United States v. ADAME

Opinions

Opinion

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before

KORN, HARRELL, and STAMPFLI Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Ian M. ADAME

Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant

No. 202500102

_________________________

Decided: 2 September 2026

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Ryan C. Lipton

Sentence adjudged 21 October 2024 by a general court-martial tried at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, consisting of officer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1, confinement for five years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.

For Appellant:

Mr. Kevin M. Courtney, Esq.

Captain Katherine E. Malcolm, USMC

For Appellee:

Commander John T. Cole, JAGC, USN Lieutenant Erin H. Bourneuf, JAGC, USN

Opinion of the Court

Senior Judge HARRELL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge KORN and Judge STAMPFLI joined.

_________________________

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

_________________________

HARRELL, Senior Judge:

A panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification each of attempted rape by force, kidnapping, and aggravated assault by strangulation, in violation of Articles 80, 125, and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1 Appellant raises the following assignments of error (AOE):

I. Did the military judge err by admitting Lance Corporal (LCpl) Zulu’s2 written statement in violation of the holding in United States v. Finch?3

II. Was the finding of guilty to attempted rape by force legally and factually sufficient?

III. Was the finding of guilty to kidnapping legally and factually sufficient?

IV. Did the military judge err by denying the Defense challenge for cause of Major (Maj) Hotel?4 We find no prejudicial error, and we affirm the findings and sentence.

1 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 925, 928.

2 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,

are pseudonyms.

3 79 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

4 Appellant raises a final AOE: Did the cumulative errors deny Appellant a fair

trial? We have thoroughly considered this issue and find it to be without merit. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987) (“[W]e are aware of no requirement of law that appellate courts in general or a court of military review in particular must articulate its reasoning on every issue raised by counsel.”).

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I. BACKGROUND

The relative post-curfew still of the student barracks was pierced by screams and cries for help. Marines and an Airman nearby assessed the situation and mobilized.

As LCpl Hall played a video game with a few others in his barracks room, he heard screaming coming from outside on the catwalk. He hushed the others in the room, Airman (AN) Papa and LCpl Lima, to listen intently. He heard more screaming, more distinctly this time, so he opened his door and saw a woman’s leg sticking out of the door of Appellant’s room, immediately next door to his. The leg kicked as it was pulled into the room, and the door slammed behind it. He told the others to go to the wall between the rooms to listen closely to figure out what was happening as he called LCpl Nunan, a Marine on duty at the barracks that evening.

LCpl Nunan arrived in short order, and LCpl Hall told him to listen closely to the room next door. LCpl Nunan approached Appellant’s room, heard screaming from within, and knocked on the door, announcing himself as “Duty.”5 When he heard more screams and pleas for help from a familiar female voice—that of LCpl November—he banged on the door with a closed fist and then tried to kick it open. He shook the door handle, felt someone on the other side doing the same, and he demanded, “Open up, open up.”6 LCpl November responded, “I can’t. He won’t let me,”7 and “He’s not letting me open the door.”8 LCpl Nunan then ran off to retrieve a master key from the duty hut while LCpl Hall took over banging on Appellant’s door.

The door eventually opened from the inside. It was dark, but LCpl Hall saw Appellant jumping into his bed and throwing the sheet over himself. He then looked down and saw LCpl November. She was naked, on her knees with her head down, and “she was very scared, hyperventilating.”9 He took off his shirt and helped her put it on as she was shaking and asking for help. He then helped her walk to her barracks room, five doors down the catwalk, by supporting her weight as she cried, hyperventilated, and coughed. When they reached her room, she collapsed to the floor, crawled under her bed, and lay in the fetal position. As LCpl Hall was about to leave to see if more help was coming,

5 R. at 1595.

6 R. at 1595.

7 R. at 1693.

8 R. at 1595.

9 R. at 1696.

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she asked me, “Don’t” -- “Don’t leave.” Like, “come here, come here, come here.” And that’s when I came back and I was, like, “What do you need? What do you need? Are you okay?” And she said, “Keep him away from me.” And that’s when I asked, “Who?” And she said, “Adame.”10 LCpl Hall then helped her into the bathroom, ensured she was locked within, and he left.

AN Papa stayed near Appellant’s room with LCpl Lima as the situation unfolded, and he captured some of the bedlam on video. Upon hearing screams that sounded “like something from a horror movie,”11 AN Papa knew “something serious”12 was happening, so he began video recording on his phone. One video captured LCpl Hall yelling, “Open the door,” and loud cries from LCpl November.13 A second video captured the cries trailing off as LCpl Hall ushered LCpl November away, followed by LCpl Lima and AN Papa looking inside Appellant ’s room from the doorway, displaying disarray within.14 The two saw Appellant and his roommate, Private First Class (PFC) Golf, in their beds, motionless . They closed the door after that brief inspection.

LCpl Nunan returned along with Sergeant (Sgt) Rho, also on duty. They encountered a shirtless LCpl Hall on the catwalk after he had left LCpl November in her room, and he updated them. They heard LCpl November crying in her room, decided to leave her alone for the moment, and went to Appellant’s room. They banged on Appellant’s door for two to three minutes with no answer until they saw LCpl November’s roommate, LCpl Smith, down the catwalk. LCpl Smith had been in a friend’s room, heard crying coming from her room, and went towards her room to investigate. The duty personnel shifted focus from Appellant’s room and enlisted LCpl Smith’s assistance in coaxing LCpl November out of her bathroom. LCpl Smith went inside and saw LCpl November in the fetal position in the bathroom, wearing only a shirt, crying. LCpl Smith asked what happened, and LCpl November

