United States of America v. David Williams Haas

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00920
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No.: 18CR3656-JLS 25CV0920-JLS 10 Plaintiff,

11 ORDER DISMISSING v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION UNDER 28 12 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET

13 ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE DAVID WILLIAMS HAAS, AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 14 Defendant. APPEALABILITY 15

16 Pending before the Court is Defendant Haas’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 17 Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (ECF No. 101). 18 Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 112) and 19 Defendant has submitted a reply (ECF No. 115). Having considered these submissions and 20 the applicable authorities, the Court will dismiss Defendant’s motion for lack of 21 jurisdiction. 22 Background 23 On June 9, 2020, Defendant Haas pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to the 24 offense of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. ECF No. 37, 38. 25 In his plea agreement, Defendant admitted to receiving, soliciting, and accepting a stream 26 of benefits from Glen Defense Marine Asia (“GDMA”), a marine vessel “husbanding” 27 corporation owned by Leonard Glenn Francis. ECF No. 38 at 4, 6. Defendant admitted 28 1 that the value of the items he received from GDMA was at least approximately $90,968.82. 2 Id. at 8. The factual basis set forth in the plea agreement detailed Defendant’s participation 3 in the offense in 22 paragraphs spanning 6 pages. Id. at 3-8. In his plea agreement, 4 Defendant represented that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, that he discussed 5 its terms with counsel and “fully understands its meaning and effect,” and that he was 6 satisfied with his counsel’s representation. Id. at 10, 17-18. Under the terms of the plea 7 agreement, Defendant agreed to waive all rights to appeal and collateral attack, “except a 8 post-conviction collateral attacked based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 9 Id. at 15. 10 Defendant was represented by retained counsel at the change of plea proceeding, 11 where Defendant acknowledged that he had taken an oath to tell the truth. ECF No. 42 at 12 3. During this proceeding, Defendant acknowledged that he read the plea agreement in its 13 entirety, that he understood the elements of the offense, that the factual basis set forth in 14 the plea agreement was true and correct, and that he was pleading guilty “because, in truth 15 and in fact, [he is] guilty and for no other reason.” Id. at 3, 6, and 9-10. Defendant further 16 indicated that he understood that he would forever waive his right to appeal or otherwise 17 challenge his conviction and sentence. Id. at 7-8. Defendant was sentenced by this Court 18 on February 2, 2023 to a term of imprisonment of 30 months, 3 years of supervised release, 19 and restitution in the amount of $90,968.82.1 ECF No. 82. 20 On February 28, 2022, trial commenced for five defendants also charged with 21 receiving bribes from Leonard Glenn Francis and GDMA. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 755. 22 During the trial, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct arose and additional allegations 23 came to light post-trial, following the convictions of four of the defendants. Id., ECF Nos. 24 1156, 1200. On September 6, 2023, these misconduct allegations led to a post-trial 25 disposition in which the convicted defendants were permitted to plead guilty to 26

