United States of America v. Tanner Rich

471 F. Supp. 3d 441, 2020 DNH 095
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedJune 3, 2020
Docket17-cr-094-LM
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 471 F. Supp. 3d 441 (United States of America v. Tanner Rich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America v. Tanner Rich, 471 F. Supp. 3d 441, 2020 DNH 095 (D.N.H. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 17-cr-094-LM Opinion No. 2020 DNH 095 Tanner Rich

O R D E R

Defendant, Tanner Rich, pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), and 846 in

May 2018. On August 29, 2018, this court sentenced defendant to

60 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release.

Defendant is currently serving that sentence at the Camp at the

Federal Medical Center (“FMC”) Devens. He requests that this

court grant him compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the danger posed to his health by the

combination of his underlying medical condition and the threat

of contracting COVID-19 while incarcerated. The government

concedes that defendant has exhausted his administrative

remedies under the statute but objects to defendant’s request.

The court held a telephonic hearing on defendant’s motion on May

22, 2020. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant so-called “compassionate release” to a

defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The statute

provides, in relevant part, that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction

. . .

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13

(sentencing guidelines policy statement on compassionate

release).

Where, as here, a motion for compassionate release is

properly before the court, the court must determine if defendant

is eligible for release. The statutory language quoted above

requires that defendant show that “extraordinary and compelling

2 reasons warrant” a reduction in his sentence, that the court

consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the

extent applicable, and that the reduction be “consistent” with

the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy statements. 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission’s policy

statement regarding compassionate release adds the requirement

that the court find that the defendant is not likely to pose a

danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as

provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2); 18

U.S.C. § 3142(g) (listing factors court should consider in

determining whether any conditions of release exist that will

“reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the

community”).

In short, a court may reduce a term of imprisonment under

the compassionate release provision if it: (1) finds that

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; (2)

finds that the defendant is not likely to be a danger to the

safety of any other person or the community; and (3) considers

the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see also United

States v. Sapp, No. 14-CR-20520, 2020 WL 515935, at *2 (E.D.

Mich. Jan. 31, 2020); United States v. Willis, 382 F. Supp. 3d

1185, 1187 (D.N.M. 2019). The defendant has the burden of

3 showing that he is entitled to a sentence reduction. United

States v. Ebbers, No. S402CR11443VEC, 2020 WL 91399, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020). And the court has “broad discretion in

deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for sentence

reduction.” United States v. Paul Gileno, No. 3:19-CR-161-

(VAB)-1, 2020 WL 1307108, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Extraordinary and Compelling Reason

Defendant contends that his history of chronic bronchitis

and other respiratory illnesses puts him at substantial risk of

experiencing severe illness should he contract COVID-19. He

further contends that he has an increased risk of becoming

infected with the virus because inmates and staff members at FMC

Devens have tested positive.

The Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines Policy

Statement regarding compassionate release identifies four

categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that

justify a sentence reduction: defendant’s medical condition;

defendant’s age; defendant’s family circumstances; and a

catchall category. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, App. Note 1. Under the

policy statement, a medical condition constitutes an

4 “extraordinary and compelling reason” if defendant is suffering

from a terminal illness, or has a serious physical or medical

condition, cognitive impairment, or deteriorating physical or

mental health due to age “that substantially diminishes the

ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the

environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she

is not expected to recover.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, App. Note

1(A)(i)-(ii). The catchall category encompasses any

“extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in

combination with” the defendant’s medical condition, age, or

family circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, App. Note 1(D).1

In the context of the current pandemic, courts have held

that a generalized risk of infection by the virus is not, by

itself, sufficient to constitute an extraordinary and compelling

1 To the extent the government argues that the court’s discretion is constrained by the definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in the Bureau of Prison’s program statement on compassionate release, the court disagrees. See doc. no. 32 at 4-5. The Sentencing Guidelines currently define the catchall category as being “determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, App. Note 1(D). However, that provision has not been amended since the passage of the First Step Act. Therefore, this court agrees with those courts that have held that the Sentencing Guidelines policy statement “provides helpful guidance” but “does not constrain the Court’s independent assessment of whether ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 579 (M.D.N.C. 2019); see also United States v.

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471 F. Supp. 3d 441, 2020 DNH 095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-v-tanner-rich-nhd-2020.