United States v. Ailemen

986 F. Supp. 1228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20359, 1997 WL 769381
District Court, N.D. California·Decided October 24, 1997·No. CR-94-0003-VRW (WDB)·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

986 F.Supp. 1228 (1997)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Pius AILEMEN, et al., Defendants.

No. CR-94-0003-VRW (WDB).

United States District Court, N.D. California.

October 24, 1997.

*1229 Gail Shifman, San Francisco, CA, Karen L. Snell, Clarence & Snell LLP, San Francisco, CA for defendant Pius Ailemen.

Martin R. Sabelli, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, Paul Delano Wolf, Law Office of Paul Delano Wolf, Oakland, CA, for defendant Ellis Quarshie.

Martin R. Sabelli, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, Gail Shifman, San Francisco, CA, Susan Raffanti, Law Office of Paul Delano Wolf, Oakland, CA for defendant Sidney Gladney.

*1230 Brian P. Benson, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Victor Onuaguluchi.

Martin R. Sabelli, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, Lester S. Rosen, Lester S. Rosen Law Offices, San Rafael, CA, Mark D. Eibert, Half Moon Bay, CA, Scott A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Cannon, Oakland, CA for defendant Nathaniel Iheukwu.

Brian H. Getz, Law Offices of Brian Getz, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Joycelyn Diane Lane.

Gail Shifman, San Francisco, CA, Tony Tamburello, Tamburello Hanlon & Waggener, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Kellee Cooper.

Harry L. Hellerstein, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, J. Frank McCabe, Goorjian & McCabe, San Francisco, CA for defendant Dele Ailemen.

Edward Swanson, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, Stephen Shaiken, Stephen Shaiken Law Offices, San Francisco, CA for defendant Kingsley Amaechi Ofomata.

Mark J. Rochon, Kohlman, Rochon and Roberts, Washington, DC, for defendant Robert Tinney.

Claire M. Leary, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Francisco, CA, Ronald E. Kliegerman, Kliegerman & Freiss, New York, NY, for defendant Keesha Duncan.

Doron Weinberg, Nina Wilder, Weinberg & Wilder, San Francisco, CA, Karen L. Snell, Clarence & Snell LLP, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Julius E. Asagba.

Gregor D. Guy-Smith, San Francisco, CA, Harriet Ross, San Francisco, CA, Karen L. Snell, Clarence & Snell LLP, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Kenneth Taylor.

Billy Ponds, Law Firm of Billy Ponds, Washington, DC, for defendant Doug Fullard.

Louis S. Katz, San Francisco, CA, for defendant Kali Malou Hidalgo.

Theresa J. Canepa, U.S. Attorney's Office, Drug Enforcement Task Force, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiff U.S.

ORDER.

WALKER, District Judge.

On July 11, 1994, the government obtained a forty-two count superseding indictment against eighteen defendants, charging them for their involvement in a heroin smuggling organization allegedly headed by Pius Ailemen. Much of the evidence that was used to indict the defendants was acquired as a result of a wiretap authorized by a judge of this court on July 29, 1993.

On September 16, 1994, Ailemen filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the wiretap due to the government's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518. This motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil on November 29, 1994.

After the parties exchanged several rounds of briefing, the magistrate conducted a seven-day evidentiary hearing, commencing on December 16, 1996. On May 22, 1997, the magistrate issued a one hundred twenty-nine page report in which he recommended that the court grant defendants' joint motion to suppress. After receiving an extension of time and relief from the page limits of the local rules, the government filed a one hundred eight page objection to the magistrate's report and recommendation ("Obj."). Defendants filed a response on August 18, which was followed by a reply on August 22. The court conducted a hearing on the matter on August 27, 1997. Upon consideration of the papers submitted by the parties and the arguments presented at the hearing, the court hereby ADOPTS the magistrate's recommendation that the court GRANT defendants' joint motion to suppress evidence obtained by electronic surveillance.

I

The referral of matter to a magistrate is governed by the United States Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639. Subparagraph 636(b)(1)(A) of the Act permits a district court to designate a magistrate to "hear and determine" pretrial matters other than certain enumerated dispositive motions, such as a motion to suppress. Motions to suppress *1231 are governed by § 636(b)(1)(B), which provides that "a judge may [] designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court of [the] motion." The court must review de novo legal conclusions and challenged findings of fact.

In making its de novo determination, the court considers the record which has been developed before the magistrate. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2412-13, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The court may accept or reject the magistrate's credibility determinations, recognizing that the magistrate is in the better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses he sees and hears. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 2415 n. 7; United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 316 (9th Cir.1995). De novo review does not mean that the court must hold a new hearing to determine credibility disputes or grant further argument. See id. at 676, 100 S.Ct. at 2412-13; United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.1990). Instead, the court must scrutinize the record and make its own decision what reliance to place on the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. at 2412-13.

II

In recognition of the highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, Congress devised strict procedures for the authorization of wiretaps. See United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1582 (9th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 241 (9th Cir. 1979)). At issue in this case is the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), which requires an application for interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication ("wiretap") to include "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Before approving a wiretap, the issuing court must satisfy itself that traditional law enforcement methods are unlikely to succeed or are too dangerous to attempt. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c

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United States v. Ailemen, 986 F. Supp. 1228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20359, 1997 WL 769381 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

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