27 1 Defendant’s term of imprisonment was subsequently reduced to 24 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 28 1 misdemeanor offenses and their felony convictions were dismissed by the Government. 2 Id., ECF Nos. 1237-1240. In the ensuing months, the Court permitted three cooperating 3 codefendants who pled guilty prior to trial and a fourth cooperating defendant in a related 4 case to withdraw their guilty pleas and enter misdemeanor pleas, based on the prosecutorial 5 misconduct issues alleged during and after the trial. Id., ECF Nos. 1314, 1317, 1321; 6 13CR4287-JLS, ECF No. 377. In addition, the Court granted the Government’s motion to 7 dismiss the case of an unsentenced cooperating codefendant who pled guilty prior to the 8 trial. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1318. 9 The Government justified these dispositions because the non-trial defendants 10 accepted responsibility for their crimes and cooperated, yet they inequitably faced “much 11 harsher outcomes that their immediate co-conspirators who did not accept responsibility, 12 did not cooperate, and opted for trial.” 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1311 at 2. The 13 Government noted that “nothing suggests the defendants pending sentencing or other 14 defendants in Francis-related cases who pleaded guilty did not commit the charged crimes,” 15 but acknowledged that “certain issues” affected the prosecution of the case. Id. at 3. These 16 issues included this Court’s finding of prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose 17 Brady material regarding a prostitute provided by Francis to trial defendant Lausman; the 18 nondisclosure of the testifying case agent’s factual mistakes in a bribery case in another 19 district; information received after the trial regarding the acquisition of certain evidence 20 known as the “Covington hard drives;” the handling and treatment of Leonard Francis; 21 authentication issues of certain evidence at trial; and evidentiary issues regarding testimony 22 of the case agent at trial. Id. at 3-4. 23 Analysis 24 Defendant contends that his conviction must be vacated due to the prosecutorial 25 misconduct disclosed during and after the related trial proceedings and the fact that the 26 similarly situated trial defendants and cooperating defendants received reduced charges or 27 dismissals. Defendant contends that his plea bargaining process was tainted because he 28 and his counsel entered plea discussions “unaware of the government’s reliance on flawed 1 and compromised evidence.” ECF No. 101-1 at 20. Defendant notes that during and after 2 the trial proceedings, it came to light that a subset of evidence known as the “Covington 3 hard drives” lacked a proper chain of custody. Defendant contends that his proffer session 4 and protracted plea negotiations were tainted by this improperly handled and maintained 5 evidence in violation of the principles established in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 6 479 (1984). Defendant further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 7 because of the government’s suppression of exculpatory evidence revealed in statements 8 made by Leonard Francis during a podcast released in 2021. In addition, Defendant 9 contends that the Government’s failure to disclose Francis’ podcast statements constituted 10 due process violations under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United 11 States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Finally, Defendant argues that the selective prosecution and 12 sentence disparities in the related cases violate the Equal Protection Clause. 13 The Government responds that Defendant waived his right to collateral attack, that 14 his § 2255 motion is time-barred, that several of Defendant’s claims are not cognizable in 15 a § 2255 motion, and that his claims are procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees that 16 Defendant’s motion is both waived and time-barred. Further, the Court agrees that 17 Defendant’s claims are not cognizable due to his voluntary guilty plea and are procedurally 18 defaulted because he has not demonstrated prejudice. 19 1. Waiver 20 A knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. United States 21 v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The right to collaterally attack a 22 sentence under § 2255 is statutory in nature, and a defendant may therefore waive the right 23 to file a § 2255 petition. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United 24 States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 25 In this case, the record reflects that Defendant’s plea agreement was knowingly and 26 voluntarily entered and Defendant makes no persuasive showing otherwise. The language 27 of the plea agreement sets forth Defendant’s acknowledgment that his guilty plea was 28 knowing and voluntary, that he understood and discussed its terms with counsel, and that 1 he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. ECF No. 38 at 10, 17-18. At the change 2 of plea proceeding, Defendant represented under oath that that he read the plea agreement 3 in its entirety, that he understood the elements of the offense, that the factual basis set forth 4 in the plea agreement was true and correct, and that he was pleading guilty “because, in 5 truth and in fact, [he is] guilty and for no other reason.” Id. at 3, 6, and 9-10. Defendant 6 also acknowledged that he understood that he would forever waive his right to appeal or 7 otherwise challenge his conviction and sentence. Id. at 7-8. 8 The Magistrate Judge took Defendant’s guilty plea in full compliance with Rule 11 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and recommended this Court accept the guilty plea 10 upon a finding that Defendant was competent to enter the plea, did so voluntarily, and there 11 was a factual basis for the plea. ECF No. 152. No objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 12 findings and recommendation were filed, and this Court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. 13 ECF No. 51. Thus, all of the evidence contemporaneous with Defendant’s guilty plea 14 suggests that the plea agreement was voluntarily entered. 15 Defendant maintains, however, that his plea was rendered involuntary because 16 abusive prosecutorial misconduct materially affected his understanding. ECF No. 115 at 17 10. Defendant points to no specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct that was part of 18 his plea negotiations, nor does he identify any specific information that would call into 19 question any of the facts and conduct admitted in the plea agreement or which materially 20 affected Defendant’s decision to plead guilty. For example, Defendant does not contend 21 that he detrimentally relied on any document(s) from the Covington hard drives in deciding 22 to plead guilty (or that they were false). Furthermore, the alleged withheld impeachment 23 evidence consists of statements made by Leonard Francis during a podcast which was not 24 in existence at the time of Defendant’s plea negotiations.2 Instead, Defendant speculates 25 that whatever conduct impacted the trial verdicts and guilty pleas of the cooperating trial 26

