UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 20-2299 (JEB) 171 “DEHLAVIEH” ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES, et al.,
Defendants In Rem.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Having seized an arsenal of Iranian-made weapons from two vessels in the Arabian Sea,
the United States brought this forfeiture action in rem. The Defendant Properties are collections
of twelve different types of weapons, including anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles. The
Government alleges that the Defendant Properties are subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(G)(i) as assets of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated
foreign terrorist organization. As no one else has claimed an interest or otherwise defended the
action, the Clerk of Court entered a default on August 20, 2021. See ECF Nos. 18–20 (Clerk’s
Entries of Default). The Government now moves for default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). See ECF No. 22. As the United States has sufficiently
demonstrated that the allegations in its Complaint warrant such judgment, the Court will grant
the Motion.
I. Background
Given the default in this case, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the Government’s
Complaint as true. The IRGC “‘is a non-traditional instrumentality of Iran,’ serving as ‘the
1 military arm of a kind of shadow government answering directly to the Ayatollah and the
mullahs who hold power in Iran.’” Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-1289, 2020 WL
3606273, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (quoting Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d
40, 47 (D.D.C. 2006)). In 2019, both the President and the Secretary of State designated the
IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization. See Pl. Mot. for Def. J. at 5. The Government notes,
furthermore, that “[t]he Department of State and the Department of the Treasury have found that
the Iranian government uses the IRGC as its primary means to direct and implement its global
terrorist campaign, to include the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons to proxies
in various countries, including Yemen.” Id. at 4 (citation omitted). For example, it provides
military support to the Houthis in Yemen, “who have been fighting the United Nations-
recognized government” there. See Compl. at 4.
In this case, the U.S. Navy “seized the Defendant Properties while conducting routine
maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). The seizures took
place on November 25, 2019, and February 9, 2020. Id. Both “U.S. and [United Nations]
authorities analyzed the . . . interdictions and concluded that Iran was responsible for planning,
organizing, and executing both shipments of weapons.” Id. at 7 (citation omitted). A “U.N.
Panel of Experts assessed the seized items to be ‘evidently of Iranian origin,” and the U.S.
military linked both caches to the IRGC. Id. at 8.
The Government filed this Complaint on August 20, 2020, and obtained a warrant for
arrest in rem that same day. See ECF Nos. 3 (Compl.) & 5 (Warrant). After sending notice of
the action via U.S. mail to potential claimants, the Government began posting such notice on a
government-forfeiture site for 30 days beginning in July 2020. See Pl. Mot. for Def. J. at 8–9.
No claims were filed, and the Clerk of Court entered default on August 20, 2021. See Entries of
2 Default. The Government now moves for default judgment and seeks forfeiture of Defendant
Properties.
II. Legal Standard
“The determination of whether a default judgment is appropriate is ‘committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.’” Lu v. Lezell, No. 11-1815, 2013 WL 12183952, at *1
(D.D.C. July 19, 2013) (quoting Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A court
may enter default judgment when the “party against whom a judgment . . . is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). “This form of relief is no less appropriate when the defendant in question is property,”
and “unless a claimant properly intervenes to raise defenses to its forfeiture, the defendant
property is deemed to have ‘failed to plead or otherwise defend’ against the allegations, and the
Clerk of Court must enter default.” United States v. All Assets Held in Account Number
XXXXXXXX, 330 F. Supp. 3d 150, 156 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)).
Once default is entered, the defendant “is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation
in the complaint.” Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001); see Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); see also 10A Wright &
Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688.1 (4th ed. 2021) (defaulting “defendant has no further
standing to contest the factual allegations of plaintiff’s claim for relief”). Nevertheless,
“[m]odern courts are . . . reluctant to enter and enforce judgments unwarranted by the facts,”
Jackson, 636 F.2d at 835, and “a district court may still deny an application for default judgment
where the allegations of the complaint, even if true, are legally insufficient to make out a claim.”
Gutierrez v. Berg Contracting Inc., No. 99-3044, 2000 WL 331721, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 20,
3 2000); see also United States v. $1,0171,251.44 of Funds Associated with Mingzheng Int’l
Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he defendant[’s] default
notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgement only if the complaint states a
claim for relief.”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008)).
III. Analysis
Before looking at the allegations in the Complaint, the Court examines its jurisdiction and
the sufficiency of notice to potential claimants.
A. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1355(a), which provides that district courts “have original jurisdiction . . . of any action or
proceeding for . . . forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress.” It
also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which provides the district courts with jurisdiction
over proceedings commenced by the United States.
This Court thus has in rem jurisdiction to issue a forfeiture order, and this holds true
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 20-2299 (JEB) 171 “DEHLAVIEH” ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES, et al.,
Defendants In Rem.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Having seized an arsenal of Iranian-made weapons from two vessels in the Arabian Sea,
the United States brought this forfeiture action in rem. The Defendant Properties are collections
of twelve different types of weapons, including anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles. The
Government alleges that the Defendant Properties are subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(G)(i) as assets of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated
foreign terrorist organization. As no one else has claimed an interest or otherwise defended the
action, the Clerk of Court entered a default on August 20, 2021. See ECF Nos. 18–20 (Clerk’s
Entries of Default). The Government now moves for default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). See ECF No. 22. As the United States has sufficiently
demonstrated that the allegations in its Complaint warrant such judgment, the Court will grant
the Motion.
