued seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion. The district court's erroneous analytical framework is of no moment because whether we apply the district court's incorrect second seizure framework or the more appropriate continuing seizure framework, the seminal question in the case remains the same: whether Trooper Lawson had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, namely, the transportation of drugs, at the time he instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road.
C
The Terry6 reasonable suspicion standard requires an officer to have a rea-~onable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before he may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person, see 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, or continue to seize a person following the conclusion of the purposes of a valid stop, see, e.g., United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876-77 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that, during a routine traffic stop, the officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation, but that "[A]any further detention for questioning is beyond the scope of the Terry stop and therefore illegal unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion of a serious crime"). [359]*359The standard “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Wardlow v. Illinois, — U.S.-, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). However, the Terry reasonable suspicion standard does require “a minimal level of objective justification” for the police action. Id. at 676. “The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Terry, 892 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). We have said that the Terry reasonable suspicion standard is “a commonsensical proposition,” and that “[ejourts are not remiss in crediting the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993).
The reasonable suspicion determination does not depend upon any one factor, but on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In assessing whether reasonable suspicion is present, we review the district court’s findings of historical fact for clear error and the determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
The Supreme Court has recognized that factors consistent with innocent travel can, when taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (“[A]ny one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.”); see also Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 677 {“Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”). In Sokolow, the defendant was stopped at Honolulu International Airport by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, who found a large amount of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. See 490 U.S. at 3, 109 S.Ct. 1581. The DEA agents had the following information before approaching the defendant: (1) he paid $2,100 cash for two airplane tickets from a roll of. $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami only forty-eight hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu takes twenty hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. See id. The Court emphasized the necessity of considering the totality of the circumstances in order to evaluate the existence of reasonable suspicion. See id. at 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581. The Court attached particular significance to the defendant’s payment of cash, to the length of his trip, and to the agents’ reasonable belief that he was traveling under an alias, considering these facts as “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 8-9, 109 S.Ct. 1581. Thus, as applied to this case, Sokolow teaches that it is not enough that Trooper Lawson could articulate factors underlying his decision to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road if Trooper Lawson’s articulated factors are not probative of behavior in which few innocent people would engage. The articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.
Trooper Lawson’s decision to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road was based on the following circumstances: (1) Interstate 95 is a major thoroughfare for narcotics trafficking; (2) Brugal exited Interstate 95 after passing two well-lit decoy drug checkpoint signs; (3) Brugal had a New York State driver’s license; (4) Brugal rented the vehicle in Miami; (5) the rental agreement indicated that Brugal had a New York City address; (6) a common practice of drug couriers is to fly to Miami, acquire drugs, rent a vehicle, and drive north; (7) Brugal indi[360]*360cated that he was searching for gas even though his vehicle had a quarter of a tank of gas; (8) Brugal just passed an exit, Exit 21, with several well-lit twenty-four hour gas stations; (9) the gas station referred to by the travel advisory sign cannot be seen from Interstate 95, and the area around Exit 22 showed no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m.; (10) the defendants were traveling at 3:30 a.m.; and (11) Brugal and his passengers only had three small bags which, according to Trooper Lawson, was insufficient luggage for three persons, two males and one female, traveling from Miami to Virginia Beach.
In their totality, the factors articulated by Trooper Lawson eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers; therefore, Trooper Lawson possessed reasonable suspicion to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road to conduct a further investigation. Trooper Lawson observed Brugal exit Interstate 95 immediately after passing two decoy drug checkpoint signs that were illuminated. If the area around the exit following the decoy drug checkpoint signs showed signs of activity at 3:30 a.m., an indication that hotels, convenience stores, and gas stations were in operation, a limited significance could attach to leaving Interstate 95 at such an exit. But, the area around Exit 22 showed no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m. Because the area around Exit 22 showed no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m., Brugal’s selection of this exit militates strongly in favor of finding reasonable suspicion. Cf. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (“Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). .
At the checkpoint, Brugal produced a New York State driver’s license. Brugal also produced a rental agreement indicating that he rented the vehicle in Miami, that he had a New York City address, and that the vehicle was to be returned to Miami on November 6, 1997. While reviewing Brugal’s driver’s license and rental agreement, Trooper Lawson asked Brugal why he had left the interstate and where he was headed. Brugal responded that he needed gas and was headed to Virginia Beach. During his questioning of Brugal, Trooper Lawson noticed that the vehicle had a quarter of a tank of gas and three pieces of luggage in the rear cargo area.
