United States of America v. Jo Patricia Rabchev

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 15, 2026
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00197
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 2:21-cv-00197-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 JO PATRICIA RABCHEV,

8 Defendant.

9 10 I. Factual Background Leading To Sanctions 11 Certain facts are undisputed in the long history leading to this Order entering sanctions 12 against Defendant Jo Patricia Rabchev (“Defendant”). This case commenced with the United States 13 of America (the “Government”) filing a Complaint against Defendant on February 4, 2021. ECF 14 No. 1. Skipping the tortured history regarding service of process, Defendant, who was then-residing 15 in Bulgaria, answered the Complaint on July 17, 2023. ECF No. 43. On September 14, 2023, the 16 original discovery plan and scheduling order was entered. ECF No. 47. The Government served its 17 third request for production of documents (each an “RFP” and collectively “RFPs”) on March 7, 18 2024. ECF No. 60-2. Defendant’s responses were due April 8, 2024. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. RFP No. 19 1, in this third set of RFPs, sought substantial information pertaining to eight bank accounts 20 belonging to Defendant that she maintained outside the United States. ECF No. 60-2 at 5-6.1 21 On September 18, 2024, the Government sent Defendant a detailed Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure (“Rule”) 37 letter outlining the deficiencies in her original RFP responses. ECF No. 60- 23 4. The Government explains its letter led to a discussion and Defendant’s agreement to supplement 24 her production. ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 4. Thereafter, Defendant requested a series of extensions, review 25 of which demonstrate that as of November 21, 2024, she had not yet provided to UBS documentation 26 necessary to allow her counsel to gather bank records responsive to the Government’s March 2024 27 1 RFPs. Id. ¶ 12. Communications received from defense counsel further demonstrated that as of this 2 same date (November 21, 2024), seven months after the initial responses to discovery were due, 3 defense counsel had just “prepared letters to” banks in Canada and the Cayman Islands in an apparent 4 attempt to obtain Defendant’s banking records. Id. ¶ 13. On December 17, 2024, the first 5 supplementation of responses to the Government’s RFPs were received. Id. ¶ 14. 6 The Government emailed defense counsel a second Rule 37 deficiency letter on January 27, 7 2025. Id. ¶ 15. On February 5, 2025, the Government and defense counsel spoke regarding the 8 letter, Defendant’s supplemental responses, and why defense counsel still had not provided to UBS 9 the form it had requested that would allow him to obtain Defendant’s records from that bank. Id. ¶ 10 16. On April 15, 2025, Government counsel followed up with defense counsel regarding 11 Defendant’s deficient supplemental responses to the RFPs, reminding defense counsel that it had 12 been two months since their last meet and confer. Id. ¶ 17. 13 The parties spoke on May 2, 2025, at which time the Government informed defense counsel 14 it was planning to file a motion to compel as more than a year had passed since the responses to 15 RFPs were due. Id. ¶ 18. Defense counsel responded by stating he was (just) planning to subpoena 16 records from the Canadian bank the Government at which Defendant held an account. Id. Also 17 these 14 months later, Defendant was (just) planning “to sign a power of attorney authorizing 18 someone in Bulgaria to obtain the records from the Bulgarian banks.” Id. Defense counsel told the 19 Government “he would have the records within two weeks.” Id. 20 On May 26, 2025, defense counsel informed the Government that Defendant’s husband had 21 died. Id. ¶ 20. The Government waited until July 15, 2025 to follow up with defense counsel 22 regarding the pending discovery requests and promised supplementation. Id. ¶ 21. As of August 23 15, 2025, Government’s counsel had heard nothing from Defendant (id. ¶ 22) and the Government 24 filed its Motion to Compel explaining the long history of Defendant’s failure to produce documents 25 responsive to the requests first propounded in March 2024. ECF No. 60. The Court heard oral 26 argument regarding the Motion to Compel on September 19, 2025, granted the Government’s 27 Motion, and gave Defendant through and including October 16, 2025 to complete her production of 1 On October 16, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Extend Time to produce documents. ECF 2 No. 72. This led the Government to grant Plaintiff an additional 30 days for the production. ECF 3 No. 74. On December 3, 2025, Defendant filed her second Motion to Extend Time to produce 4 documents. ECF No. 76. The Court entered an Order on December 18, 2025:

