United States Steel Corp. v. Wood

Alabama Court of Appeals

United States Steel Corp. v. Wood

114 So. 2d 533, 40 Ala. App. 431, 1958 Ala. App. LEXIS 146

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 25, 1958

Docket6 Div. 463

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 114 So. 2d 533 (United States Steel Corp. v. Wood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States Steel Corp. v. Wood, 114 So. 2d 533, 40 Ala. App. 431, 1958 Ala. App. LEXIS 146 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958).

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Opinions

CATES, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court holding an employee-claimant, Mr. Cecil Wood, not to be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance because of a labor dispute in September and October, 1954, Code 1940, T. 26, § 214(A), as amended.

Our record omits the various matters required to be filed by the Director of Industrial Relations with the circuit court [433]*433under Code 1940, T. 26, § 221. However, since the circuit court cannot entertain an appeal without the appellant having shown that it exhausted its administrative remedies, we shall presume from the judgment that the jurisdictional facts have been shown because in a civil appeal the submission of the case by both parties is accorded deference, and also the record here would alternatively support consideration on a petition for a writ of certiorari. Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 So.2d 303, 141 A.L.R. 87; Alabama Power Co. v. City of Fort Payne, 237 Ala. 459, 187 So. 632, 123 A.L.R. 1337.

The testimony of Leland Johnson, Assistant General Superintendent of the ore mines and quarries of U. S. Steel, was that Mr. Cecil Wood, the claimant, worked at number seven ore mine of that company in Jefferson County, Alabama.

Mr. Wood testified that on September 29, 1954, he was working the 11:00 p. m.-7:00 a. m. turn (shift) at number seven ore mine (at Wenonah, Jefferson County, Alabama) of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Division of the United States Steel Corporation. Mr. Wood’s testimony continues as follows:

“Q. Tell us just as best you recall just what happened at the end of this shift? A. I believe Mr. Henderson was night foreman at that time, and as we loaded up to come out that morning, he said that there wouldn’t be any work until further notice or something to that effect.

“Q. He told you that there wouldn’t be any further work? A. Yes.

“Q. I believe that you told us at the time the Board of Appeals had the hearing, you did not know or did not recall whether Mr. Henderson specifically mentioned the railroad situation or transportation situation or not; is that still your recollection of it? A. That is right; I don’t know whether he did or not.

“Q. Is that all you know about why you didn’t work? A. That is all.

“Q. You were ready and willing to work? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And as soon as there was work there for you to do that the Company told you about, you were willing to work? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And did you know anything about the problem that they say originated in the Ore Conditioning Plant that night? A. No, sir.”

There were two strikes on September 29, 1954, affecting transportation of iron ore from the company’s mines; first, to an ore conditioning plant and thence to the furnaces for processing ultimately into steel.

The transportation department of the company had a railroad strike which began 6:00 a. m., September 29, 1954, and ran to 11:55 a. m., September 30, 1954.

The ore plant was shut down by a dispute which began at 4:40 a. m., September 29, 1954, with a work stoppage at 7:16 a. m., of that day lasting until 3 :00 p. m., October 11, 1954.

Wood was continuously out of work from 7:00 a. m., September 30 to 11:00 p. m., October 12, 1954. Since no contention is made thereabout, we take it that Wood met the burden of showing himself eligible for each week for which he has filed a claim (see Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So.2d 496), and that the burden of persuasion has shifted to his employer or the Director of Industrial Relations (as trustee of the Unemployment Compensation Fund) to show he is disqualified, if he is to be denied benefits because of a disqualification.

The record fails to show when Wood first reported to the Employment Service for work and filed his unemployment compensation claim. The exact date of filing is not important for present purposes. Nevertheless, his first week of compensable unem[434]*434ployment must, under Code 1940, T. 26, § 213(D), as amended, be preceded by a week’s waiting period of total unemployment.

Thus, the first week of benefits could not have been earlier than that beginning October 7, 1954 — at a time when the rail strike was no longer in “active progress.” So, whatever causative impulse arose from that dispute had lost all its force in the continuance of Mr. Wood’s being out of work during the time for which he asks to be paid.

This dispute at the ore plant arose because the company had, after making some mechanical changes on ore crushers, graded two labor jobs from Class Three to Class Two, with a pay rate reduction from $1.68 to $1,625 per hour. The fairness of this reclassification was being considered conformably with grievance procedures under the labor-management agreement. The evidence does not reveal at what stage the matter rested on September 29.

The ore plant night shift foreman and the night shift laborers had an argument at 4:40 a. m., when the foreman ordered them to clean out a blockage caused by a failure of an “eccentric.” This work apparently was considered by the workmen to be a duty within a Class Three job but not appurtenant to Class Two. The matter came to a head when the 7 a. m. shift came on and a large laboring crew were directed to start cleaning out the crusher. This they refused to do unless they were paid job Class Three. The foreman sent them home and the other men at the ore plant left in sympathy.

This ore conditioning plant served all the ore mines so that as the ore went from mine to blast furnace it had to be processed at the ore plant. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that it was an absolute impossibility to operate the iron ore mines without operating the ore plant. We consider that the evidence tends to show that the cessation of operations of the ore crusher could be a bottleneck to the operation of the mines under the physical layout of the employer’s work.

This brings us then to a consideration of the dispute at the ore conditioning plant. No question is made as to its existence. The first question is: Was it in the same establishment as that in which Mr. Wood was employed ? This in turn involves whether or not the principles deducible from Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. v. Martin, 33 Ala.App. 502, 36 So.2d 535, affirmed 251 Ala. 153, 36 So.2d 547, wherein the coal mines and the railroad system of this same employer (then called T. C. I.) were held to be discrete units, and, therefore, not embraced in a single establishment. Even though this first question may be resolved in favor of the employer, we then are met with the contention that, since the unemployment insurance law was enacted to better conditions in a complex industrial society given to periods of almost chronic over-production (or under-consumption) that its beneficient provisions are to be broadly construed. The analogy to the construction of an insurance policy is almost inescapable, e. g., “ * * * and thereby deprive them of compensation benefits which they had bought and paid for.” Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala.App. 78, at page 81, 1 So.2d 395, at page 398; see Usher v. Department of Industrial Relations, 261 Ala. 509, 75 So.2d 165.

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