UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. Criminal No. 20-cr-061-LM Opinion No. 2025 DNH 012 P Jared Stottlar
ORDER
The defendant, Jared Stottlar, moves for compassionate release under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See doc. no. 141. He contends that his medical circumstances
and his rehabilitative efforts demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason
for a sentence reduction. The government objects. See doc. no. 146. The court held
an evidentiary hearing on Stottlar’s motion, at which Stottlar testified. For the
following reasons, Stottlar’s motion for compassionate release (doc. no. 141) is
denied without prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant a sentence reduction, otherwise known as “compassionate
release,” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That statute provides in relevant part:
[T]he court, . . . upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . .
...
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
A prisoner seeking compassionate release under this statute must make
three showings. First, he must show that he has either exhausted administrative
remedies within the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or that at least thirty days has
passed since BOP received his request to seek a sentence reduction. Id.; accord
United States v. Feliz, 565 F. Supp. 3d 118, 120 (D.N.H. 2021). Second, he must
show that there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction
that are “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A); accord United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 18-19
(1st Cir. 2022). Third, he must show that a sentence reduction is consistent with the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.”
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); accord United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 54 (1st Cir.
2022). Where the applicable sentencing factors cut against release and outweigh the
defendant’s showing on the extraordinary-and-compelling prong, a sentence
reduction is not warranted. See United States v. Hilow, 561 F. Supp. 3d 151, 153
(D.N.H. 2021). “[D]istrict courts possess significant discretion in evaluating motions
for compassionate release.” Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 55.
2 BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from the factual summary set forth in the
presentence report (doc. no. 120). Neither party objected to the facts as set forth in
the presentence report at the sentencing hearing, and the court accordingly adopted
the facts as set forth therein.
A. Traffic Stop #1 (August 8, 2019)
The Tilton, New Hampshire, Police Department (“Tilton PD”) began
investigating Stottlar for methamphetamine trafficking in August 2018. Around
that time, officers received information from a cooperating individual that the
individual had purchased large quantities of methamphetamine from Stottlar on
several occasions. In addition, Stottlar’s neighbors reported to the police that there
had been constant traffic in and out of Stottlar’s apartment in Tilton. Tilton PD’s
own surveillance confirmed that Stottlar had an unusually large number of visitors
at his apartment. Tilton PD subsequently received information that Stottlar was
supplying methamphetamine to an individual named Katelyn McCormick, who was
known to be involved in distributing large quantities of the drug. Following an
arrest of McCormick in 2019, officers conducted a forensic examination of
McCormick’s cell phone and confirmed that Stottlar was her supplier.
On August 8, 2019, Tilton PD conducted a motor vehicle stop of McCormick
as she was leaving Stottlar’s apartment. During the stop, officers recovered
approximately two pounds of methamphetamine. McCormick stated that she
3 purchased the methamphetamine from Stottlar earlier that day, and that, during
the purchase, she saw that Stottlar had an additional pound of the drug in his
possession. She also stated that Stottlar was known to carry a handgun, and that he
had several cameras and a large safe in his garage.
Based upon the information provided by McCormick, Tilton PD obtained a
search warrant for Stottlar’s residence, vehicle, and person. That same day, officers
stopped Stottlar in his car as he was leaving his home. Stottlar said there was a gun
in the car and agreed to let officers search him. The officers found nearly $6,000 in
cash on Stottlar, which had been separated and wrapped in rubber bands. The
police later searched the car pursuant to the warrant. They found over a pound of
methamphetamine, $54,000 in cash, and two handguns (both of which were in the
driver’s side door). One of the handguns had been previously reported stolen.
Officers also found scales, plastic baggies, and rubber bands.
Meanwhile, officers also searched Stottlar’s residence pursuant to the
warrant. In Stottlar’s bedroom, they found an AR-15, a pump-action shotgun, a bolt-
action rifle, and three handguns (one of which had previously been reported stolen),
along with more methamphetamine and drug packaging materials. They also
observed a surveillance system on the property and found a case full of what
appeared to be used cell phones.