5 To state it plainly, Defendant has stalled or otherwise provided enumerable excuses for the failure to produce records sought long ago by the United States. This cannot 6 be reasonably disputed. However, given today’s date and the extension requested, it makes little sense to deny Defendant’s request that seeks to set January 2, 2026 7 (misstated as 2025 in Defendant’s Motion) as the date by which she must produce the bank records recognized as requested. ECF No. 76 at 2. Nonetheless, 8 Defendant is warned that this is the absolute last time an extension will be granted. Failure to produce all bank records requested by Plaintiff by or before January 2, 9 2026, will result in sanctions. Sanctions may include a finding of contempt of court, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, a daily monetary fine, and or the striking of 10 Defendant’s Amended Answer. 11 ECF No. 80 (emphasis removed). 12 Despite the unequivocal statement by the Court, Defendant filed a Third Motion to Extend 13 Time seeking to February 11, 2026 to produce documents requested almost two years prior. ECF 14 No. 81. The Court noted Defendant’s excuses for failing to produce documents and ordered:

15 Defendant must show cause in writing no later than January 30, 2026 why she should not be held in contempt of court for the failure to produce documents held 16 in Canada and the Cayman Islands after approximately two years of time to gather and produce the same. [In the event of a f]ailure to show cause[,] Defendant will 17 be assess[ed] a daily fee of $100 as a sanction for her failure.” 18 ECF No. 82. With respect to records from UBS, the Court noted Defendant’s averment that the bank 19 was “unable to produce documents until the end of January 2026.” Id. The Court commented that 20 there was no guarantee UBS would “produce … records at the end of January and, candidly, given 21 the history of delay engaged in by Defendant,” the Court had no confidence Defendant would “take 22 all steps necessary to ensure production” occurred. Id. The Court gave the Government until 23 January 12, 2026 to advise whether it objected to the extension of time requested by Defendant. Id. 24 The Court then clearly advised Defendant “that absent some extraordinary event, this … [would be] 25 absolutely the last time an extension … [would] be granted.” Id. The Court stated “[d]aily monetary 26 sanctions will be entered for every day after February 11, 2026 that such documents … [were] not 27 produced.” Id. 1 On January 12, 2026, after receiving the Government’s opposition to Defendant’s third 2 extension request, the Court ordered (1) “the … prior order to show cause [“OSC”] no later than 3 January 30, 2026, relating to Defendant’s failure to produce documents held in Canada and the 4 Cayman Islands remains in full force and effect”; (2) “one final extension of time, to February 11, 5 2026, no exceptions to be entertained, to produce ALL documents held and produced by UBS. …”; 6 and (3) failure “to comply with the terms of this Order regarding production of all documents held 7 by UBS by or before February 11, 2026, … will [result in] … an Order sanctioning Defendant. Such 8 sanctions will include a daily monetary sanction in the amount of $100 for every day Defendant fails 9 to produce all such documents and the recommendation that: (i) certain facts in the Government’s 10 Complaint be established and taken as true for purposes of this action; and (ii) prohibits Defendant 11 from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters 12 in evidence.” ECF No. 84 (emphasis removed, corrections to romanette numbers made). 13 Defendant filed a response to the OSC on January 30, 2026, with an errata filed one day later. 14 ECF Nos. 85, 86. The errata included Defendant’s one page, seven paragraph Declaration, 15 Defendant’s Tenth Supplemental Disclosure sent to the Government, and a few other unredacted 16 bank documents. ECF No. 86-1 at 2-22.2 In her Declaration, Defendant claimed, without identifying 17 dates, that she “visited this bank in Bulgaria” (not clarifying which of the two Bulgarian banks in 18 which she had accounts she was referring to) and received bank records that were given to her 19 counsel who she believed provided them to the Government; on some unidentified date she requested 20 records from the Canadian bank at which she had an account and provided all those records through 21 her counsel to the Government; and, on an unidentified date or dates, had requested records from 22 UBS for four different accounts and provided all records “in … [her] possession” to the Government. 23 ECF No. 86 ¶¶ 3-5. Defendant’s response to the Court admitted that Bank Vontobel “separated from 24 UBS” but she understood “additional bank records” would be provided “very soon.” Id. ¶ 6. 25 26