At this point, based on his knowledge and experience, Trooper Lawson, who had been a state trooper for eighteen years, had reasonable grounds to conclude that Brugal fit the profile of a drug courier from New York City who flew to Miami, rented a vehicle, and was attempting to return to New York City with drugs. Trooper Lawson testified that, based on his knowledge and experience, drug couriers fly to Miami from a northern destination, such as New York, to obtain drugs, rent a vehicle, and return north with the drugs. Admittedly, standing alone, there is nothing atypical about an individual from New York City renting a vehicle in Miami. We are sure many individuals from New York City do so. So these two facts, New York City resident and vehicle rental in Miami, standing alone, do not support the inference that Brugal was a drug courier who flew from New York City to Miami. However, these two facts must be considered with other facts observed by Trooper Lawson. Brugal’s vehicle was stopped in South Carolina while traveling northbound on Interstate 95 from Miami at 3:30 a.m. Neither party disputes that Interstate 95 is a major drug thoroughfare and that Miami is a source city for drugs. At the checkpoint, Brugal informed Trooper Lawson that he was looking for gas. Although Interstate 95 contained a traveler’s advisory sign for a gas station, three circumstances keep suspicions high. First and critically, Brugal chose to exit Interstate 95 at Exit 22, the first exit after the two decoy drug checkpoint signs. Second, the area around Exit 22 showed no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m. Third, Brugal’s vehicle had at least a quarter of a tank of gas, and Brugal just [361]*361passed an exit, Exit 21, with several well-lit twenty-four hour gas stations. In light of these facts, any reasonable officer would remain suspicious of the driver’s activities. In other words, a reasonable officer could conclude that few innocent travelers from New York City are traveling northbound on Interstate 95 in South Carolina at 3:30 a.m. in a vehicle rented in Miami fourteen hours earlier, exiting the interstate after passing two decoy drug checkpoint signs, and looking for gas at an exit that shows no signs of activity, even though they had just passed three well-lit gas stations and had at least a quarter of a tank of gas. In short, given the deference that this court is required to give Trooper Lawson’s experience, see Lender, 985 F.2d at 154, Trooper Lawson’s conclusion that Brugal fit the profile of a drug courier from New York City who flew to Miami, rented a vehicle, and was attempting to return to New York City with drugs was eminently reasonable.
The reasonable conclusion that Trooper Lawson drew from his observations creates a rather out of the ordinary travel scenario for Brugal. Why would an individual from New York City fly to Miami, rent a vehicle, and drive to Virginia Beach? Obviously, one can conceive of instances where an individual from New York City would travel to Miami, rent a vehicle, and drive to Virginia Beach. For example, an individual from New York City could be driving an individual from Miami who wished to go to Virginia Beach and did not like to fly, ride on a train, ride on a bus, or drive alone. However, common sense tells us that it is significantly more probable that Brugal flew from New York City to Miami, a source city for drugs, acquired drugs, and, instead of flying with the drugs on an airplane, rented a vehicle in Miami to transport the drugs to New York City. See Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (“[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”).
Under Sokolow, an officer’s articulated factors in their totality must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied. See 490 U.S. at 7-11, 109 S.Ct. 1581. In this case, Trooper Lawson’s articulated factors met this burden. Indeed, few, if any, innocent individuals from New York City, fly to Miami, rent a vehicle to drive to Virginia Beach, proceed to drive most of the day and night on Interstate 95, exit the interstate after passing two decoy drug checkpoint signs, and look for gas at an exit that shows no signs of activity at 3:30 a.m., when they have just passed three well-lit gas stations and have at least a quarter of a tank of gas. Because Trooper Lawson had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he directed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, we see nothing constitutionally infirm about the defendants’ continued seizure which permitted Trooper Lawson to conduct a further investigation into their activities and to request Brugal’s consent to search.7
[362]*362D
We now turn to the validity of Bru-gal's consent to the searëh. "A defendant who voluntarily consents to a search waives his Fourth Amendment rights, and the police officer may conduct the search without probable cause or a warrant." United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir.1995); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In assessing the voluntariness of an individual's consent, we examine the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Mendenhal, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Schuecldoth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Appropriate factors to consider include "the characteristics of the accused (such as age, maturity, education, intelligence, and experience) as well as the conditions under which the consent to search was given (such as the officer's conduct; the number of officers present; and the duration, location, and time of the encounter)." United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.1996). The government need not produce evidence that the defendant "knew of his right to refuse consent to prove that the consent was voluntary." Id.