I. Background
Given the default in this case, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the Government’s
Complaint as true. The IRGC “‘is a non-traditional instrumentality of Iran,’ serving as ‘the
1 military arm of a kind of shadow government answering directly to the Ayatollah and the
mullahs who hold power in Iran.’” Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-1289, 2020 WL
3606273, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (quoting Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d
40, 47 (D.D.C. 2006)). In 2019, both the President and the Secretary of State designated the
IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization. See Pl. Mot. for Def. J. at 5. The Government notes,
furthermore, that “[t]he Department of State and the Department of the Treasury have found that
the Iranian government uses the IRGC as its primary means to direct and implement its global
terrorist campaign, to include the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons to proxies
in various countries, including Yemen.” Id. at 4 (citation omitted). For example, it provides
military support to the Houthis in Yemen, “who have been fighting the United Nations-
recognized government” there. See Compl. at 4.
In this case, the U.S. Navy “seized the Defendant Properties while conducting routine
maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). The seizures took
place on November 25, 2019, and February 9, 2020. Id. Both “U.S. and [United Nations]
authorities analyzed the . . . interdictions and concluded that Iran was responsible for planning,
organizing, and executing both shipments of weapons.” Id. at 7 (citation omitted). A “U.N.
Panel of Experts assessed the seized items to be ‘evidently of Iranian origin,” and the U.S.
military linked both caches to the IRGC. Id. at 8.
The Government filed this Complaint on August 20, 2020, and obtained a warrant for
arrest in rem that same day. See ECF Nos. 3 (Compl.) & 5 (Warrant). After sending notice of
the action via U.S. mail to potential claimants, the Government began posting such notice on a
government-forfeiture site for 30 days beginning in July 2020. See Pl. Mot. for Def. J. at 8–9.
No claims were filed, and the Clerk of Court entered default on August 20, 2021. See Entries of
2 Default. The Government now moves for default judgment and seeks forfeiture of Defendant
Properties.
II. Legal Standard
“The determination of whether a default judgment is appropriate is ‘committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.’” Lu v. Lezell, No. 11-1815, 2013 WL 12183952, at *1
(D.D.C. July 19, 2013) (quoting Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A court
may enter default judgment when the “party against whom a judgment . . . is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). “This form of relief is no less appropriate when the defendant in question is property,”
and “unless a claimant properly intervenes to raise defenses to its forfeiture, the defendant
property is deemed to have ‘failed to plead or otherwise defend’ against the allegations, and the
Clerk of Court must enter default.” United States v. All Assets Held in Account Number
XXXXXXXX, 330 F. Supp. 3d 150, 156 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)).
Once default is entered, the defendant “is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation
in the complaint.” Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001); see Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); see also 10A Wright &
Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688.1 (4th ed. 2021) (defaulting “defendant has no further
standing to contest the factual allegations of plaintiff’s claim for relief”). Nevertheless,
“[m]odern courts are . . . reluctant to enter and enforce judgments unwarranted by the facts,”
Jackson, 636 F.2d at 835, and “a district court may still deny an application for default judgment
where the allegations of the complaint, even if true, are legally insufficient to make out a claim.”
Gutierrez v. Berg Contracting Inc., No. 99-3044, 2000 WL 331721, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 20,
3 2000); see also United States v. $1,0171,251.44 of Funds Associated with Mingzheng Int’l
Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he defendant[’s] default
notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgement only if the complaint states a
claim for relief.”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008)).
III. Analysis
Before looking at the allegations in the Complaint, the Court examines its jurisdiction and
the sufficiency of notice to potential claimants.
A. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1355(a), which provides that district courts “have original jurisdiction . . . of any action or
proceeding for . . . forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress.” It
also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which provides the district courts with jurisdiction
over proceedings commenced by the United States.
This Court thus has in rem jurisdiction to issue a forfeiture order, and this holds true
regardless of “[w]hether or not [the] foreign government will ultimately choose to comply.”
United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013); see also
United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 2d 205, 211
(D.D.C. 2011).
B. Notice
A forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute is governed by Supplemental
Rule G of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule G(4)(a)(i) states that “[a] judgment of
forfeiture may be entered only if the government has published notice of the action within a
4 reasonable time after filing the complaint or at a time the court orders.” The Government
fulfilled this obligation by posting timely notice on an official government-forfeiture website,
www.forfeiture.gov, for at least 30 consecutive days, as required by Supplemental Rule
G(4)(a)(iv)(C). See Pl. Mot. for Def. J. at 8–9.
Plaintiff was also required to provide direct notice “to any person who reasonably
appear[ed] to be a potential claimant on the facts known to [it]” and to send such notice “by
means reasonably calculated to reach the potential claimant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.
G(4)(b)(i), (iii)(A). The Government met this requirement. See Mot. for Def. J. at 12-13.
C. Merits
Supplemental Rule G also requires that the Complaint “identify the statute under which
the forfeiture action is brought” and “state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable
belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
R. G(2)(e)–(f).
Plaintiff brings this action under the Civil Forfeiture section of Title 18, Crimes and
Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it claims that Defendant Properties are subject to forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i), which permits forfeiture of “all assets, foreign or
domestic”“of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating any
Federal crime of terrorism . . . against the United States . . . .” (internal footnote omitted). The
IRGC fits within this definition. See Mot. for Def. J. at 14–15. Indeed, the Secretary of State
has designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Id. at 15.
In addition, the Government has alleged sufficient facts to establish that the weapons
seized belonged to the IRGC. The Complaint explains that “that there was ‘not any plausible
way that these missiles and weapons could have gotten on a [vessel] between Iran and Yemen
5 except that the IRGC has continued a pattern of smuggling to the Houthis and Yemen,’”
Compl., ¶ 15 (quoting authority at U.S. Central Command with expertise in these matters).
The Court, accordingly, finds that the Government has met its burden here.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Government’s Motion for Default
Judgment. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: November 15, 2021