27 2 The 13 pages of substantive documents attached appear to include three monthly statements from the Canadian bank at which Defendant maintained a savings account, a U.S. Department of Treasury form, a haphazard group of 1 Defendant also said she “requested bank records from” the Cayman Islands bank and had provided 2 those to her counsel. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant provided no other information in her Declaration. 3 Defendant’s January 30, 2026 substantive response to the OSC says “Defendant has 4 produced bank records in her control for each of the … accounts” identified by the Government. 5 ECF No. 85 at 2 (emphasis added). The response references Defendant’s Declaration filed the 6 following day and summarized above. Id. Despite this case arising solely under federal law, 7 Defendant refers to Nevada state law for purposes of defining “legal control” of documents and then 8 cites two cases in which FBAR (see below) was at issue for purposes of arguing relevancy. These 9 cases do not assist Defendant. 10 With respect to relevancy, United States v. Ruimi, Case No. 2:22-cv-01576-RAJ, 2024 WL 11 97361, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2024), held (and Defendant quoted): “documents and 12 communications falling outside the ‘years at issue’ are in fact relevant and material to the 13 determination of willfulness,” the same standard cited by the Government. Further, Defendant 14 contends there was no holding that the defendant in that case was required to produce the documents. 15 ECF No. 85 at 3. Defendant is incorrect. In Ruimi, the court considered the government’s argument 16 that “Defendant cannot properly limit his discovery production to the ‘years at issue’” and found the 17 defendant had “no basis to temporally limit his discovery production ….” Ruimi, 2024 WL 97361 18 at **3-4 (emphasis added). The court ordered: “For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS 19 Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. … Defendant is ordered to provide complete responses to RFP Nos. 20 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.” Id. at *5 (emphasis in 21 original). Thus, without doubt, Defendant misstates the holding of the decision in United States v. 22 Ruimi as the defendant was required to produce documents. 23 Defendant next cites to PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, Case No. 2:21-cv-02129-GMN-NJK, 2024 24 WL 3621449, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 2024), and other case law for the proposition that a party is 25 obligated to produce documents he/she has a legal right to obtain. Defendant cites several cases 26 regarding the duty to produce documents stating the “practical ability to obtain” a document does 27 not establish control, and that it is the Government’s burden in this case to demonstrate Defendant 1 that the determination of control is fact specific, and quotes Clark v. Vega Wholesale, 181 F.R.D. 2 470, 472 (D. Nev. 1998), for the proposition that the party from whom documents are sought must 3 be able to “command release” by the party in actual possession of the documents. Id. at 4. Defendant 4 then cites case law holding that “a party need not have actual possession of documents to be deemed 5 in control of them.” Id. citing Estate of Young v. Holmes, 134 F.R.D. 291, 293 (D. Nev. 1991) 6 (citations omitted). Yet, again, Defendant admits, through citations, that if she has the “legal right 7 to obtain” her bank records, she is “deemed to have control” of those documents. Id. at 4-5 citing 8 id. Interestingly, Defendant never applies the law she cites to the issues before the Court; instead, 9 she states in conclusion that she “has produced bank records in her control for each of the … account” 10 at issue and “has produced the records she’s been able to obtain.” Id. at 2 citing to Defendant’s 11 Declaration (found at ECF No. 86), 5. In this January 30, 2026 filing, Defendant also offer, 12 somewhat nonsensically, that she “expects to receive additional bank records from … UBS bank by 13 the end of January 2026,” thereby admitting control and ignoring the date on which this statement 14 was made. Id. at 2. 15 Defendant cites no case law or facts supporting the proposition that she has neither the legal 16 right nor the ability to obtain all of her bank records from banking institutions in which she holds 17 accounts. All of Defendant’s statements and actions are to the contrary. As one court stated, “[i]t 18 is unreasonable to believe that … [Defendant] would not have the legal right to obtain … bank 19 records from the banks where … [she] does business.” Phillips v. Lycamobile USA, Inc., Case No. 20 2:25-MC-0001-ACE, 2025 WL 2097453, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 15, 2025). To the extent Defendant 21 contends she cannot “obtain” the bank records the Government first sought through RFPs served in 22 March 2024 based on the application of foreign law, the argument fails for two reasons. First, a 23 party relying on foreign law has the burden of showing that such law bars compliance with a court 24 order. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 25 (1981). Second, Defendant cites no facts in support of such a conclusion. ECF Nos. 85-86. Indeed, 26 Defendant offers two Declarations (ECF Nos. 86 at 2-3 and 89) neither of which states she lacks 27 control, the legal right to obtain records from the banks at issue, or is prevented from doing so by 1 Given that Defendant provides nothing to support the contention that she lacks or ever lacked 2 control over her own bank records, and provides no reason (other than unsupported vagaries) why 3 she has not provided the records first sought by the Government in March 2024, the Court finds the 4 Government had no need to address any supposed lack of control because there is no legitimate 5 dispute that Defendant has the necessary legal control and right to obtain the records sought. The 6 Court further finds Defendant’s Response to the OSC fails to demonstrate cause for her failure to 7 produce documents from the Canadian, Cayman Islands, and UBS banks with the exception of 8 Vontobel. 