27 2 Defendant pled guilty in June of 2020, the podcast was not aired until October and November of 2021. 28 1 defendants also impacted his guilty plea. But in assessing the voluntariness of a plea, the 2 court must accord great weight to statements made by the defendant contemporaneously 3 with his plea. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986), citing Blackledge v. 4 Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). “The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations 5 unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal...” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. 6 Thus, against the existing record in this case, Defendant’s speculative assertions are 7 insufficient to demonstrate that his guilty plea was involuntary. 8 The Court notes that the plea agreement waiver of collateral attack did contain an 9 exception for post-conviction challenges based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 10 counsel. Defendant, however, fails to make a colorable claim that his motion falls within 11 this exception. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant has the 12 burden of showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient 13 performance prejudiced Defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 14 Deficiency of performance is established through a showing that “counsel’s representation 15 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To 16 establish prejudice in the plea agreement context, the defendant must show that there is a 17 reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 18 would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 19 Here, Defendant contends that the Government’s suppression of material facts about 20 Leonard Francis’s credibility and the “mishandling” of evidence resulted in a tainted plea- 21 bargaining process and ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF No. 101-1 at 20-21. 22 However, the focus of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the 23 Government’s alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence, not the reasonableness of 24 defense counsel’s performance. Defendant makes absolutely no showing that his 25 attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there is 26 any reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Defendant would not have pleaded 27 guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Instead, Defendant’s ineffective assistance 28 1 of counsel claim is merely a repetition of his Brady/Giglio claim in disguise. Thus, the 2 Court finds that the collateral attack waiver provision in the plea agreement to be 3 applicable, despite the exception for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea 5 agreement and therefore waived his right to bring his Section 2255 motion. 6 2. Limitation Period 7 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) establishes a 1-year limitation period running from the latest of: 8 (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 9 governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 10 States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 11 (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 12 Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 13 (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented 14 could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