10 R. at 1700.

11 R. at 1274.

12 R. at 1274.

13 Pros. Ex. 2.

14 Pros. Ex. 3.

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just kept telling me to get him out of the room. And I was, like, confused because there was nobody in the room. So I kept asking her who, and she just kept screaming at me, like, “Get him out. Get him out.” And then that’s when she said, “Get Adame out.”15 LCpl Smith told LCpl November to get dressed because the duty personnel wanted to talk to her. LCpl November put on sweatpants and emerged from the bathroom holding onto LCpl Smith for comfort. She was reluctant to speak to the duty personnel; LCpl Nunan described her as “overwhelmed about the situation, very distraught,”16 and “traumatized.”17 Upon prodding from Sgt Rho, she finally said, “It’s just a friend, he received the wrong message”18 and that “nothing happened.”19 The duty personnel then went back to Appellant’s room. This time, PFC Golf opened the door, and he appeared “very confused” and “dazed”20—he testified at trial that he drank around 17 shots of alcohol that night before falling asleep, he was awoken later by duty personnel banging on the door, and he had no independent knowledge of what happened in between. The duty personnel saw a mess in the room and Appellant in his bed. Sergeant Rho asked PFC Golf to awaken Appellant, and PFC Golf nudged him several times. Appellant sat up, and when told to get out of bed, brought his knees up and fidgeted under the blanket. He emerged wearing jeans, and not the gray sweatpants several witnesses observed him wearing earlier that evening.21 The duty personnel took Appellant and PFC Golf to the duty hut, and an investigation ensued.

Two days after the incident, a Sexual Assault Forensic Nurse Examiner photographed abrasions and contusions on Appellant and LCpl November, and she took swabs from both. Subsequent analysis identified LCpl November’s DNA on a penile swab of Appellant.

At the outset of her testimony at trial, LCpl November acknowledged having gaps in her memory of the night of the incident. She testified that as she lay in her bed, Appellant, her friend and classmate, knocked on her door and

15 R. at 1322.

16 R. at 1605.

17 R. at 1606.

18 R. at 1605.

19 R. at 1673.

20 R. at 1607.

21 A Naval Criminal Investigative Service special agent later seized Appellant’s

gray sweatpants from LCpl November’s room.

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invited her to his room to play a card game. She agreed and went to his room where she played cards with Appellant and PFC Golf while they all took shots of alcohol. She remembered taking around five shots. At some point, PFC Golf left, and she did not remember him ever returning.

When LCpl November got up to leave, Appellant “began to wrestle” her.22 He pinned her to the floor, she struggled to get free, and then he strangled her with both hands. She had difficulty breathing, but she did not lose consciousness . She managed to free herself and went toward the door, but he dragged her into his closet, pinned her to the floor, and strangled her again. She pleaded with him to stop. Appellant took off her pants (she was not wearing underwear) as she told him “to stop and I didn’t want this.”23 She testified that she believes she lost consciousness at that point. Her shirt and bra came off too; she did not remember when or how.

Although she did not remember Appellant taking off his pants, she felt his bare skin as she tried to push his pelvis away. He was positioned between her legs, and she felt “him pressed against my vagina and him trying to insert [his penis].”24 As she continued pleading with him to stop, “He kept telling me I wanted it. [He k]ept saying, ‘You want this. You want this [November].’ ”25 She did not remember if “he was able to fully insert his penis inside of [her] vagina,” though she remembered that he “kept telling me it felt good and I was tight and that I want this.”26 She testified, “I remember fighting, pushing him away from me, and just looking at the wall. And I just remember pressure -- it was a lot of pressure in my head. That whole duration in the closet is just, like, clips, like, bits and parts.”27 To escape, she told him, “I’ll do something you like, but you need to get off of me so I could do it for you.”28 He agreed and got off her. Then, I went for the closet door and I went to reach for it, but he managed to pull me back. I pushed him off again, and I ran out the closet door towards the front door. And I managed to unlock it,

22 R. at 1851–52.

23 R. at 1856.

24 R. at 1869.

25 R. at 1857.

26 R. at 1857–58.

27 R. at 1859.

28 R. at 1860.

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but he came from behind me and locked it again and began dragging me back towards the closet.29 She screamed as Appellant dragged her back into the closet. She used the same ploy to escape again:

I told him I was sorry and that I would actually do what I was talking about, that I’d make him feel good, and just to -- just to get off me. And he fell for it again. And then that’s when I, again, ran out the closet, and I managed to open the door before he pulled me back.

.... . . . [A]s he was dragging me back, I began screaming and trying to bang on the walls, on the floor.30 Help arrived. She heard a bang and someone say, “Open the door.”31 She “responded saying, ‘I couldn’t open the door,’ and ‘He wouldn’t let me.’ ”32 Appellant tried to pull her back as she was “struggling with him to keep speaking towards the door to let them know that I couldn’t, personally, open the door and that there was someone preventing me from opening the door.”33 The banging continued, and Appellant eventually “let me go, and I managed to open the door, kind of, just leaped forward and open the door.”34 LCpl Hall was at the door, and he “picked me up and he took off his shirt to put on me, and I remember pulling it down and he led me to my room.”35 When asked at trial, “Why didn’t you want to tell [the duty personnel] what happened?” she responded, I didn’t want to talk to anybody. I think, at that point, I was just in a lot of shock and I couldn’t really process what just happened.

29 R. at 1859.

30 R. at 1860–65.

31 R. at 1866.

32 R. at 1866.

33 R. at 1866.

34 R. at 1866–67.

35 R. at 1867.

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And I just wanted to be alone and I don’t want to talk about anything that happened. I didn’t want to be touched. I didn’t want to be questioned. I just wanted to be left alone.36 Members acquitted Appellant of forcibly raping LCpl November but convicted him of attempting to do so. Members also convicted Appellant of kidnapping LCpl November and strangling her by placing his hands around her neck and squeezing.37

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of LCpl Zulu’s prior consistent statement did not substantially influence the findings.