9 Nonetheless, to confirm that the Government had not received all of what it first requested 10 in March 2024, the Court entered a Minute Order on February 2, 2026 giving the Government until 11 February 18, 2026 to file a Status Report (the “Report”). ECF No. 87. The Government’s Report 12 explains Defendant produced some additional documents, but certain “key categories of records 13 remain[ed] unproduced.” ECF 88 at 2. Specifically, the Government identified “complete account 14 opening documents, all corresponding monthly statements, and annual statements … [requested in 15 RFP] No. 1(c)-(e), and ha[d] … not provided a sufficient explanation of the efforts undertaken to 16 obtain them.” Id. The Government explained this is an action to collect from Defendant outstanding 17 civil penalties (31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)), which is commonly known as FBAR penalties, and the 18 records sought are necessary to establish the willfulness element of the claim. Id. The Government 19 submits that with respect to accounts in Canada, Bulgaria, and the Cayman Islands, the “documents 20 would establish when each account was opened, how the account was titled, the nature of 21 Defendant’s ownership interest, and the information she provided to the financial institution at the 22 time of opening. Without this … [information], the United States cannot determine the full duration 23 of Defendant’s ownership or control over these foreign accounts.” Id. at 3. Monthly and annual 24 statements are necessary to establish “balances maintained … during the years at issue … and 25 whether those balances triggered reporting obligations.” Id. at 4. With respect to accounts in 26 Bulgarian banks, Defendant produced “limited records” showing one account was opened as early 27 as 2006; however, there are no account opening documents or statements thereafter. Id. 1 The Government’s Report explains the relevance of the documents, argues no further 2 extensions are warranted given production was first ordered to be completed by October 16, 2025 3 and five months later, after three extensions of time, production is still incomplete. Id. at 4-5. The 4 Government argues Defendant has clearly demonstrated “limited, sporadic, and incomplete” efforts 5 to produce documents. Id. at 6. The Government walks through the piecemeal production by 6 Defendant beginning in October 2025, and notes that the most recent production, alleged by 7 Defendant to represent records from Bulbank located in Bulgaria, “appear to be Chase Bank 8 documents containing handwritten notations about Bulbank.” Id. 9 The Government summarizes Defendant’s efforts to produce documents stating: “In total, 10 between October 16, 2025 and the present, Defendant has produced only 12 pages from UniCredit 11 Bulbank in Bulgaria, 10 pages from Central Cooperative Bank, five pages from the Cayman Islands 12 bank, and three pages from the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.” Id. at 7. The Government 13 provided a similar summary related to Defendant’s deficiencies on December 17, 2025. Id. citing 14 ECF No. 70 at 2. The Government notes that in Defendant’s Declaration she visited the Bulgarian 15 banks in September and October 2025—not once before or after those months. Id. citing ECF No. 16 89 ¶ 3. The Government further notes “Defendant offers no correspondence from the banks, no 17 written confirmation that such records are unavailable, and no documentation reflecting a formal 18 denial of her requests.” Id. at 8. 19 The Government submits sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) are appropriate and seeks 20 default judgment against Defendant. Id. If the Court declines to enter default judgment, the 21 Government seeks an “adverse inference consistent with the missing evidence” such that “the 22 unproduced records would establish reportable balances and ownership.” Id. The Government also 23 asks the Court to deem certain (unidentified) allegations in its Complaint as established and preclude 24 Defendant from offering any evidence not already produced in discovery. Id. at 8-9. No substantive 25 response to the Government’s Report was received from Defendant, albeit none was ordered. 