United States v. 615.10 Acres of Land

327 F. Supp. 691, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13190
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedMay 21, 1971
DocketCiv. A. No. 70-C-36-A
StatusPublished

This text of 327 F. Supp. 691 (United States v. 615.10 Acres of Land) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. 615.10 Acres of Land, 327 F. Supp. 691, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13190 (W.D. Va. 1971).

Opinion

OPINION and JUDGMENT

DALTON, Chief Judge.

In the southwestern part of Virginia at the junction of Smyth, Washington, and Grayson Counties rises a majestic mountain, which is known as White Top. Its peak reaches an elevation of 5533 feet above sea level and the property commands spectacular vistas of the surrounding countryside, of which it is a landmark. The United States brought an eminent domain proceeding to acquire this splendid land for the public benefit and thus to preserve its wonders for future generations.

In view of the size and importance of the property, the court deemed it proper to appoint a commission, as provided for [693]*693in F.R.Civ.P. 71A(h), to determine its fair valuation. Three distinguished residents of southwestern Virginia, S. H. Sutherland, S. Floyd Landreth, and G. W. Summerson, accepted appointment to the Commission.

The court instructed the Commission on the law and procedures to be used and they then commenced on a diligent investigation of the problem. After mature deliberations upon all of the evidence presented by the parties, the Commission found that $155,635.05 was fair compensation for the property in question. The Commission has prepared an excellent report which exemplifies in every respect its skill and ability and which not only justifies the court’s confidence in its appointment, but also excites the admiration of anyone who reads the report.

To this award the defendants have filed exceptions which generally contend that the Commissioners failed to take certain elements of value into consideration. In addition it is contended that the Commissioners should not have considered a certain right of way to White Top Mountain over United States Government property. As to this latter point, the transcript indicates that the parties entered into a stipulation on this point, which, if anything, was apparently favorable to the defendants. Therefore, this contention is without merit.

The defendants argue that it might well cost an amount almost equal to the award just to construct roads of the kind which already exist on White Top. Even if this contention is true, however, it does not offer relief to the defendants because the critical inquiry is the fair value of the property as a whole and not what it would cost to duplicate the existing characteristics of the mountain. Counsel for the defendants cross-examined the government’s witnesses on this point and in addition presented his thoughts to the Commission. The report indicates that the Commission understood and appreciated the quality of the internal access on White Top.

Much of the defendants’ brief in support of their objections to the report is spent in denying the comparability of sales of other parcels of land in the area which the Commission considered in arriving at its determination. It is argued that the other properties were not comparable because they were not as high in elevation, did not offer the same quality of view as was available from White Top, or were not as accessible from main highways. The court feels that this kind of argument should have been made to the Commission rather than made here. Of course no two properties are exactly alike but it was the function of the Commission to receive evidence of other sales and determine how comparable in terms of market value they actually were. The Commission viewed the other properties in question and received arguments from the defendants concerning differences between the properties. The report offers a full discussion of this question which indicates the Commission’s appreciation of its difficulties.

In their memorandum in support of their exceptions to the award, the defendants have alleged that one of the commissioners may have been improperly influenced by riding with one of the witnesses for the government to one or more of the hearings. Interestingly enough this point was not raised before the Commission or in the exceptions to the report but for the first time in the defendants’ brief. The government has responded to this issue by pointing out that on one occasion the same commissioner also rode with Mr. Blakemore, who is the president of the corporate defendants. While the court is alert to any suggestion of impropriety, it confesses that it is unable to determine any basis for such a suggestion in this case.

In placing this contention in proper perspective, the court recognizes that the proceedings before the Commission were conducted in an informal manner. To view the principal property and other properties which were alleged to be comparable, it was necessary to make several trips of various lengths and a measure [694]*694of informality was to be expected. All of the commissioners were distinguished residents of the Western District of Virginia and it is inconceivable to this court that one of the commissioners could have been influenced by riding in a car with a witness of one of the parties. There is certainly no evidence which lends credence to any thought of improper influence, especially since the Commission’s award was 60% higher than the estimate made by the witness in question. The complaint made in this case is similar to one made in United States v. 72.71 Acres, More or Less, 157 F.Supp. 401 (D.Md.1957), aff’d, 256 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 931, 79 S.Ct. 319, 3 L.Ed.2d 304 (1959). In that case the dissatisfied landowner complained that one of the government attorneys had ridden in the bus with the jurors to view the property being taken. In denying the objection Judge Chestnut pointed out that the happening was only an incidental matter about which the defendant made no objection at the time.

Perhaps most indicative of the lack of merit to this complaint is the fact that it has been made so late. This circumstance suggests that the objection is actually an afterthought. If this matter was of real concern to the defendants, an objection should have been made at the time to the Commission. In United States v. 72.71 Acres, More or Less, supra, Judge Chestnut held that an objection of this kind came too late when it was first raised in the district court. In a slightly different situation the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has held that failure to object to improper argument either during or at the conclusion of the argument acted as a waiver of any objection. State Highway Commissioner v. Reynolds, 206 Va. 785, 146 S.E.2d 261 (1966). See also Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 451, 68 S.Ct. 611, 92 L.Ed. 798 (1948). Similarly, this court is of the opinion that this objection comes too late when it is first made only after the exceptions to the commissioners’ report have been filed.

Also raised for the first time in the defendants’ brief is a complaint that erroneous figures were used in paragraph #1 of the Commission’s calculations. Actually the figures which the defendants contend should have been used by the Commission in this method for arriving at value were in fact used by it in another method which was employed. The figures in paragraph #1 which are the subject of complaint are the average prices per acre of the three properties alleged to be comparable with White Top. Of eourse the use of these figures was appropriate.

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Related

Francis v. Southern Pacific Co.
333 U.S. 445 (Supreme Court, 1948)
United States v. Merz
376 U.S. 192 (Supreme Court, 1964)
John C. Webb and Helen H. Webb v. United States
256 F.2d 669 (Fourth Circuit, 1958)
State Highway Commissioner v. Reynolds
146 S.E.2d 261 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1966)
Hurley v. Hurley
65 S.E. 472 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1909)
Hurricane Lumber Co. v. Lowe
66 S.E. 66 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1909)
United States v. Payne
368 F.2d 74 (Fourth Circuit, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
327 F. Supp. 691, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-61510-acres-of-land-vawd-1971.