15 In this case, Defendant’s conviction became final on February 24, 2023.4 His 16 Section 2255 motion was filed on February 4, 2025, nearly two years later. Thus, 17 Defendant has clearly exceeded the limitations period set forth in Section 2255(f)(1). 18 Defendant contends that his motion is timely under Section 2255 subsection (f)(2) because 19 the government’s concealment of its misconduct constituted an impediment to making the 20 motion, and under subsection (f)(4) because the specifics of the government’s misconduct 21 22 23 3 Notably, Defendant also fails to make any showing that the facts he admitted in his guilty plea were at all compromised by any non-disclosed evidence. He also fails to demonstrate that he was 24 prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence, as would be required to establish a 25 violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (recognizing that prejudice must result from the failure to disclose the evidence). 26 4 The judgment in this case was entered on February 10, 2023 (ECF No. 82), and Defendant filed no notice of appeal. Thus, his conviction became final 14 days later. See United States v. Schwartz, 274 27 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that statute of limitations for § 2255 motion began to run upon the expiration of the time during which the defendant could have sought review by direct appeal). 28 1 as it relates to Defendant’s plea negotiations and proffer sessions “remain exclusively 2 within the government’s possession.” In addition, Defendant argues that equitable tolling 3 should apply. 4 The Court is not persuaded that either of these Section 2255 limitation provisions 5 are applicable in this case. First, the Court is not persuaded that an acknowledgment of 6 prosecutorial misconduct is the type of governmental action encompassed within the 7 “impediment to making a motion” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2). The Court 8 agrees with the Government’s position that the absence of an admission of error does not 9 prevent a motion alleging the error. In fact, the trial defendants, without impediment by 10 the government, brought motions raising the same allegations Defendant now contends he 11 was “impeded” from raising until 2024. In January 2022, those defendants filed a motion 12 alleging prosecutorial misconduct related to the Francis podcasts and his medical furlough. 13 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 662. In July 2023, a similar motion was filed with respect to the 14 Covington hard drives. Id., ECF No. 1200. Second, the Government’s concession of 15 improprieties during the trial of the related defendants occurred on September 6, 2023, 16 when a joint recommendation for misdemeanor dispositions for the convicted defendants 17 was presented the Court. Id., ECF No. 1243. Thus, even if one were to count the 18 concession of error as the removal of a governmental impediment, Defendant’s motion 19 filed on February 4, 2025 still falls outside of the 1-year limitation period established under 20 Section 2255(f)(2). 21 Defendant also fails to demonstrate that the facts supporting his claims could not 22 have been discovered prior to February of 2024, as would be required under Section 2255 23 subsection (f)(4). The Francis podcast was publicly released, before Defendant was even 24 sentenced, in October and November of 2021. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 635-3 at 2. As 25 noted in the paragraph above, the other facts supporting Defendant’s claims were known, 26 or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, by at least September 27 6, 2023, more than one year prior to the filing of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion in 28 February 2025. 1 Defendant’s argument that Subsection (f)(4) is applicable because the specifics of 2 the government’s misconduct relating to his plea negotiations and proffer sessions remain 3 exclusively in the government’s possession is faulty on two fronts. First, it presumes 4 misconduct even though the government has never conceded any error with respect to the 5 related defendants who pled guilty and were sentenced prior to the trial-related 6 dispositions. The government has steadfastly maintained that there is nothing to suggest 7 that other defendants in Francis-related cases who pleaded guilty did not commit the 8 charged crimes. See, e.g., 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1311 at 3. Second, Defendant was 9 part of the plea negotiations and proffer sessions, the evidence and information he relied 10 upon in making his decision to plead guilty was not exclusively in the Government’s 11 possession. If any of the trial-related concessions of error or allegations of misconduct 12 impacted Defendant’s plea negotiations and proffer sessions, Defendant would be in a 13 position to know this and due diligence would require him to raise his claims within one 14 year of their publication in 2021 or 2023. 15 Finally, for this reason, the Court is not persuaded that Defendant has demonstrated 16 due diligence or extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., 17 Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (to receive equitable tolling, “[t]he 18 petitioner must establish two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 19 and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.”)(quotation omitted)). The 20 Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s attempt to resolve this matter by correspondence 21 with the prosecutor after the expiration of the limitations period constitutes due diligence, 22 nor an extraordinary circumstance standing in the way of a timely filing. Accordingly, the 23 Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction in this matter because Defendant’s motion was 24 filed outside of the 1-year limitation period established by Section 2255(f). 25 3. Guilty Plea Limitation 26 “It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused 27 person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” 28 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). “ ‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully 1 aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 2 him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 3 promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 4 unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having 5 no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).” Id. at 509, quoting Brady 6 v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 7 As previously discussed with respect to his plea agreement waiver of collateral 8 attack, Defendant has not meaningfully called into question the voluntary and intelligent 9 character of his guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty with the assistance of counsel and in 10 full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 11 Under these circumstances, Defendant is not entitled to collateral relief. 12 4. Procedural Default 13 “The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim 14 on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review.” Sanchez-Llamas v. 15 Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350–51 (2006) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 16 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)). “‘Where a defendant has 17 procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be 18 raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either “cause” and actual 19 “prejudice” or that he is “actually innocent.”’” United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 20 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622; citing United States v. Johnson, 21 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993)) (footnote omitted). 22 In this case, Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Even if the Court 23 were to presume cause resulting from the timing of the disclosures in the trial and related 24 cases, Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice or that he is actually innocent. As the 25 Court previously noted when it denied Defendant’s request for additional discovery (ECF 26 No. 111), Defendant fails to make any specific showing that his guilty plea was impacted 27 by any of the misconduct or issues uncovered during the trial which took place two years 28 after he pled guilty. Although Defendant makes generalized assertions regarding his plea 1 || agreement process, the government’s suppression of evidence and reliance on fraudulent 2 ||evidence, Defendant makes no specific showing how any of these factors invalidated his 3 || guilty plea. Much of the alleged misconduct resulting in the more lenient post-trial 4 || dispositions stemmed from trial issues unique to those defendants involved in the trial. In 5 ||the case of the cooperating witness defendants, their dispositions stemmed from the 6 || Government’s position that they, as cooperators, should not receive harsher sentences than 7 || those who opted for trial and did not accept responsibility. This determination was based 8 |/in equity, there was no showing or finding that these defendants did not commit the crimes 9 ||they admitted. While it is true that these defendants received more lenient sentences than 10 || Defendant Haas, Defendant simply has not established that his own conviction was illegal 11 |/or unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate 12 || actual prejudice resulting from his failure to present his claims on direct appeal and that 13 claims are procedurally defaulted. 14 Conclusion 15 The Court finds that the Section 2255 motion and the record conclusively 16 ||demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to no relief because the motion was waived as a 17 ||result of Defendant’s plea agreement and not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. §2255(f). The 18 Court further finds that Defendant’s claims are not cognizable in light of his guilty plea 19 || and are procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 20 ||to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody is Hereby 21 ||Dismissed. Additionally, the Court Denies Defendant a certificate of appealability, as 22 ||Defendant has not made a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional 23 || right. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||Dated: December 5, 2025 tt 26 pee Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 28