1. Additional Background LCpl Zulu, with whom LCpl November was in a sexual relationship at the time of the incident, testified at trial, describing events from earlier in the evening. During his direct examination, he testified that he accepted Appellant ’s invitation to play cards in Appellant’s room with Appellant, PFC Golf, and LCpl Smith. He did so for a while, but he left when he became uncomfortable with Appellant continuing to pressure him to take shots of alcohol. Later that evening, after watching a show and playing video games in another room, he walked by LCpl November’s room and heard her scream, “No, get off of me,” and, “Adame, stop.”38 The door was closed, but not latched, so he pushed it open and saw Appellant on top of LCpl November in “a bear-crawl position.”39 They were perpendicular on LCpl November’s bed, both fully clothed. Then:

A: I asked what was going on and if everything was okay. Q: And did Adame get off of [LCpl November]? A: He did not, sir. Q: What did you do then? A: I grabbed him by, like, his waist, rib-cage area, and pulled him off.

36 R. at 1863.

37 Members acquitted Appellant of one specification of sexual assault and a second

specification of aggravated assault by strangulation.

38 R. at 1399.

39 R. at 1400.

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Q: What happened next? A: Then, I asked what was going on. He said, “Everything ’s all right.” So then, I basically just pushed him and told him to get out. Q: And when you pushed him and told him to get out, what did you do next? A: I closed the door behind him, sir. Q: Okay. So he left? A: Yes, sir.

....

Q: When you closed the door, did you lock it? A: Yes, sir. I did. Q: What . . . happened next? A: I asked her if she was okay. And she was, kind of, shook up. Then, after a short period of time, I left. Q: Okay. When you say “shook up,” what do you mean?

Can you . . . describe that? A: She was in shock. She had her hands on top of her head.

Just basically being, like, “I don’t know what just happened .” ....

Q: What did she tell you? A: She was just shook up, her voice was, like, very shaky.

She’s -- she’s just, like, I don’t know, like, Adame’s being aggressive and weird, sir. Q: Okay. And then, you stated that after a few minutes, you left the room? A: Yes, sir.

....

Q: When you left the room after you had spoken to [LCpl November], is there any way for you to lock it from the outside when you close the door?

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A: Unless I have a key, no. Which I didn’t at the time. 40 On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached LCpl Zulu with various prior inconsistent statements, highlighted his sexual relationship with LCpl November, and elicited the fact that he lied in his first interview with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) special agents, falsely claiming that he did not drink alcohol that evening.

During redirect examination, the Government offered a handwritten and signed statement by LCpl Zulu as a prior consistent statement pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). LCpl Zulu identified it as his written statement provided to NCIS special agents during his second interview. The military judge reviewed the statement, overruled a Defense objection on hearsay grounds, admitted the entire statement into evidence, and permitted the Government to publish copies of it to the members.

The statement, just over one page in length, leads off:

I was in Adames room after he invited me to go play cards that’s when I saw the bottles of alcohol and made it aware that I did not want to drink and if I did it would be minimal and he said “Okay”. Then as the games continued . . . you could tell Adame was getting intoxicated and he was starting to get aggressive due to us not wanting to take shots with him because he was filling them to the rim. I got uncomfortable and left . . . .41 Later that night, as he walked toward his room, I heard roughhousing and [LCpl November] saying “Adame stop” and “get off of me” so I peeked my head into [LCpl November ]’s room . . . and saw Adame on top of her while she was struggling and I told him to get off but he didn’t listen so I pulled him off and started to push and shove him and he said “Relax man, lets just go play cards” and I agreed in order to get him out so when he was at the doorway I pushed him and locked the door and asked if she was alright and she said “Yeah but Adames being weird and aggressive” so I stayed in her room for about 5 minutes total before leaving . . . .42

40 R. at 1401–08.

41 Pros. Ex. 19 at 1.

42 Pros. Ex. 19 at 1.

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2. Analysis Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted are generally inadmissible as hearsay.43 Prior consistent statements that meet certain requirements, however, are not hearsay:

Statements that Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay:

(1) A Declarant-Witness’ Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement , and the statement:

.... (B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered :

(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground[.]44 Although the military judge initially admitted LCpl Zulu’s written statement pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii), he later, upon reconsideration , limited it to (ii). Appellant argues that the military judge abused his discretion since admission of the statement did not fully comply with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’ (CAAF) five-part test in United States v. Finch.45

43 Mil. R. Evid. 801(c), 802.

44 Mil. R. Evid. 801(d).

45 79 M.J. at 396 (“[F]or a prior consistent statement to be admissible under M.R.E.

801(d)(1)(B)(ii), it must satisfy the following: (1) the declarant of the out-of-court statement must testify, (2) the declarant must be subject to cross-examination about the prior statement, (3) the statement must be consistent with the declarant’s testimony, (4) the declarant’s credibility as a witness must have been “attacked on another ground” other than the ones listed in M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i), and (5) the prior consistent statement must actually be relevant to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility on the basis on which he or she was attacked. The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of articulating the relevancy link between the prior consistent statement and how it will rehabilitate the witness with respect to the particular type of impeachment that has occurred.”). Appellant concedes the first four and contests only the fifth.