26 27 1 II. Discussion 2 a. Summary of the Law. 3 “Federal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, ‘to manage 4 their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Goodyear Tire 5 & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 6 630-31 (1962)). That authority includes the “inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful 7 orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 8 Civil contempt “consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and definite court order by 9 failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” Go–Video, Inc. v. The 10 Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court may use its civil contempt 11 powers “for either or both of two purposes; to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s 12 order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” United States v. United Mine 13 Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); see also Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 560- 14 61 (2019) (quoting, in part, United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04). Sanctions for civil contempt 15 are considered nonpunitive and “avoidable through obedience” to court order. Int’l Union, United 16 Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 831 (1994). When a court imposes coercive 17 contempt fines, the requirement of an “opportunity to purge,” i.e., “reduce or avoid the fine through 18 compliance” is what distinguishes civil from criminal contempt; civil contempt fines are 19 fundamentally conditional in nature. Id. at 829 (citing Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 20 590 (1947)); see also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632-33; United States v. Ayres, 166 F.3d 991, 21 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Civil contempt sanctions ... are only appropriate where the contemnor is able 22 to purge the contempt by his own affirmative act ....”). Coercive sanctions “may only be imposed 23 ‘after a reasoned consideration’ of ‘the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by the 24 continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about 25 the result desired.’” Parsons v. Ryan, 949 F.3d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 2020). Civil contempt sanctions 26 “may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Int’l 27 Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 512 U.S. at 827. “Neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a 1 typically take the form of unconditional monetary sanctions; whereas coercive civil sanctions, 2 intended to deter, generally take the form of conditional fines.” Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, 3 Inc., 815 F.3d 623, 628-30 (9th Cir. 2016). 4 The Ninth Circuit explains that a “district court should apply the least coercive sanction (e.g., 5 a monetary penalty) reasonably calculated to win compliance with its orders.” United States v. 6 Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n determining how 7 large a coercive sanction should be[,] the court should consider the character and magnitude of the 8 harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction.” 9 Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). “If the 10 fine, or any portion of the fine, is coercive, it should be payable to the court, not [the complainant].” 11 Id. 12 Because the Government seeks sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil 13 Procedure, the Court notes it has the authority to sanction “for failure to obey a discovery order as 14 long as the established issue bears a reasonable relationship to the subject of discovery that was 15 frustrated by sanctionable conduct.” Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 947 (9th Cir.2001), cert. 16 denied sub nom., McLachlan v. Simon, 536 U.S. 941 (2002). Under Rule 37(b)(2), subsections (A) 17 through (C), sanctions are “appropriate only in ‘extreme circumstances’ and where the violation is 18 ‘due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.’” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 19 899, 905 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1018 (2002) (citations omitted); Computer Task Group, 20 Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). “Disobedient conduct not shown 21 to be outside the litigant’s control meets this standard.” Fair Housing of Marin, 285 F.3d at 905. 22 b. Analysis 23 The Court is at a loss with respect to Defendant’s failure to produce documents after 24 substantial time and opportunity to do so. The request for documents began in March 2024 and, to 25 date, Defendant has provided, at best, an incomplete production and reasons that simply do not 26 demonstrate sincere efforts to obtain the records relevant to this dispute. This case was brought 27 against Defendant (Jo Patricia Rabchev) from its commencement in 2021. Despite a request first 1 18 months after the request was made. Defendant offers no explanation for her delay. In sum, 2 Defendant’s response to the OSC offers nothing demonstrating efforts by her to obtain records from 3 the Bulgarian banks at any time other than the September and October 2025 visits. 4 In her Declarations (ECF Nos. 86 and 89) Defendant says she “requested … records” from 5 the Canadian bank at issue, including account opening records; however, she says nothing about 6 what she did or when she did so. Despite the lack of specifics, Defendant claims she has not received 7 account opening records and that she otherwise “provided all bank records … obtained from this 8 account” to her attorney. Id. Defendant does not mention that her counsel did not commence an 9 effort to obtain bank records from Canada until approximately seven months after they were first 10 requested. ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 13. Moreover, Defendant says nothing about her efforts to follow up on 11 whatever it is her counsel did. 12 Regarding her bank account in the Cayman Islands, Defendant says she “recently located 13 records for this bank” which she provided to her counsel. ECF No. 89 ¶ 6. Again, Defendant does 14 not comment on the fact that her counsel does not appear to have commenced communications with 15 the Cayman Islands bank until November 2024; nor does she identify what, if any efforts she or her 16 counsel made to obtain records since that date. Defendant says nothing whatsoever about her effort 17 to obtain records from the Cayman Islands bank—only that she has “been unable to obtain bank 18 account opening records for this account.” Id. 19 Defendant’s explanations are at best inadequate and at worst so vague as to be evasive. The 20 Court does not enter sanctions lightly. ECF Nos. 85, 86. Indeed, the Court provided Defendant 21 substantial time following the Government’s August 2025 Motion to Compel to produce records. 22 The Court provided Defendant with substantial warning that sanctions, including daily monetary 23 sanctions, would be entered if she failed to comply with the Court’s Orders. ECF No. 71 (Transcript 24 of the September 19, 2025 hearing on the Government’s Motion to Compel at 7, 8, 9, and 11); ECF 25 No. 80 (addressing Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time at ECF No. 76 and stating 26 “Defendant’s failure to produce records on or before January 2, 2026, as required by this Order and 27 which were previously ordered produced by the Court (ECF No. 69), will result in sanctions up to 1 Amended Answer”); and ECF No. 82 (advising Defendant that if UBS documents were not produced 2 as ordered “daily monetary sanctions … [would] be entered for every day after February 11, 2026” 3 and explaining that failure to show cause for why the records from the Canadian and Cayman Islands 4 banks were not produced, would result in “a daily fee of $100 as a sanction for the failure.”). The 5 Court’s warnings were clear, unequivocal, and provided Defendant ample time to avoid sanctions. 6 Defendant’s failure to provide information demonstrating anything more than cursory efforts to 7 comply with Court orders and otherwise non-responsiveness to the Court’s repeated warnings and 8 opportunity to obtain bank records or, at a minimum, demonstrate substantial good faith efforts to 9 do so, support the award of sanctions. W. States Insulators & Allied Workers Pension Plan v. Jenco 10 Mech. Insulation, Inc., Case No. C-11-0175 EMC, 2013 WL 2252004 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) 11 (stating “given the party’s ‘evasive behavior and non-responsiveness,’ monetary sanctions in the 12 amount of $100 per day were ‘reasonably calibrated to coerce compliance, and ... in line with other 13 orders providing for coercive monetary sanctions’”). 14 III. Order 15 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, consistent with the Court’s prior 16 Orders, Defendant must pay monetary sanctions into the Court’s general fund. However, to ensure 17 Defendant has been provided every opportunity to comply with the Court’s Orders: 18 1. the obligation to pay daily sanctions will commence 30 court days after the date of 19 this Order. Thereafter, Defendant must pay $100 for each court day she fails to produce complete 20 records for each bank account identified in the Government’s RFP for a period of 60 days. 21 2. the 30 court days is provided to Defendant to allow her time to produce all documents 22 requested or demonstrate her substantial, good faith efforts to do so by providing details, supported 23 by correspondence or other communications, in which she has engaged with each financial 24 institution and the responses from the same that explain how each institution caused the failure to 25 produce records over the last two year period (the “Good Faith Requirement”). Defendant may file 26 a report with the Court no later than April 23, 2025—absolutely no extensions will be granted for 27 any reason whatsoever—demonstrating production of all documents requested by the 1 Government or establishing, with substantial, independent evidence, that her failure to 2 produce the bank records requested was outside her control. 3 3. If as of April 23, 2026, Defendant has not either cured her failure to produce 4 documents or satisfied her “Good Faith Requirement” demonstrated through a report to the Court, 5 she must pay the $100 fine for 60 days commencing on April 24, 2026. If during that 60 day period 6 Defendant fulfills her production requirement and the parties submit a joint status report so stating, 7 Defendant’s obligation to pay sanctions will automatically cease. If Defendant fails to fulfill her 8 obligations during this 60 day period, the Government is to provide prompt notice to the Court and 9 request sanctions including the striking of Defendant’s Amended Answer and the entry of default 10 against Defendant. 11 4. The daily amount to be deposited by Defendant will be held in the Court’s general 12 fund. 13 Dated this 15th day of March, 2026. 14

16 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27