United States Steel Products Co. v. Poole-Dean Co.

Ninth Circuit

United States Steel Products Co. v. Poole-Dean Co.

245 F. 533, 157 C.C.A. 645, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1515

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 1, 1917

DocketNo. 2936

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 245 F. 533 (United States Steel Products Co. v. Poole-Dean Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States Steel Products Co. v. Poole-Dean Co., 245 F. 533, 157 C.C.A. 645, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1515 (9th Cir. 1917).

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Opinion

MORROW, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1] The defense that the work was done for the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not for the defendant, cannot be sustained. The plaintiff had no contractual relations whatever with the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway. It is true the work was done under the terms of a subcontract provided for in an original contract between the defendant and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway; but the contract in suit was between the plaintiff and defendant. This is expressly admitted in a number of paragraphs in defendant’s answer, and particularly in paragraph 4, where it is alleged that:

“Plaintiff submitted to defendant written proposals for the performance of a part of said contract between defendant and Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, which proposals were accepted in writing by defendant, and said proposals and acceptance constituted and do now constitute the contract between plaintiff and defendant mentioned in plaintiff’s said amended complaint.”

[537]*537[2] The main question for this court to determine is whether or not the contract between the parties, and under which the work in question was done, was entirely in writing; that is, whether the four letters introduced in evidence and relied upon by the defendant contained the completed contract. If that question can be answered in the affirmative as a matter of law, then it was the duty of the trial judge to construe such contract; but, if it must be answered in the negative, it was within the province of the jury, and its duty, under proper instructions from the court, to determine what the contract was, not only from the writings introduced as setting forth the alleged agreement, but from all the evidence produced in connection with such writings and the subject-matter thereof. Etting v. United States Bank, 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.) 57, 75, 6 L. Ed. 419; Rankin v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Savings Deposit Co., 189 U. S. 242, 252, 23 Sup. Ct. 553, 47 L. Ed. 792; American Bridge & Contract Co. v. Bullen Bridge Co., 29 Or. 549, 46 Pac. 138.

[3] That the contract was not entirely in writing we think is admitted by the defendant in its answer, wherein it states, in paragraph VII, that:

“It was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made upon the express understanding, that defendant should deliver said steel to plaintiff by water transportation, and that said steel should be delivered as completely fabricated as it was defendant’s custom to ship by water transportation similar steel for similar work.”

Again, in paragraph IX, allusion is made to the fact that “said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding” that certain conditions existed, while in paragraph X it is positively set forth as a defense that:

“It was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding, that the pontoons for the wing of the dry dock should be furnished and provided by Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not by defendant, and said pontoons are the pontoons mentioned in plaintiff’s said amended complaint; and it was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding, that space for storing, assorting, and handling said steel on the dock of Grand Trunk Pacific Railway at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, should be furnished and provided by Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not by defendant.”

These allegations in themselves disclose the fact that the contract under which the work in question was done was not fully expressed by the writings, and that the court could not as matter of law exclude evidence of the oral agreements and mutual understanding of the parties upon which such writings were based, and in accordance with which said work was done; nor could the court decline to submit to the jury the question of what the real contract was between the parties, and whether the terms of that contract had been properly carried out. That the execution of a more formal instrument by the parties was contemplated is shown in a paragraph of one of the letters of the de[538]*538fendant set forth in the pleadings, where it is said that “our formal contract with you for the erection will be drawn up as soon as conditions permit.” The testimony shows that the plaintiff tried repeatedly to have such an instrument prepared and executed, but defendant failed, for some reason not disclosed, to comply. Having had ample opportunity to reduce to writing the full details of their agreement, and failed to do so, the defendant is not now in a position to invoke the rule of law which prohibits the introduction of oral evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument. That rule does not apply to the facts of this case, from any standpoint.

[4] The first, second, third, and fourth causes of action are based upon the agreement alleged by plaintiff to have been made, and the court having properly instructed the jury in regard thereto, tire findings of the jury as to the facts will not be disturbed.

The fifth cause of action relates to the performance of extra work by the plaintiff at the alleged instance and request of the defendant, outside of the alleged contract, for which a charge is made of $400.70. The defendant admits that this work was done at its request, but alleges that the work was ordered at various times by the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and such orders merely transmitted by defendant to plaintiff; that after said work was completed plaintiff’s claim of $400.70 therefor was presented by plaintiff to the said Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and duly allowed, and the amount thereof deducted from certain indebtedness due from plaintiff to said railway. Evidence was introduced upon this matter, and the question submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the court.