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“We review a military judge’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.”46 However, just as in United States v. Ayala, “[b]ased on the record before us, it is not necessary to decide whether or not the military [judge] erred in admitting the exhibit[] at issue. Even if there was error, we conclude there is no prejudice.”47 We apply the following test:

For preserved nonconstitutional evidentiary errors, the test for prejudice is whether the error had a substantial influence on the findings. . . . [I]n conducting its prejudice analysis, this Court weighs: (1) the strength of the Government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.48 The Government’s case was strong, consisting of probative and largely corroborative witness testimony and photographic, video, and forensic evidence. Though trial defense counsel provided effective, zealous representation, the Defense’s case was weak by comparison, focused principally on sowing doubt by raising specters of bias, witness collusion, and compromised forensic evidence , while promoting a narrative, less supported by the evidence, of LCpl November coming to her senses after succumbing to the effects of alcohol, realizing she was naked with someone other than her boyfriend, and “freak[ing] out.”49 “In examining [the materiality and quality of the evidence in question], we essentially are assessing how much the erroneously admitted evidence may have affected the court-martial.”50 We “consider[] the particular factual circumstances of each case,” such as the extent to which the evidence contributed to the government’s case; the extent to which instructions to the panel may have mitigated the error; the extent to which the government referred to the evidence in argument; and the extent to which the members could weigh the evidence using their own layperson knowledge.51

46 United States v. Norwood, 81 M.J. 12, 17 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing Finch, 79 M.J.

at 394).

47 81 M.J. 25, 29 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

48 Finch, 79 M.J. at 398–99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

49 R. at 1270, 2579.

50 United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

51 Id. (citations omitted).

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LCpl Zulu’s prior statement “contributed little to the Government’s case.”52 This is evident primarily because its material substance—LCpl Zulu intervening and removing Appellant from LCpl November’s room after hearing her protests —was already before the members. “The statement[], being consistent with trial testimony, [was] largely cumulative.”53 Since it “did not add substantially to what was already before the panel, it seems unlikely the evidence was significant in the minds of the members.”54 As in Ayala, LCpl Zulu’s prior statement was “not significant evidence” since it “repeated evidence that had come in through [LCpl Zulu]’s testimony and therefore would already have been considered by the [members]. We do not consider that mere repetition of [his] story would color the [members’] decision and therefore have any substantial influence on the findings.”55 Further, while the Government made a few references to the evidence provided by LCpl Zulu during its lengthy closing argument, it made no specific reference to anything provided only within his written statement . Accordingly, any error in admitting LCpl Zulu’s written statement as a prior inconsistent statement did not have a substantial influence on the findings .

B. Appellant’s conviction for attempted rape by force is legally and factually sufficient.

1. Legal Sufficiency We consider the legal sufficiency of Appellant’s conviction for attempted rape by force according to the following framework:

We review questions of legal sufficiency de novo. The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This legal sufficiency assessment draws every rea-

52 Id.

53 United States v. Brown, ___ M.J. ___, No. 25-0181, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 418, at

*35 (C.A.A.F. May 12, 2026) (Ohlson, C.J., concurring in the judgment).

54 Id.

55 81 M.J. at 30. See also Finch, 79 M.J. at 400 (“[P]erhaps most importantly, inde-

pendent evidence in the same vein as AH’s statement about sleepovers in the videotaped interview was admitted at the court-martial without defense objection.”).

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sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution . As such, the standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a conviction.56 The Government charged Appellant with forcibly raping LCpl November in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, by “commit[ing] a sexual act upon [LCpl November ] by penetrating [LCpl November]’s vulva with Lance Corporal Adame’s penis, by using unlawful force.”57 The military judge instructed the members that if they acquitted Appellant of that offense, they should then consider the lesser offense of attempted forcible rape.

Pursuant to Article 79, UCMJ, “An accused may be found guilty of . . . [a]n attempt to commit the offense charged.”58 Article 80, in turn provides, “An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under [the UCMJ], amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.”59 The elements of an attempt in violation of Article 80 are:

(1) That the accused did a certain overt act; (2) That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a certain offense under the UCMJ; (3) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and (4) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense.60 Appellant points to the laundry list of overt acts that the military judge identified from the testimony at trial and decided to include within his instructions to the members, contesting that the Government proved them beyond a reasonable doubt. The military judge instructed the members that the first element of the offense of attempted forcible rape is on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, on or about 26 November 2023, the accused did certain overt acts, that is, the accused forcibly held down [LCpl November] against her will, removed [LCpl November]’s pants, removed his own sweatpants,

56 United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citation modified).

57 Charge Sheet.

58 Article 79(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879(a).

59 Article 80(a), UCMJ.

60 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2023 ed.) [MCM (2023)], pt. IV, para.

4.b. at IV-4.

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pressed his penis against [LCpl November]’s vagina without actually penetrating [LCpl November]’s vagina, and physically tried to insert his penis inside of [LCpl November]’s vagina[.]61 Appellant goes through these overt acts one by one, arguing that the Government failed to prove any of them, primarily due to LCpl November’s inconclusive testimony. We disagree; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed these overt acts.

Granted, LCpl November did not provide an entirely coherent narrative from start to finish of the ordeal that accounts in whole for other witnesses’ observations and physical evidence collected during the investigation. For example , based on other evidence presented at trial, her memory of where certain events took place—Appellant’s room or hers—may not have been accurate. The Government accounted for this in the presentation of its case, calling an expert in forensic neuropsychology,62 who, when asked, “In your opinion, would you expect to see an impact on someone’s memory if they consumed alcohol, lost consciousness repeatedly, and underwent a traumatic event?” responded, “Yes. I would expect to see some impact to their recall.”63 Even so, LCpl November testified with clarity and certainty on the crucial matters that the military judge identified as overt acts. She testified that Appellant pinned her down as she struggled to get away. She testified that he removed her pants. She testified that, although she did not specifically remember him removing his pants, she knew that he did because she felt the bare skin of his pelvis as she tried to push him away. And she testified that as he kneeled between her legs, “I could feel him pressed against my vagina and him trying to insert him”—a clear reference to his penis. This testimony, coupled with the DNA evidence, was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the overt acts.