For reasons that are not apparent, Tilton PD did not seek an arrest warrant
for Stottlar following execution of the warrant and permitted him to leave the scene
on foot.
4 B. Traffic Stop #2 (November 11, 2019)
On November 11, 2019, a Tilton PD officer stopped a pick-up truck for not
having its headlights on after dark. The officer immediately recognized Stottlar (the
driver) in light of Tilton PD’s ongoing investigation into Stottlar’s trafficking
activities. The officer saw a partially opened backpack in the backseat of the truck,
and was able see plastic baggies inside the backpack. When asked, Stottlar denied
there were drugs in the backpack and claimed the baggies were for storing screws
and nails. He did admit there was a gun in the truck, however. While being
questioned, Stottlar started sweating despite the cold temperature outside.
Officers seized the truck pending issuance of a search warrant but allowed
Stottlar to return home. On November 15, 2019, the officers searched the truck
pursuant to a warrant. They found over two pounds of methamphetamine, a loaded
handgun in the driver’s side door, and over $22,000 in cash.
C. Traffic Stop #3 (November 20, 2019)
Shortly after midnight on November 20, 2019, an officer with the Franklin,
New Hampshire, Police Department stopped a car for defective headlights and for
an expired registration sticker. The officer identified Stottlar as the driver. Further
investigation revealed that the car’s license plates were suspended. The officer told
Stottlar that he could not drive the car given the aforementioned issues, but that he
was free to leave. Stottlar asked if he could get a tool bag from the car. When the
5 officer went to retrieve Stottlar’s bag, however, he saw a black case labeled “Dime
bags” inside. The officer then told Stottlar that the tool bag needed to remain with
the vehicle. Stottlar left without the bag. Officers later searched the black case
pursuant to the department’s inventory search policy. The search revealed
approximately thirty-eight grams of methamphetamine, along with a scale and a
pipe.
The officers obtained an arrest warrant for Stottlar based on what they found
in the car. They travelled to his residence on November 21, 2019, to execute that
arrest warrant as well as a search warrant related to a child pornography
investigation involving Stottlar’s cousin, who lived there too. The officers located
Stottlar upon their arrival and arrested him. When they began searching the home
pursuant to the child pornography warrant, however, they immediately discovered
multiple firearms, a blow torch, and a large glass smoking device. In addition, a
drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Stottlar’s car, which was
parked in the driveway. The officers stopped their search to seek an additional
search warrant for drug-related items, which was granted. They found $14,450 in
cash inside Stottlar’s car. Inside the residence, they found two firearms, scales, drug
packaging items, drug ledgers, and pills. Meanwhile, officers transported Stottlar to
the Merrimack County House of Corrections. Jail officials searched Stottlar’s person
and discovered methamphetamine in his pants pocket.
6 D. Traffic Stop #4 (December 9, 2019)
On December 9, 2019, an officer with Tilton PD saw Stottlar driving a car.1
The officer was aware of an outstanding state court warrant for Stottlar’s arrest.
The officer stopped the car and arrested Stottlar. A search of his person incident to
arrest revealed approximately $6,700 in cash. A search of Stottlar’s car revealed
approximately forty-five grams of methamphetamine.
Following his arrest, Stottlar waived his Miranda rights and spoke with the
police. Stottlar admitted to purchasing large quantities of methamphetamine from a
supplier utilizing a storage unit facility in Belmont, New Hampshire. He said that
he typically purchased between one and five pounds of methamphetamine at a time,
but that he had purchased as much as ten pounds on at least one occasion.
E. Arrest on June 9, 2020 & Additional Statement
On June 2, 2020, the government filed a criminal complaint in this court charging
Stottlar with one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
Doc. no. 1; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). Officers arrested Stottlar on
June 9, 2020 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued in conjunction with this criminal
complaint. Stottlar once again waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with
officers. He admitted to distributing methamphetamine for several years, and said
that he had received a shipment of twenty pounds of methamphetamine the day
before the initial search of his residence on August 8, 2019. Stottlar claimed that he
1 Presumably, Stottlar made bail after being arrested following the previous
incident. 7 stopped selling methamphetamine briefly after this search, but then obtained
several new supply sources and resumed selling. Stottlar has been incarcerated on
this matter since his June 9, 2020 arrest.