After Brugal pulled his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, Trooper Lawson pulled his unmarked police cruiser behind Brugal's vehicle and activated the video camera mounted on the dashboard. Trooper Lawson then approached Brugal's vehicle and asked Brugal to "come out and talk to [him] for a minute." Brugal immediately exited his vehicle and walked with Trooper Lawson to the back of his (Bru-gal's) vehicle. Trooper Lawson momentarily returned to his cruiser to illuminate the cruiser's headlights. After doing this, Trooper Lawson approached Brugal and, while examining the rental agreement, asked him if he rented the vehicle in Miami, and Brugal responded in the affirmative. Brugal also indicated that he had just moved there from New. York City. Trooper Lawson asked Brugal if he had weapons, drugs, or anything illegal in his vehicle, and Brugal responded that he did not. Trooper Lawson then asked Brugal if he could search the vehicle, and Brugal responded "no problem." Trooper Lawson repeated his request to search and, again, Brugal responded "no problem."
Nothing in the record suggests that Brugal did not voluntarily consent to the search. Indeed, no evidence suggests that the police used coercive tactics to gain Brugal's consent. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir.1996) (explaining that "the absence of official coercion is a sine qua non of effective consent"). Under the facts of this case, the search of Brugal's vehicle was consensual and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir.1990) (holding that the defendant's consent, which was given when the defendant shrugged his shoulders and raised his arms in response to the officer's request to pat the defendant down, was voluntary because the officer was dressed in plain clothes, made no threats, displayed no weapons, and asked for consent in public).
E
Finally, we must address the logic of the opinion concurring in the judgment. In his opinion, Judge Luttig concludes that the search was permissible because Bru-gal's consent was obtained during a consensual encounter between Brugal and Trooper Lawson. His conclusion is premised on two propositions. First, his conclusion is premised onthe proposition that the purposes of the checkpoint-verffication of a valid driver's license and vehicle registration-were fulifiled after, not be[363]*363fore, Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road. Second, his conclusion is premised on the proposition that Trooper Lawson returned Brugal’s rental agreement before his consent was given. We will address each of these propositions in turn.
A review of the record, in particular the district court’s opinion, leads to the inexorable conclusion that the purposes of the checkpoint — verification of a valid driver’s license and vehicle registration — were fulfilled before Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road. In its opinion, the district court opined that reasonable suspicion was necessary to justify the “second seizure,” i.e., Trooper Lawson’s decision to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road. The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the district court’s analysis is that the district court was of the opinion that the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled before the second seizure began; otherwise, the district court would have examined the case employing an entirely different analysis. If the district court believed that the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled after Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, the subject of reasonable suspicion never would have come up; rather, the district court would have analyzed whether Trooper Lawson took the necessary steps to fulfill the purposes of the checkpoint before and after he ordered Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road.
Our inquiry on this point need not proceed further. However, two additional points are further instructive. First, the district court’s opinion is noticeably devoid of any finding that Trooper Lawson was even remotely concerned about Brugal’s authority to operate the vehicle, either before or after he requested Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road; nor did the district court find, or even suggest, that Trooper Lawson’s decision to instruct Brugal was motivated by such a concern. If the district court believed that Trooper Lawson possessed genuine concerns regarding Brugal’s authority to operate his vehicle, we are confident that the district court would have made some type of finding that Trooper Lawson harbored such a concern. We are likewise confident that, if the district court believed that Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road to conduct a further investigation into Brugal’s authority to operate his vehicle, the district court would have made a finding in this regard. However, the district court made it clear in its order what motivated Trooper Lawson to instruct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road: “[Trooper Lawson] acted on a hunch that these Defendants were 3 ‘mules’ transporting drugs. He pulled them over and discqvered that he was right.” This finding concerning Trooper Lawson’s motivation, which by no means is a “summary observation,” post at 367 n.3, is further buttressed by Trooper Lawson’s testimony regarding the eleven factors that made him suspicious of the defendants’ activities and his testimony that he only asked motorists to pull over to the shoulder of the road if he felt there was “reasonable suspicion, or [he could] gather reasonable suspicion.” Second, the district court made a specific finding that Trooper Lawson observed that Brugal had a valid driver’s license and “was in full compliance with the terms of the rental contract.” This finding suggests that once Trooper Lawson observed that Brugal possessed a valid driver’s license and vehicle registration, the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled.
