United States v. 6.50 Acres of Land

632 F. Supp. 226, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29242
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 18, 1986
DocketNo. C79-573A
StatusPublished

This text of 632 F. Supp. 226 (United States v. 6.50 Acres of Land) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. 6.50 Acres of Land, 632 F. Supp. 226, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29242 (N.D. Ohio 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DOWD, District Judge.

The defendant, Oakhill Properties, a partnership1 which owned the land and buildings taken by the United States of America in a condemnation action for the Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Park, seeks an award in the amount of its costs and fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, PL No. 96-481 (28 U.S.C. § 2412) plus the attorney’s fees and costs required to prosecute the motion for the fees and costs.

I. APPLICABLE LAW TO THE APPLICATION FOR COSTS AND FEES

Two issues of law have arisen with respect to application for fees and costs in condemnation suits brought by the United States government. First, do the provisions of E.A.J.A. apply to condemnation cases and if so, in what circumstances? Secondly, what standard is to be applied to the issue of whether the position of the United States in the case was one of “substantial justification” as that phrase is used in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a).

The application of the defendants for attorney’s fees is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a) which provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any cost awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action, other than cases sounding in tort, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances made an award unjust. (Emphasis added).

After the instant motion was filed, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the defendant did not file a timely motion, that the defendant was not a prevailing party and that the statute was superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a). By an order filed March 5,1984, the Court ruled for the defendants on the issues raised by the plaintiff, but withheld a determination on the motion for summary judgment until the parties had an opportunity to brief the issue of “substantial justification” as that phrase appears in the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a).

In the previous order of March 5, 1984, this Court ruled that in condemnation cases the landowner is “the prevailing party” in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a) where the award of the jury is substantially in excess of the government’s deposit or settlement offer, citing as authority U.S. v. 329.73 Acres, 704 F.2d 800 (5th Cir.1983) and U.S. v. 101.80 Acres, 716 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.1983). As the jury verdict was in excess of either $100,000.00 or $150,000.00 of the government’s highest settlement offer2 and in excess of $200,000.00,of the government’s appraisal of the value of the property, this Court has ruled that the defendants are the “prevailing party” as that phrase is used in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a). Thus, the issue has narrowed to the question of whether the government has been able to meet the burden of showing that its position in this case was one of “substantial justification.”

The interpretation and application of the phrase “substantial justification” has troubled both district and circuit courts since the enactment of E.A.J.A. Some courts have concluded that the position of the United States as that phrase is contained in 2412(d)(1)(a) refers to the litigation position of the government while other circuits have found that the phrase refers [229]*229to the underlying agency position.3 In the case at hand, the defendants have argued that they are entitled to fees under either interpretation. Were the underlying agency position to be the interpretation to be followed in evaluating the issue of “substantial justification,” then the defendant landowners would be in a position to argue that the park officials managing the Cuyahoga .Valley National Recreation Park manipulated the decision to seek a fee interest as opposed to a scenic easement for defendants’ property and influenced in a negative fashion the subsequent prosecution of this case in a manner adverse to the interest of the defendants.

However, the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Trident Marine Construction, Inc. v. Corp. of Engineers, 766 F.2d 974 (6th Cir.1985) has resolved for the Sixth Circuit the interpretation to be applied to the phrase “substantial justification” by district courts in evaluating E.A.J.A. applciations for fees. In Trident, following an analysis of the two positions, the Court found the rationale supporting the litigation position to be the stronger view and followed the same. Consequently, this Court will apply the government’s litigation position in analyzing its opposition to the claim that it should pay the defendants, as the prevailing party, its fees and costs.

II. HISTORY OF THE CASE

On March 30, 1979, the United States of America filed its complaint seeking, by way of condemnation, on behalf of the Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Park a fee simple interest in the land of the defendant partnership.4 The land, 6.50 acres was improved by a renovated 1854 farmhouse with lavish furnishings, a remodeled barn, and other dwellings on the acreage. The defendant property owners filed an answer setting up a number of affirmative defenses directed to the claim that the procedures followed by the government did not conform to law. Additionally, the answer charged the government and its agents with having acted maliciously and in bad faith in designating the property in question for a fee condemnation rather than a scenic easement condemnation.

The case was initially assigned to Judge Leroy J. Contie, Jr., of the United States District Court. Subsequently, in accordance with the protocol establishing new dockets, the case was assigned to Judge Ann Aldrich of the United States District Court in May of 1980. Subsequently the case was again assigned, pursuant to the protocol of establishing new dockets, to this Court on October 16, 1982.

On September 4, 1981, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was subsequently overruled by Judge Aldrich. On February 2, 1982, the defendants filed a 77 page motion for summary judgment. On February 16, 1982, the government filed a 23 page competing motion for partial summary judgment directed toward the issue raised in defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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Bluebook (online)
632 F. Supp. 226, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-650-acres-of-land-ohnd-1986.