II. Procedural Background
On July 22, 2020, the grand jury returned a three-count indictment against
Stottlar charging him with: one count of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii)
(pertaining to Traffic Stop #1 on August 8, 2019); one count of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(pertaining to Traffic Stop #1); and one count of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii)
(pertaining to Traffic Stop #4 on December 9, 2019). See doc. no. 10 (indictment).
On August 2, 2021, the grand jury returned a six-count superseding
indictment charging Stottlar as follows:
• Count One: possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #1 on August 8, 2019)
• Count Two: possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #1)
• Count Three: possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing
8 methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #2 on November 11, 2019)
• Count Four: possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #2)
• Count Five: possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #3 on November 20, 2019)
• Count Six: possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (pertaining to Traffic Stop #4 on December 9, 2019)
Doc. no. 57 (superseding indictment).
Stottlar faced mandatory minimum sentences of ten years on each of Counts
One and Three. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). He faced mandatory minimum
sentences of five years on each of Counts Five and Six. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B). Finally, he faced mandatory minimum sentences of five years on each of
Counts Two and Four. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). While the sentences on the drug
counts (Counts One, Three, Five, and Six) could have been concurrent with each
other, the sentences on the firearms counts (Counts Two and Four) would have been
required to be consecutive to each other and all other sentences imposed in this
matter. See 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Thus, if Stottlar had been convicted on all
counts in the superseding indictment, he would have been sentenced to at minimum
twenty years’ imprisonment.
9 After substantial pretrial litigation, the parties reached a “binding” plea
agreement in October 2022. See doc. nos. 101, 119;2 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
Under that agreement, Stottlar agreed to plead guilty to a superseding information
charging him with one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or
more of methamphetamine (Count One), and one count of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count Two). See doc no. 118; doc. no. 119 at
1. Stottlar was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of sixty months’
imprisonment on each count, and the sentence on Count Two was statutorily
required to run consecutively to the sentence on Count One. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Thus, the
mandatory minimum aggregate sentence was 120 months. In their plea agreement,
the parties agreed that Stottlar would be sentenced to 144 months. See doc. no. 119
at 5-6.
At the sentencing hearing on March 9, 2023, the court calculated Stottlar’s
advisory sentencing guidelines range to be 168 to 195 months. Thus, acceptance of
the parties’ agreement required a downward variance. Ultimately, the court ruled
that, despite the scale of Stottlar’s distribution activities and the fact that he
continued such activities even after being stopped by the police on multiple
occasions, acceptance of the party’s plea agreement was warranted in light of
2 Although the parties filed their plea agreement in this court in October 2022,
the original superseding information contained a typographical error necessitating that the parties file a revised plea agreement and a second superseding information.
10 Stottlar’s rehabilitative efforts since his incarceration and his minimal prior
criminal history.
Stottlar subsequently filed the instant motion for compassionate release. At
the hearing on Stottlar’s motion, the parties represented to the court that Stottlar’s
projected release date (accounting for good-time credits) is August 27, 2030. He has
served approximately 38% of his imposed sentence and approximately 45% of the
time until his projected release date.
DISCUSSION
As noted, to obtain a sentence reduction under the compassionate release
statute, the defendant must: (1) exhaust administrative remedies; (2) demonstrate
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction; and (3) show that
a sentence reduction is consistent with applicable sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The government does not dispute that Stottlar has exhausted his
administrative remedies. Thus, the court considers only the second and third
elements.