Appellant next argues that evidence of his specific intent to commit the offense of forcible rape was lacking. Again, we disagree. Most compelling in

61 R. at 2506.

62 The expert witness described neuropsychology as a “specialization area of clini-

cal psychology that . . . provides additional specialized training in the brain, neuroanatomy , and . . . the result of impacts and insults to the brain, cognitive functioning, things like attention, memory, and how to diagnose and treat those conditions.” R. at 2007–08.

63 R. at 2020.

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this respect is LCpl November’s testimony that after Appellant removed her pants and as she struggled and pleaded, “He kept telling me I wanted it. [He k]ept saying, ‘You want this. You want this [November].’ . . . [He j]ust kept telling me it felt good and I was tight and that I want this.”64 The Government also introduced circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s sexual intent. When the chaos of the evening subdued, LCpl Smith discovered on her phone—which she had left charging in her room most of the evening while she was elsewhere—photographs taken by Appellant of him holding his exposed erect penis. The military judge admitted the photographs over Defense objection, ruling, [T]he evidence tends to support the narrative that the accused, while alone with the victim, pulled down his pants, exposed his penis, and photographed his penis, all mere moments before the alleged sexual act with the victim began. This is highly probative because it makes it more likely that the accused had sexual desires involving the victim in the moments leading up to [the] alleged sexual acts.65 A rational trier of fact could have viewed the evidence in precisely that manner, and when viewed in conjunction with other evidence, such as LCpl Zulu’s testimony that he forcibly removed Appellant from LCpl November’s room upon hearing her protests, it paints a scene that Appellant was determined to act upon that sexual desire over any obstacle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant specifically intended to forcibly rape LCpl November. Concluding the same for the remaining elements, Appellant’s conviction for attempted forcible rape is legally sufficient .

2. Factual Sufficiency We “may consider whether [a finding of guilty] is correct in fact upon request of the accused if the accused makes a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.”66 “After an accused has made such a showing, [we] may weigh the evidence and determine controverted questions of fact subject to . . . appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other

64 R. at 1857–58.

65 App. Ex. LXI at 4.

66 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(i), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(i).

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evidence.”67 “If, as a result of [such] review . . ., [we are] clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence, [we] may dismiss, set aside, or modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.”68 Appellant has made a specific showing of a deficiency in proof regarding “(1) the absence of competent proof of specific intent to commit rape by force; and (2) the lack of credible evidence that the alleged overt acts—particularly removal of clothing and attempted insertion of his penis into her vulva—occurred as charged.”69 We have accordingly weighed the evidence subject to appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, and we are not clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence.

C. Appellant’s conviction for kidnapping is legally and factually sufficient .

Article 125, Kidnapping, provides, “Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully—(1) seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, or carries away another person ; and (2) holds the other person against that person’s will; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”70 The Government charged Appellant with violating this punitive article in the following manner:

In that Lance Corporal Ian M. Adame, U.S. Marine Corps, on Active Duty, did, on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, on or about 26 November 2023, wrongfully seize and hold [LCpl November], a person not a minor, against her will.71 As charged, the elements of this offense are:

(1) That on or about 26 November 2023, on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, Appellant seized LCpl November, a person not a minor; (2) That Appellant then held LCpl November against her will; and (3) That Appellant did so wrongfully.72

67 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(ii), UCMJ.

68 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(iii), UCMJ.

69 Appellant’s Brief at 18.

70 10 U.S.C. § 925.

71 Charge sheet.

72 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.b. at IV-115.

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The President has defined most of the relevant terms for this offense.

“ ‘Held’ means detained. The holding must be more than a momentary or incidental detention.”73 “ ‘Against that person’s will’ means that the victim was held involuntarily. The involuntary nature of the detention may result from force . . . .”74 And, “ ‘Wrongfully’ means without justification or excuse.”75 “Seize,” in the context of kidnapping, is undefined in the statute or Manual for Courts-Martial, so we arrive upon the ordinary meaning,76 “To forcibly take possession (of a person or property).”77 Other than generally disputing the sufficiency of the evidence for the kidnapping conviction, Appellant contends that the Government argued an uncharged “carry away” theory of kidnapping at trial. True, the Government’s view of the evidence included movement of LCpl November by Appellant between seizing and holding her,78 but the Government nevertheless proved what it charged: Appellant did “seize and hold” LCpl November. That is not undermined by the Government’s effort, in order to present a complete narrative, to prove more than was required.79 Evidence from which a rational trier of fact

73 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.c.(2) at IV-115.

74 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.c.(3) at IV-115.

75 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.c.(5) at IV-116.

76 See United States v. Schloff, 74 M.J. 312, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (“In the absence of

any specific statutory definition, we look to the ordinary meaning of the word.”); United States v. Secord, 86 M.J. 56, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2025) (Maggs, J., dissenting) (“For helpful guidance in determining the ordinary meaning of words, the Court typically consults dictionaries.”).

77 Seize, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also United States v. Wilson,

No. ARMY 20230233, 2024 CCA LEXIS 327, at *9 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2024) (defining “seize” the same).

78 In response to a Defense motion for a finding of not guilty pursuant to Rule for

Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 917, the Government argued, “The seizure and holding that the government charged and believe the evidence supports is that [LCpl November] was seized by Lance Corporal Adame and dragged from, at some point, her room into his room and held there in his room, against her will, for some period of time.” R. at 2435. The Government later argued to the members, “He seized her and pulled her into his room.” R. at 2544.

79 See generally United States v. Etsitty, 140 F.3d 1274, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The

list of prohibited acts is disjunctive, prohibiting seizure or abduction or carrying away. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). There is no element of movement implied in ‘seizure’, especially because ‘carrying away’ is listed separately.”). Kidnapping under the UCMJ “is based generally on 18 U.S.C. § 1201.” MCM (1984 ed.), app. 21, Analysis at A21- 102.