Finding no error in the instructions of the coürt below, the judgment is affirmed.

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MORROW, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1] The defense that the work was done for the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not for the defendant, cannot be sustained. The plaintiff had no contractual relations whatever with the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway. It is true the work was done under the terms of a subcontract provided for in an original contract between the defendant and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway; but the contract in suit was between the plaintiff and defendant. This is expressly admitted in a number of paragraphs in defendant’s answer, and particularly in paragraph 4, where it is alleged that:

“Plaintiff submitted to defendant written proposals for the performance of a part of said contract between defendant and Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, which proposals were accepted in writing by defendant, and said proposals and acceptance constituted and do now constitute the contract between plaintiff and defendant mentioned in plaintiff’s said amended complaint.”

[537]*537[2] The main question for this court to determine is whether or not the contract between the parties, and under which the work in question was done, was entirely in writing; that is, whether the four letters introduced in evidence and relied upon by the defendant contained the completed contract. If that question can be answered in the affirmative as a matter of law, then it was the duty of the trial judge to construe such contract; but, if it must be answered in the negative, it was within the province of the jury, and its duty, under proper instructions from the court, to determine what the contract was, not only from the writings introduced as setting forth the alleged agreement, but from all the evidence produced in connection with such writings and the subject-matter thereof. Etting v. United States Bank, 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.) 57, 75, 6 L. Ed. 419; Rankin v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Savings Deposit Co., 189 U. S. 242, 252, 23 Sup. Ct. 553, 47 L. Ed. 792; American Bridge & Contract Co. v. Bullen Bridge Co., 29 Or. 549, 46 Pac. 138.

[3] That the contract was not entirely in writing we think is admitted by the defendant in its answer, wherein it states, in paragraph VII, that:

“It was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made upon the express understanding, that defendant should deliver said steel to plaintiff by water transportation, and that said steel should be delivered as completely fabricated as it was defendant’s custom to ship by water transportation similar steel for similar work.”

Again, in paragraph IX, allusion is made to the fact that “said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding” that certain conditions existed, while in paragraph X it is positively set forth as a defense that:

“It was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding, that the pontoons for the wing of the dry dock should be furnished and provided by Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not by defendant, and said pontoons are the pontoons mentioned in plaintiff’s said amended complaint; and it was mutually understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time said contract between plaintiff and defendant was entered into, and said contract between plaintiff and defendant was made with the express understanding, that space for storing, assorting, and handling said steel on the dock of Grand Trunk Pacific Railway at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, should be furnished and provided by Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and not by defendant.”

These allegations in themselves disclose the fact that the contract under which the work in question was done was not fully expressed by the writings, and that the court could not as matter of law exclude evidence of the oral agreements and mutual understanding of the parties upon which such writings were based, and in accordance with which said work was done; nor could the court decline to submit to the jury the question of what the real contract was between the parties, and whether the terms of that contract had been properly carried out. That the execution of a more formal instrument by the parties was contemplated is shown in a paragraph of one of the letters of the de[538]*538fendant set forth in the pleadings, where it is said that “our formal contract with you for the erection will be drawn up as soon as conditions permit.” The testimony shows that the plaintiff tried repeatedly to have such an instrument prepared and executed, but defendant failed, for some reason not disclosed, to comply. Having had ample opportunity to reduce to writing the full details of their agreement, and failed to do so, the defendant is not now in a position to invoke the rule of law which prohibits the introduction of oral evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument. That rule does not apply to the facts of this case, from any standpoint.

[4] The first, second, third, and fourth causes of action are based upon the agreement alleged by plaintiff to have been made, and the court having properly instructed the jury in regard thereto, tire findings of the jury as to the facts will not be disturbed.

The fifth cause of action relates to the performance of extra work by the plaintiff at the alleged instance and request of the defendant, outside of the alleged contract, for which a charge is made of $400.70. The defendant admits that this work was done at its request, but alleges that the work was ordered at various times by the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and such orders merely transmitted by defendant to plaintiff; that after said work was completed plaintiff’s claim of $400.70 therefor was presented by plaintiff to the said Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and duly allowed, and the amount thereof deducted from certain indebtedness due from plaintiff to said railway. Evidence was introduced upon this matter, and the question submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the court.

Finding no error in the instructions of the coürt below, the judgment is affirmed.

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245 F. 533, 157 C.C.A. 645, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1515, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-steel-products-co-v-poole-dean-co-ca9-1917.

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