Stottlar contends that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
sentence reduction in light of his medical circumstances and his rehabilitative
efforts. With respect to his medical circumstances, he submits that he was
diagnosed with colon cancer after a June 2023 colonoscopy, and that he suffers from
several other chronic conditions that BOP has failed to adequately treat. The court
is deeply troubled by the quality of care Stottlar has received while in BOP custody
as well as BOP’s failure to timely communicate with Stottlar regarding his
11 conditions and treatment. For example, although the results of the June 2023
biopsy confirmed Stottlar’s cancer diagnosis, BOP never informed him of this
diagnosis. It was only when he was brought to an appointment with a surgeon
employed by an outside provider, and the surgeon began informing Stottlar of his
plan to surgically remove the cancerous portion of Stottlar’s colon, that Stottlar
became aware of his diagnosis. What is more, although Stottlar’s colon surgery was
successful and an April 2024 biopsy did not indicate the presence of cancerous cells,
BOP did not inform Stottlar of the result of that biopsy either. Stottlar learned he
was cancer-free for the first time when he read the government’s objection to his
motion for compassionate release. BOP’s failure to inform Stottlar of these matters
raises grave doubts as to whether BOP can provide Stottlar with basic information
about his own health.3 In the context of Stottlar’s colon cancer diagnosis, a
potentially deadly disease, receiving adequate communication about the progress of
his condition and treatment is an important component of his medical care. In
addition, BOP has failed to provide Stottlar with the treatment he needs to address
several chronic conditions that cause him severe pain which BOP has known about
for some time.
3 The court is similarly alarmed by a recent report authored by the Department
of Justice Office of the Inspector General concerning FMC Devens (the institution where Stottlar is incarcerated), which documents a healthcare worker staffing crisis at FMC Devens and lengthy delays in the provision of medical care to inmates. The report suggests that the problems Stottlar is experiencing result from systemic shortcomings at FMC Devens and are therefore more likely to recur. 12 Moreover, Stottlar’s rehabilitation has been remarkable. He completed the
Strafford County Department of Corrections’ “Therapeutic Communities” program
while a pretrial detainee, which is a highly reputable substance use disorder
treatment program. His work at this program was so outstanding that he was
permitted to remain with the program for more than a year after he completed it.
The jail’s Director of Programs was so taken with Stottlar’s rehabilitative efforts
while at Strafford County that she felt compelled to write the first letter she had
ever written on behalf of an inmate. And upon his transfer to BOP custody, Stottlar
began working on the Memory Disorder Unit at FMC Devens, which offers intensive
care to inmates with memory disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease. BOP staff
describe Stottlar’s work on this unit as exceptional, and it is clear he is making a
positive difference.
For these reasons as well as others in the record, the court seriously
contemplated the possibility of release in this case. At the same time, it is
undisputed that BOP arranged for Stottlar to undergo surgery to remove the
cancerous portion of his colon, that the surgery was successful, and that a follow-up
colonoscopy in April 2024 revealed that Stottlar continues to be cancer-free. And,
while Stottlar’s rehabilitation is impressive, rehabilitation alone cannot constitute
an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
However, even assuming without deciding that Stottlar’s medical circumstances
and rehabilitation combine to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
sentence reduction, applicable sentencing factors outweigh these reasons and
13 compel denial of his motion. See Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 55 (explaining that “a
supportable determination that the balance of the section 3553(a) factors weighs
against a sentence reduction constitutes an independent reason to deny
compassionate release”); Hilow, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 153-54 (assuming without
deciding that prisoner had shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
sentence reduction but nevertheless denying compassionate release where
sentencing factors cut against release).
Applicable sentencing factors under § 3553(a) include the nature and
circumstances of Stottlar’s offense, his personal history and characteristics, and
considerations such as promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment,
affording adequate deterrence, protecting the public from further crimes, and
providing Stottlar with needed care, training, and rehabilitation in the most
effective way. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). The court’s ultimate goal in balancing
these factors, whether at the sentencing phase or in the compassionate release
context, is “to ensure that a sentence is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary.’”
Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 56 (quoting § 3553(a)).
The conduct underlying Stottlar’s convictions was alarming and dangerous.