In the face of the irrefutable conclusion that the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled before Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road, Judge Luttig concludes otherwise. In so doing, he completely ignores the district court’s factual findings and the import of its legal analysis. In[364]*364deed, Judge Luttig’s opinion does not even address the significance of the district court’s findings or legal analysis; instead, he relies on portions of Trooper Lawson’s testimony that were not addressed by the district court.
According to Judge Luttig, Trooper Lawson must have instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road in an effort to ensure that Brugal was legally entitled to operate the vehicle because he retained Brugal’s rental agreement, but returned his driver’s license. While acknowledging that Trooper Lawson was never asked why he retained the rental agreement, but returned Brugal’s driver’s license, Judge Luttig suggests that “the most (if not the only) reasonable inference given the otherwise counter-intuitive return of the driver’s license but retention of the rental agreement, is that Lawson had remaining questions about the validity of that document, the legitimacy of Brugal’s possession of that document, or the legality of Brugal’s possession of the car itself in light of the information that appeared on that document — none of which would necessarily have been answered by the facts that Brugal was able to produce a facially valid driver’s license and a rental agreement.” Post at 367.
Judge Luttig’s retention of the rental agreement/return of the driver’s license analysis is seriously flawed, if not “counter-intuitive” in its own right. First and critically, it altogether ignores the legal analysis engaged in by the district court.
As noted above, if the district court was of the opinion that Trooper Lawson instructed. Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road in order to ask additional questions concerning Brugal’s authority to operate his vehicle, the district court would have engaged in a different legal analysis and, at a minimum, would have made some type of finding in this regard. It did neither. Second, Judge Luttig’s rationale ignores the fact that there are equally plausible reasons why Trooper Lawson decided to retain Bru-gal’s rental agreement, but return Bru-gal’s driver’s license. For example, Trooper Lawson testified that a common practice of drug couriers is to fly to Miami, acquire drugs, rent a vehicle, and drive north. In light of this testimony, one could reasonably conclude that Trooper Lawson retained Brugal’s rental agreement not because he wanted to question Brugal regarding his authority to operate the vehicle, but rather, because he wanted to continue to question Brugal to ascertain whether he was a drug courier. Similarly, Trooper Lawson’s follow-up question — did you rent the vehicle in Miami — which Judge Luttig suggests confirms Trooper Lawson’s motivation — is consistent with an attempt to ascertain whether Brugal fit a drug courier profile. Third, Judge Lut-tig’s analysis ignores the district court’s finding that Trooper Lawson instructed Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road because he “acted on a hunch that these Defendants were 3 ‘mules’ transporting drugs.”8
[365]*365We now turn to the second proposition supporting Judge Luttig’s conclusion that the search was permissible because Bru-gal’s consent was obtained during a consensual encounter between Brugal and Trooper Lawson — that Trooper Lawson returned Brugal’s rental agreement before his consent was given. For this proposition, Judge Luttig relies on Trooper Lawson’s testimony that he returned Brugal’s rental agreement after Brugal stated he had rented the vehicle in Miami.
It is not entirely clear from the record whether Trooper Lawson ever returned Brugal’s rental agreement, and the district court never made a finding on this point.9 The defendants vigorously contend that Trooper Lawson never returned the rental agreement to Brugal, but Judge Luttig is correct that Trooper Lawson testified that he did. The video of the encounter does not show that Trooper Lawson did in fact return the rental agreement. Under these circumstances, neither we, nor Judge Lut-tig, are in a position to make a finding that Trooper Lawson returned Brugal’s rental agreement. If we did, we would encroach upon the province of the district court, something we decline to do.10
Ill
Because Trooper Lawson possessed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, he was constitutionally entitled to direct Brugal to pull his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road. Brugal’s subsequent consent to allow Trooper Lawson to search the vehicle was voluntary, therefore, the evidence seized during the search should not have been suppressed by the district court. Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motions to suppress is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.