United States v. 1,100 MacHine Gun Receivers

73 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17395, 1999 WL 1005018
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedAugust 26, 1999
Docket2:97CV00491C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 73 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (United States v. 1,100 MacHine Gun Receivers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. 1,100 MacHine Gun Receivers, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17395, 1999 WL 1005018 (D. Utah 1999).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

The United States has brought this action seeking to forfeit the defendants, 1095 alleged machinegun receivers. Interport, Inc. (“Interport”) is the claimant. Trial was held before the court, sitting without a jury, on July 15-16, 1999. The court took the matter under advisement.

The court has reviewed the evidence received, and considered the arguments of counsel and the applicable law. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, the court now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Interport was incorporated in 1985. The primary business of Interport is importing firearms and firearm parts into the United States. William York is the president and authorized agent of Interport. York has been involved for many years in the firearm industry and has testified as an expert in litigation involving firearms.

On October 28, 1994, Interport submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) a form entitled “Application and Permit for Importation of Firearms, Ammunition and Implements of War.” (PL's Ex. 10). This form is commonly known as a “Form 6.” York prepared and signed the Form 6.

York, on behalf of Interport, wrote on the Form 6 that Interport was applying to import “Spare parts for AKM 1 type Military Rifle (as per attachment) NO RECEIVERS!” (PL’s Ex. 10). The list *1291 attached to the Form 6 identified the defendants as “FIRE CONTROL BOX — cut from rifle.” (Id. at 2). York thought of the term “fire box” himself. (Pl.’s Ex. 22 at 4).

When the ATF approves a Form 6 application, a number is stamped on the face of the form; the Form 6 then is no longer an application but becomes the permit allowing importation of firearms. On November 22, 1994, ATF approved Interport’s application and issued Permit No. 94-13811. The ATF stamped on the front of the Form 6: “NO FIREARMS, FRAMES, RECEIVERS OR ACTIONS FOR FIREARMS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR IMPORTATION UNDER THIS PERMIT.” (PL’s Ex. 10).

Defendants were shipped with the other AKM parts from Germany to the United States at the direction of Interport. They arrived in San Francisco in January 1995 and were transported to Salt Lake City, Utah, the official port of entry.

After inspecting the shipment, inspectors from the United States Customs Service (“Customs”) allowed all items except the defendants to be released to Interport. Customs requested an opinion from ATF whether the defendants were AKM receivers. On January 30, 1995, based on ATF’s opinion that defendants were receivers, Customs inspectors seized the defendants as merchandise being introduced into the United States in violation of law.

The United States contends that the defendants are receivers and therefore subject to forfeiture. Interport contends that the defendants are “scrap” and not receivers because, as they exist in then-present state, the defendants cannot receive a barrel. The parties stipulated that the defendants fall into eight categories, depending on their length and whether they contain internal parts. The defendants vary in length from seven inches in length to eight and % inches in length. (PL’s Ex. 9). Representative samples of the defendants were admitted at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibits 1-8.

Some AK’s have “milled” receivers, meaning that the receiver is sculpted out of a single piece of metal and is threaded at the front to receive the barrel. Other models, such as the AKM, are not milled but are stamped out of sheet metal. In such models, the receiver is not threaded. To insert the barrel, a separate part called a “barrel mount,” “barrel block,” or “trun-ion” (these terms are synonymous for purposes of this case) must be attached to the front portion of the receiver.

A receiver is similar to the chassis of a car. It houses the operational parts that make a gun fire, much like a chassis houses the engine, transmission and other mechanisms necessary to make an automobile operate. The parts typically housed by a receiver are the gun’s firing mechanisms — hammer, bolt, trigger, sear, and firing pins. York admitted in his deposition that the defendants provide housing for the hammer, bolt and firing mechanisms. (PL’s Ex. 23 at 2).

On two earlier occasions, in 1993 and 1994, York had encountered difficulties with the United States when he attempted to import maehinegun receivers from Sten and Karl Gustaf. In connection with York’s attempted importation of the Karl Gustaf machineguns, York was sent a diagram and instructions showing how a receiver must be destroyed. The instructions stated: “The receiver must be completely severed in the specified locations with a cutting torch which displaces at least y4 inch of metal. Saw cutting is not acceptable. (PL’s Ex. 27)”. The illustration showed three cuts made through the receiver. The defendants were not cut in the manner described in Exhibit 27.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This is an action for civil forfeiture. Jurisdiction of the court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1395 and is not disputed.

The United States contends that forfeiture of the defendants is authorized by 19 *1292 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 545.

A forfeiture proceeding is an in rem proceeding, based upon the legal fiction that the property itself is guilty of a crime or is proceeds of a crime. United States v. $149,442.43, 965 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir.1992). The government bears the initial burden of showing probable cause for instituting the forfeiture procedure. The standard for establishing probable cause is similar to the standard applied to arrests, searches, and seizures. Id. Once probable cause has been established, the claimant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is not subject to forfeiture. Id. at 877.

Forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B)

Section 1595a(e)(2)(B) authorizes forfeiture of merchandise if “its importation or entry requires a license,' permit or other authorization of an agency of the United States Government and the merchandise is not accompanied by such license, permit or authorization.” 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B). According to the United States, the defendants can be forfeited under this statute because 27 C.F.R. § 178.112

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Bluebook (online)
73 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17395, 1999 WL 1005018, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-1100-machine-gun-receivers-utd-1999.