He distributed massive quantities of methamphetamine over a prolonged period. He
was found to be in possession of pounds of methamphetamine on multiple occasions
and confessed to receiving a shipment of twenty pounds of meth the day before
officers searched his home in August 2019. Even after police raided his home, he
went right back to drug dealing. Methamphetamine is a dangerous drug that
14 destroys communities—and Stottlar was flooding his community with it. See United
States v. Corbin, No. 1:11-cr-00025-JAW, 2011 WL 5239008, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 1,
2011) (discussing the dangers of methamphetamine). While Stottlar’s trafficking
activities were no doubt driven in part by his own methamphetamine addiction, his
circumstances are a far cry from those of a person who transports or sells small
amounts of methamphetamine only to support an addiction. Stottlar sold
methamphetamine by the pound. His primary motive was profit, not to stave off
withdrawals.
Stottlar not only dealt drugs on a massive scale, but he was also armed while
doing so. The initial search of his home in August 2019 revealed six firearms,
including an AR-15, a pump-action shotgun, a bolt-action rifle, and three
handguns—one of which was stolen. When officers stopped and searched Stottlar’s
car as he was leaving his home that day, they found two more handguns in the
driver’s side door of the vehicle—one of which was stolen. He had yet another loaded
handgun in the driver’s side door of his car when stopped in November 2019. And a
further search of his home a little over a week later revealed two more firearms. He
was caught with eleven guns in three months. As this court has previously
observed, “illegal guns and drugs are as serious a combination of crimes as it gets.”
Feliz, 565 F. Supp. 3d at 122 (brackets omitted). Indeed, “[t]his dangerous
connection between illegal drugs and firearms is well-known and has been
recognized by Congress” in the enactment of the firearms charge to which Stottlar
15 pled guilty. United States v. Levasseur, No. 1:22-cr-00155-LEW, 2023 WL 6623165,
at *9 (D. Me. Oct. 11, 2023) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
To be sure, not all of the § 3553(a) factors weigh against a sentence reduction.
The court has already noted its grave concerns as to whether BOP is providing
Stottlar with adequate care—let alone “the most effective” care. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Moreover, Stottlar lacked a serious record before his convictions for the instant
offenses, and given his substantial rehabilitation since his arrest, he is unlikely to
recidivate. Indeed, BOP itself classifies Stottlar as having a low risk of recidivism.
Nevertheless, Stottlar has not served half of his sentence, even when
accounting for good-time credits. Courts generally find that granting compassionate
release with such a large portion of the defendant’s sentence left to be served fails to
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or afford adequate
deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios-Cruz, Crim. No. 12-0162(GMM), 2023
WL 4838152, at *5 (D.P.R. July 28, 2023). That is all the truer when, as here, “much
of [the defendant’s sentence] was statutorily mandated.” Hilow, 561 F. Supp. 3d at
154. Though Stottlar was sentenced to 144 months of imprisonment, he was subject
to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months. Stottlar has not even served half
of the lowest sentence authorized by law for the crimes he pled guilty to. To release
him now would undermine the rule of law and create a stark sentencing disparity
between Stottlar and similarly situated defendants.
Finally, in receiving a 144-month sentence, Stottlar was the beneficiary of a
downward variance of 24 months. At Stottlar’s sentencing, the court determined his
16 sentencing guidelines range to be 168 to 195 months. The court varied downward to
a sentence of 144 months to honor the parties’ agreement to that sentence in their
plea agreement. Given that Stottlar was already the beneficiary of a reduced
sentence, a further reduction at this time would be inconsistent with the goals of
sentencing. See Delacruz v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 3d 451, 457 (D.N.H. 2020).
After balancing these factors, the court concludes that a sentence reduction
at this time would be inconsistent with § 3553(a)’s requirement that the sentence be
sufficient but not greater than necessary. However, should some substantial change
in his circumstances take place, Stottlar may immediately seek the appointment of
counsel and renewal of his motion for compassionate release.
CONCLUSION
Stottlar’s motion for compassionate release (doc. no. 141) is denied without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
February 3, 2025
cc: Counsel of Record