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could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant seized LCpl November included her testimony that as she fled the room, succeeding in reaching the door and opening it, Appellant forcibly took possession of her, dragging her back in, and locking the door. LCpl Hall witnessed at least a portion of this, seeing LCpl November’s leg pulled into Appellant’s room and the door slamming behind it.

Appellant also argues, “The alleged holding was inherent in the assault and does not constitute a separate kidnapping offense.”80 We disagree. As noted above, “The holding must be more than a momentary or incidental detention.”81 The Court of Military Appeals long ago adopted “[a] test to consider whether the . . . detention is merely incidental to other offenses,”82 examining six factors :

a. The occurrence of an unlawful seizure, confinement, inveigling , decoying, kidnapping, abduction or carrying away and a holding for a period. Both elements must be present. b. The duration thereof. Is it appreciable or de minimis? This determination is relative and turns on the established facts. c. Whether these actions occurred during the commission of a separate offense. d. The character of the separate offense in terms of whether the detention/asportation is inherent in the commission of that kind of offense, at the place where the victim is first encountered, without regard to the particular plan devised by the criminal to commit it. e. Whether the asportation/detention exceeded that inherent in the separate offense and, in the circumstances, evinced a voluntary and distinct intention to move/detain the victim beyond that necessary to commit the separate offense at the place where the victim was first encountered. f. The existence of any significant additional risk to the victim beyond that inherent in the commission of the separate offense

80 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 14.

81 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.c.(2) at IV-115.

82 United States v. Newbold, 45 M.J. 109, 112 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing United States

v. Jeffress, 28 M.J. 409, 413 (C.M.A. 1989)).

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at the place where the victim is first encountered. It is immaterial that the additional harm is not planned by the criminal or that it does not involve the commission of another offense.83 Analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that Appellant’s holding of LCpl November was not incidental to other offenses. After seizing LCpl November , Appellant detained, i.e., held, LCpl November in his barracks room behind a locked door. While the precise duration of the holding is unclear, it was neither momentary nor de minimis; rather, it was appreciable, lasting minutes while rescuers were held at bay. Though Appellant had just before strangled and attempted to rape LCpl November, the holding was not inherent to those other offenses. The Manual for Courts-Martial explains, “a rapist who throws his victim to the ground, does not, by such acts, commit kidnapping,”84 but this is not that. Rather, the attempted rape was complete by the time she escaped from being pinned to the floor, fleeing some distance and almost reaching safety before being seized by Appellant and dragged back into the room. The holding that followed, while rescuers banged and kicked at the door, was independent of the holding and force inherent to the attempted rape. Lastly, as in United States v. Barnes, “[t]his detention imposed additional risk to” LCpl November “as she was vulnerable to further assaults and additional injuries.”85 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant held LCpl November against her will. Concluding the same for the remaining elements, Appellant’s conviction for kidnapping is legally sufficient .

It is also factually sufficient. Appellant has made a specific showing of a deficiency in proof regarding seizure and holding. We have accordingly weighed the evidence subject to appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, and we are not clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence.

D. Major Hotel was not impliedly biased.

1. Additional Background The convening authority detailed Maj Hotel to the court-martial. During general voir dire, he raised his hand when the military judge asked the panel,

83 United States v. Barnes, 38 M.J. 72, 74–75 (C.A.A.F. 1993) (citation modified).

84 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.c.(2) at IV-115.

85 38 M.J. at 75.

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“Has anyone or any member of your family, or anyone close to you personally, ever been the victim of an offense similar to any of those charged in this case?”86 During individual voir dire, Maj Hotel explained, “[M]y sister-in-law was raped when she was in college, and then my [ex-wife] was sexually assaulted when she was in college as well.”87 Regarding his sister-in-law, he elaborated, “I know that she was intoxicated and that somebody that she was close to when she was in college basically took her back to her dorm room, or apartment, and sexually assaulted her there,”88 though he later acknowledged that “I probably don’t know that much detail.”89 This occurred in 2008 or 2009, it was never reported, and he learned of it through his brother. Although Maj Hotel has a meaningful relationship with his sister-in-law, the matter never comes up during their conversations.

Regarding his ex-wife, Maj Hotel explained that the incident occurred in 2012 or 2013 while the two were attending college together and dating. She went home over winter break, and a family friend committed the assault by oral penetration; alcohol was not involved. She told Maj Hotel about it around four months later. They later married, she received therapy, and they “moved past it.”90 The matter was “[n]ot something I brought up on a regular basis.” 91 The two divorced at some point, the timing of which is unclear from the record.

In response to questioning from trial counsel, Maj Hotel affirmed that he would “still be able to be impartial, not biased by those incidents,”92 and he agreed that he would hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and follow the military judge’s instructions on the law even if they were to conflict with any of his personal beliefs.

When asked by defense counsel what his initial thoughts were upon reading the charge sheet in this case, Maj Hotel responded:

I guess sadness that we’re even having a trial for something like this, but I certainly thought about my ex-wife and sister-in-law,

86 R. at 979.

87 R. at 1068.

88 R. at 1068–69.

89 R. at 1070.

90 R. at 1072.

91 R. at 1072.

92 R. at 1074.

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but I don't think it’s something that would affect my impartiality , necessarily. I think it’s just, you know, if you have somebody that you know that went through something that someone is being accused of, then you’re going to think about it.93 “Sadness for who?” asked defense counsel.94 “Just the entire situation,” responded Maj Hotel.95 He then denied that he would be thinking about his sister -in-law and ex-wife if he sat throughout the trial.

The Defense challenged Maj Hotel, offering the following as a basis:

We would challenge him under implied bias based on his answer whenever . . . the defense asked what his initial thoughts were reading the charge sheet, he said, necessarily, he was going to be thinking of his sister-in-law and his ex-wife. He felt sadness for the whole scenario.

