United States v. Aem, Inc.

718 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69387, 2010 WL 2465426
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJune 17, 2010
Docket6:08-cv-00231
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 718 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (United States v. Aem, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Aem, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69387, 2010 WL 2465426 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN ANTOON II, District Judge.

This case is a stale and anemic remnant of the once robust prosecution of Defen *1335 dant Frank Amodeo and the many corporate Defendants once under his control. The dispute has occupied a place on this Court’s docket since October 30, 2008. In the beginning, the focus was on the individual Defendant Amodeo, who was responsible for the criminal conduct of all of the original corporate Defendants. Amodeo eventually entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 270 months in prison.

Later, the charges against some of the corporate Defendants were dismissed by the Government. All that remain are the charges of conspiracy and wire fraud against Defendants AEM, Inc. d/b/a Mirabilis HR, Hoth Holdings, LLC, and Mirabilis Ventures, Inc. (“the Corporate Defendants”). At a hearing on June 16, 2010, I heard and accepted nolo contendere pleas from the Corporate Defendants. (See Hr’g Mins., Doc. 147). This Order sets forth the basis for acceptance of those pleas.

Background

On May 27, 2008, and June 5, 2008, the Corporate Defendants filed Chapter 11 voluntary petitions for bankruptcy. Thereafter, R.W. Cuthill was appointed Receiver of the Corporate Defendants and charged with the responsibility of liquidating their assets. The Indictment against the Corporate Defendants was filed on October 30, 2008.

Throughout the case, the attorneys for the parties have repeatedly sought continuances of trial, always professing a spirit of cooperation and optimism that the matter would result in pleas. More recently, the discussions included suggestions that the Corporate Defendants wished to enter nolo contendere pleas. It appeared to the Court that counsel were in agreement on this point, but the prosecutor candidly stated that he could not agree to nolo contendere pleas without permission from the United States Attorney and the Department of Justice. Ultimately, that permission was denied, and the case was set for trial. On May 21, 2010, the Corporate Defendants filed their “Motion for Court’s Consent to Withdraw Plea of Not Guilty and Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere.” (Doc. 139). The Government filed a response opposing the motion. (Doc. 141). As announced at the June 16 hearing and as set forth herein, the Corporate Defendants’ motion is granted and their nolo contendere pleas are accepted by the Court.

The Law

The concept of a nolo contendere plea (also “nolo plea”) is extraordinary. It is a means by which a criminal defendant may be subjected to punishment for an offense without explicitly admitting guilt. In fact, a “plea of nolo contendere is, for purposes of punishment, the same as the plea of guilty.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1974 Amendments). The difference is that a plea of nolo contendere is “viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for leniency.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35-36 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

Although nolo contendere pleas are specifically authorized by Rule 11(a)(3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether they should be accepted. See United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031 (6th Cir.2001). Historically, receptiveness to nolo pleas has varied greatly from court to court. Compare, e.g., United States v. *1336 Bagliore, 182 F.Supp. 714, 716 (E.D.N.Y.1960) (taking a generally “hostile” view regarding nolo contender pleas), with United States v. Jones, 119 F.Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.Cal.1954) (taking the opposite approach and determining that such a plea should be accepted absent compelling reasons for not allowing it). Whatever attitude a court may have toward the concept of nolo pleas, the Rule specifically provides that in exercising its discretion “the court must consider the parties’ views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(3).

While the view of the Government as to whether a nolo contendere plea should be accepted by the court is important, Rule 11(a)(3) does not make acceptance contingent upon Government consent. The Government’s position, however, ordinarily has bearing on the ultimate question — whether the plea serves the “public interest in the effective administration of justice.” Id. Answering this essential question requires a case-by-case analysis; nolo contendere pleas most often do not serve the public interest, but the circumstances of each case must be examined to determine the costs and benefits of such a disposition. The Court has engaged in such an analysis in this case and has determined the benefits of allowing the Corporate Defendants to enter nolo contendere pleas outweigh the costs.

Analysis

There is no established formulaic approach to deciding whether a nolo contendere should be accepted. Nonetheless, reported cases give rise to a list of factors to be considered, and of course, the factors to be considered are likely to vary from case to case. Whatever factors a court elects to consider, “[t]he primary purpose of accepting a plea of nolo is to promote the administration of justice. This means justice not only for the defendant but also for the public.” United States v. Chin Doong Art, 193 F.Supp. 820, 823 (E.D.N.Y.1961).

This Court has considered the following factors in determining that the public interest in the effective administration of justice will be served by accepting nolo contendere pleas from the Corporate Defendants.

1. The deterrent effect of the conviction will not be diminished if the Corporate Defendants enter nolo contendere pleas rather than guilty pleas.

A plea of nolo contendere has no bearing on the sentence to be imposed. In this case, no individual will go to prison regardless of whether the plea is one of guilty or one of nolo contendere. The wrongdoer, Frank Amodeo, has already been sentenced to a lengthy term in prison, and a forfeiture judgment in the amount of $200 million has already been entered against all Defendants. Those penalties serve as a sufficient deterrent.

In some cases, a nolo plea may allow a defendant to later deny wrongdoing by pointing out that the plea was not one of guilty. Were there wrongdoers still involved in the management or ownership structure of the Corporate Defendants, this factor might weigh in favor of not accepting the nolo plea. That, however, is not the situation at hand. The Corporate Defendants are now managed by the Receiver, who is attempting to liquidate the corporate entities. The Receiver became involved with the Corporate Defendants long after the criminal conduct giving rise to the charges in this case.

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Bluebook (online)
718 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69387, 2010 WL 2465426, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-aem-inc-flmd-2010.