United States of America v. Jared Gil

484 F. Supp. 3d 19, 2020 DNH 153
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedSeptember 8, 2020
Docket19-cr-074-LM-1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 484 F. Supp. 3d 19 (United States of America v. Jared Gil) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America v. Jared Gil, 484 F. Supp. 3d 19, 2020 DNH 153 (D.N.H. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 19-cr-074-LM-1 Opinion No. 2020 DNH 153 Jared Gil

O R D E R

Defendant moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A) based on the threat posed to his health by the

combination of his asthma and the possibility that he will

become infected with COVID-19 while incarcerated at Federal

Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Fairton in New Jersey. The

government concedes that defendant has exhausted his

administrative remedies as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A), but

objects to his release. The court held a video hearing on

defendant’s motion on July 28, 2020, at which defendant appeared

via telephone and made a statement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant so-called “compassionate release” to a

defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The statute

provides, in relevant part, that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .

. . .

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13

(sentencing guidelines policy statement on compassionate

release).

Where, as here, a motion for compassionate release is

properly before the court, the court must determine if defendant

is eligible for release. The statutory language quoted above

requires that defendant show that “extraordinary and compelling

reasons warrant” a reduction in his sentence, that the court

consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the

extent applicable, and that the reduction be “consistent” with

the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy statements. 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission’s policy

statement regarding compassionate release mirrors the statutory

2 language and adds the requirement that the court find that “the

defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or

to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). A defendant’s dangerousness is a

paramount concern as a court weighs the decision to grant a

defendant early release. See United States v. Bradshaw, No.

1:15-CR-422, 2019 WL 7605447, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2019)

(explaining overlap between dangerousness requirement in

compassionate release policy statement and § 3553(a) requirement

that court consider the need to protect the public).

In short, a court may reduce a term of imprisonment under

the compassionate release provision if it: (1) finds that

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; (2)

finds that the defendant will not pose a danger to the safety of

any other person or the community; and (3) considers the

sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see also United

States v. Rasberry, No. 2:15-CR-00127-JDL, 2020 WL 3977614, at

*1 (D. Me. July 14, 2020); United States v. Hilow, No. 15-CR-

170-JD, 2020 WL 2851086, at *1 (D.N.H. June 2, 2020). The

defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to a

sentence reduction. Hilow, 2020 WL 2851086, at *3. And the

court has “broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny

a motion for sentence reduction.” United States v. Britton,

3 Crim. No. 18-cr-108-LM, 2020 WL 2404969, at *2 (D.N.H. May 12,

2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on federal drug-trafficking charges

on March 26, 2019 and stipulated to detention at that time. On

August 1, 2019, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

40 grams or more of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), and 846. On March 6, 2020, the

court sentenced defendant to 40 months imprisonment and three

years of supervised release. The court recommended to the

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that it house the defendant at FCI

Danbury in Connecticut and permit him to participate in a drug

treatment program and in mental health treatment. See doc. no.

60 at 2.

Due to an outbreak of COVID-19 at FCI Danbury, defendant

could not be placed there and was re-routed to FCI Fairton in

New Jersey. Because defendant was designated to be housed at

FCI Danbury but was re-routed to FCI Fairton, defendant is

considered a “holdover” inmate. Doc. no. 77-1 at 1. This means

that he will not be able to “partake in the usual orientations,

operation, or activities new arrivals are offered or allowed” at

FCI Fairton. Id. On June 15, 2020, defendant filed a pro se

4 motion for compassionate release, which was later supplemented

by appointed counsel.

DISCUSSION

I. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Defendant contends that he has moderate asthma that puts

him at high risk for experiencing severe illness should he

become infected with COVID-19. He has submitted medical records

in support of that diagnosis. See doc. no. 77-5 at 1-2. He

argues that his health condition combined with the known

presence of COVID-19 at FCI Fairton constitute extraordinary and

compelling reasons supporting his release. The government

concedes that defendant suffers from moderate asthma and its

medical expert agrees that this condition puts defendant at high

risk for severe illness from COVID-19. The government further

concedes that, in the context of the current pandemic,

defendant’s high-risk medical condition constitutes an

extraordinary and compelling reason.

The court agrees that defendant has established

extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting his release.

Under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)

guidelines, moderate asthma is among the underlying health

conditions that “might” put a person at higher risk for severe

5 illness from COVID-19.1 And defendant has a substantial risk of

becoming infected with COVID-19 in the first instance because

FCI Fairton has an active outbreak of the virus. There are four

inmates and one staff member at the facility who are currently

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Bluebook (online)
484 F. Supp. 3d 19, 2020 DNH 153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-v-jared-gil-nhd-2020.