While I asked what he meant by that, he meant the whole scenario, not a person in particular, but then followed-up again, mentioned the two people he knew to be victims in his life. And given that the perception of having a member like this who initially thought of those two victims in his life, would be substantial doubt as to the impartiality of him sitting on this panel.96 After correctly articulating the standard for implied bias, the military judge ruled in detail as follows:

The basis for challenge from the defense here is . . . that he’d be thinking about his sister-in-law and his ex-wife and the sadness that he articulated for the situation. So based on his responses, the Court does not find that this amounts to implied bias.

He did, indeed, answer that when he first looked at the charge sheet, he thought of those two individuals. . . . [T]he Court certainly understands that there might be a situation where a panel member who has family members who -- or close personal relationships with individuals who have been through something like that, that that might permeate their mind as they sit on a court-martial panel.

93 R. at 1081–82.

94 R. at 1082.

95 R. at 1082.

96 R. at 1083–84.

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Here, his answer in response to the defense’s question about whether he would be thinking about them while sitting on this trial was in the negative. He affirmly[97] said he would not be thinking about them while sitting on this trial. And so this Court is convinced that, based on his responses and the sincerity of his response, that he would be focusing on the trial.

. . . [I]t’s also not a per se basis for challenge that someone would be thinking about that -- about individuals like that while they sit on a trial. It’s unreasonable for anyone to expect that people just don’t think about ancillary things. The key analysis is whether the thought of those things will impact their ability to sit as a member on the court-martial. And there’s just no evidence of that based on his response.

. . . [T]o the extent his responses are viewed as disclaimers, and the question, of course, with implied bias is whether despite the disclaimer most people in the member’s position would be bias[ed], the Court does not find that that part of the implied bias analysis is met based on his responses. I think his disclaimer was sincere. And based on what he said, I don’t believe that most people in that situation, despite a disclaimer, would be prejudiced, or bias[ed] and unable to sit impartially as a member .

And with respect to sadness for the situation, certainly, if he had discussed feeling sadness or empathy for the victim, that might be more ripe for a challenge here, but he was very clear that the sadness for the situation was where the sadness was directed . . . not towards any one particular person, and those were his words.

And so for all of those reasons, based on his responses, the Court does not find that implied bias exists. The Court does not find that an objective observer would have substantial doubt about the fairness of the accused’s court-martial panel if this member were to sit on the panel.

97 We do not know if the military judge intended to use this archaic adverb as stated

or a more contemporary one such as “affirmatively” or “firmly.” Regardless, it was a comment upon the certainty or conviction of Maj Hotel in his response to questioning, based in part on the military judge’s personal observation of him.

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Of course, the Court understands that in close cases, military judges are enjoined to liberally grant defense challenges for cause. The Court does not find that this is a close case, and for that reason, the challenge for cause is denied.98 The Defense exercised its peremptory challenge against another member, and Maj Hotel was impaneled.

2. Law “As a matter of due process, an accused has a constitutional right, as well as a regulatory right, to a fair and impartial panel.”99 “A member shall be excused for cause whenever it appears that the member . . . [s]hould not sit as a member in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality.”100 “This rule includes actual bias as well as implied bias.”101 The latter, at issue here, is bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality. The test for implied bias is whether the risk that the public will perceive that the accused received something less than a court of fair, impartial members is too high. In asking that question, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, and assume the public is familiar with the unique structure of the military justice system.102 “[I]f the military judge finds an implied bias challenge to be a close question, the challenge should be granted.”103 When resolving an issue of implied bias, we first determine where to fix our view along “a sliding standard of appellate review . . . based on the specific facts of the case”:104

98 R. at 1085–87.

99 United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citing United States

v. Mack, 41 M.J. 51, 54 (C.M.A. 1994)).

100 R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).

101 United States v. Miles, 58 M.J. 192, 194 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing United States v.

Daulton, 45 M.J. 212, 217 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).

102 United States v. Keago, 84 M.J. 367, 372 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (citation modified).

103 Id.

104 Id. at 373.

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Because the test for implied bias is an objective one that is only partially based on the military judge’s credibility determinations and findings of fact, military appellate courts review implied bias challenges pursuant to a standard that is less deferential than abuse of discretion, but more deferential than de novo review .

.... . . . A military judge who cites the correct law and explains his implied bias reasoning on the record will receive greater deference (closer to the abuse of discretion standard), while a military judge who fails to do so will receive less deference (closer to the de novo standard). Accordingly, the more reasoning military judges provide, the more deference they will receive.105

3. Analysis Appellant likens Maj Hotel to Captain (Capt) A in United States v. Terry,106 an impliedly biased member of the court-martial to which a specification of rape had been referred. According to the CAAF, Capt A’s experience with rape was pronounced and distinct. A long time girlfriend, whom Capt A may have intended to marry, was raped and became pregnant. The experience caused the girlfriend to break off her relationship with Capt A. Further, the girlfriend named the child after Capt A, indicating the nature of the bond and the continuing feelings between the girlfriend and Capt A. We believe that most persons in Capt A’s position would have difficulty sitting on a rape trial, even given the passage of six years. Further, an objective observer might well have doubts about the fairness of Appellant’s court-martial panel. Applying the liberal grant mandate, the military judge erred in not eliminating such doubts from Appellant's court-martial at the outset .107 The Government counters that Maj H (not to be confused with the instant Maj Hotel), a not impliedly biased member in Terry, is apter for comparison. In contrast to Capt A, the CAAF concluded,

105 Id. at 372–73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

106 64 M.J. 295 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

107 Id. at 297.

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Maj H properly sat on Appellant’s court-martial. Although Maj H’s wife had been the victim of some form of sexual assault by a family member, the record reflects that Maj H and his wife had not discussed the incident for over five years. Moreover, his wife had reconciled with the family member responsible for the sexual assault, which had occurred ten to twenty years earlier.108 In sum, there were “a number of factors in Maj H’s situation that tend to ameliorate his exposure to the crime, dispelling the appearance of implied bias.”109 We agree with the Government that Maj Hotel is more akin to Terry’s Maj H than Capt A. Similar also is the challenged member in United States v. Casillas , whom the CAAF concluded was not impliedly biased:

[Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt)] AG’s wife had been a rape victim thirty years prior to the trial, a longer time period in comparison to [Maj H]’s wife in Terry. As in Terry, CMSgt AG and his wife discussed the incident very rarely, only two or three times over three decades. CMSgt AG explained why he thought he could be an impartial panel member and stated that he would not have a problem telling his wife if the panel were to find the defendant not guilty.

. . . Based on CMSgt AG’s “candid and credible” responses, the military judge found that CMSgt AG had no actual bias. The military judge separately considered whether CMSgt AG’s participation in the court-martial would damage the public’s perception of fairness in the military justice system and concluded that it would not. Even considering the liberal grant mandate, the military judge denied Appellant’s challenge for implied bias, describing the question as not “a particularly close call.”

We find nothing about CMSgt AG’s answers during voir dire, or the circumstances of his wife’s prior experience with sexual assault, that gives us cause to deviate from our precedent in Terry. This is especially true given that the military judge in this case: (1) placed his observations of CMSgt AG’s body language , demeanor, and credibility on the record; (2) identified that implied bias is an objective standard; (3) explained his reasoning on the record, including why these circumstances would

108 Id.

109 Id. at 304.

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not “do damage to this trial, in the eyes of the public in the perception of fairness” in our system of military justice; and (4) expressly took the liberal grant mandate into consideration in finding that the implied bias question was not a close call. Given that well-developed record, we conclude that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant’s challenge for actual bias. Furthermore, we agree with the military judge that Appellant’s implied bias challenge was not a close call and find it appropriate, under these circumstances, to defer to the military judge’s denial of Appellant’s implied bias challenge.110 We have the benefit of a similarly developed record. Along the sliding scale, our standard of review in this instance abuts abuse of discretion in light of the military judge’s thorough ruling, generally checking the same boxes as the military judge in Casillas. Maj Hotel’s “experience with rape was [not] pronounced and distinct.”111 Rather, it was “attenuated.”112 With respect to his sister-inlaw , he knew limited details of her victimization and had never even discussed it with her. With respect to his ex-wife, more than a decade had passed since the incident, they “moved past it,”113 and there is no indication that they maintained any relationship at the time of trial. We afford deference to the military judge’s assessment of Maj Hotel’s sincerity, and we see nothing in the record that would cause the public to doubt Maj Hotel’s assertion of his impartiality despite the fact that, when put on the spot to verbalize his immediate thoughts upon reading the charge sheet, he expressed a general feeling of sadness for the situation and acknowledged that he thought of those two women. The military judge correctly recognized that court-martial members need not be automatons to ensure the public’s confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the panel. Maj Hotel was not impliedly biased.

110 86 M.J. 94, 103–04 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

111 Terry, 64 M.J. at 297.

112 Id. at 304.

113 R. at 1072.

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III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred .114 However, we note that the Entry of Judgment incorrectly identifies the finding to Charge I. Although we find no prejudice, Appellant is entitled to have court-martial records that correctly reflect the content of his proceeding .115 In accordance with R.C.M. 1111(c)(2), we modify the Entry of Judgment and direct that it be included in the record.

The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court

114 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

115 United States v. Sutton, 81 M.J. 677 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021); United States

v. Crumpley, 49 M.J. 538, 539 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).

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UNITED STATES NMCCA NO. 202500102

v. ENTRY OF

Ian M. ADAME JUDGMENT Lance Corporal (E-3) U.S. Marine Corps As Modified on Appeal Accused

2 September 2026

From 8 May 2024 to 21 October 2024, the Accused was tried at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, by a general court-martial, consisting of officer and enlisted members. Military Judge Ryan C. Lipton presided .

FINDINGS

The following are the Accused’s pleas and the Court’s findings to all offenses referred to trial:

Charge I: Violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty, but Guilty of violation of Article 80, UCMJ.

Specification 1: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit a sexual act upon PFC A. N., by penetrating PFC A. N.’s vulva with LCpl Adame’s fingers, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of LCpl Adame, by using unlawful force.

Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed without prejudice.

United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Modified Entry of Judgment

Specification 2: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit a sexual act upon PFC A. N., by penetrating PFC A. N.’s vulva with LCpl Adame’s penis, by using unlawful force.

Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty, but Guilty of the lesser offense of attempted rape by force.

Specification 3: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit a sexual act upon PFC A. N., by penetrating PFC A. N.’s vulva with LCpl Adame’s fingers, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of LCpl Adame, without the consent of PFC A. N.

Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed without prejudice.

Specification 4: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit a sexual act upon PFC A. N., by penetrating PFC A. N.’s vulva with LCpl Adame’s penis, without the consent of PFC A. N.

Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty.

Charge II: Violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty.

Specification 1: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit an assault upon PFC A. N. by unlawfully strangling her, to wit: placing his hands around her neck and squeezing. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty.

Specification 2: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, commit an assault upon PFC A. N. by unlawfully strangling her, to wit: placing his arm around her neck and squeezing. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty.

2

United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Modified Entry of Judgment

Charge III: Violation of Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty.

Specification: Did, on or about 26 November 2023, wrongfully seize and hold PFC A. N., a person not a minor, against her will. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty.

SENTENCE

On 21 October 2024, members sentenced the Accused to the following:

Reduction to E-1; Forfeiture of all pay and allowances; Confinement for 5 years; and A dishonorable discharge.

FOR THE COURT:

MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court

3