United States of America v. Alnardo Suarez
This text of 2018 DNH 222 (United States of America v. Alnardo Suarez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. Case No. 08-cr-161-2-SM Opinion No. 2018 DNH 222 Alnardo Suarez
O R D E R
Petitioner pled guilty to several offenses: one (1) count
of Unlawful Possession with Intent to Distribute Five or more
Grams of Cocaine Base (“Crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii); one (1) count of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana) with Intent to
Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and
841(b)(1)(D); and one (1) count of Conspiracy to Distribute More
than Fifty Grams of Cocaine Base (“Crack”), in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 846(b)(1)(A). His plea was entered pursuant
to a “binding” agreement under Fed. R. Cr. P. 11(c)(1)(C) for a
fixed sentence of 150 months of incarceration.
Petitioner’s total offense level under the Sentencing
Guidelines was properly calculated to be 29 after adjustments.
Petitioner’s offense level and criminal history category would
have generated a guideline sentencing range of between 87 to 108
months, but for a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than 10
1 years (120 months) required, by statute, to be imposed on the
conspiracy offense. Five year (60 month) statutorily mandated
minimum sentences also applied to the two “possession with
intent” offenses.
The government and petitioner agreed to a 150-month
sentence in light of the applicable mandatory minimum sentences
and in consideration of the government’s dismissing a gun charge
(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), that carried a five-year mandatory minimum
consecutive sentence. As petitioner says, given the
circumstances, the parties “split the difference between a 120-
month sentence and a 180-month sentence by agreeing to a
sentence of 150 months.” (Document no. 90).
Petitioner now seeks sentence relief under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), asserting that he was initially sentenced “based
on a sentencing range” that was later lowered by the United
States Sentencing Commission. Petitioner invokes Amendment 782
to the Guidelines, and points to Hughes v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), arguing that the initially-
applicable guideline sentencing range (absent the mandatory
minimum sentence to 120 months) has been lowered, and Hughes
explains that where the guidelines range played a “relevant
part” in the court’s imposition of sentence, the sentence can be
said to have been “based on” the guidelines range that was
subsequently lowered. Accordingly, a defendant is, under such
2 circumstances, eligible to be considered for discretionary
sentence relief.
Here, however, it is plain that petitioner’s sentence was
not based on a guideline range that was subsequently lowered.
His sentence was based on a guideline sentencing “range” of 120
months, given the applicable mandatory minimum, and upon the
parties’ plea agreement, part of the consideration for which was
dismissal of an additional charge carrying a consecutive 5-year
minimum. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Koons v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1783 (2018), resolved the issue presented
here. When a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
that is higher than the otherwise applicable guideline range
because a statutorily mandated minimum sentence prevails, as is
the case here, the imposed sentence is not one “based on” the
Guidelines, but rather on the statutory mandatory minimum. See
also United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
United States v. Mills, 613 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Jones, 313 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2018). “In
those cases, the mandatory minimum effectively supersedes the
guidelines range, which then drops out of the sentencing
framework and is not considered by the judge.” Jones, 313 F.
Supp. 2d at 170 (citing United States v. Valle, 635 Fed. Appx.
708, 710 (11th Cir. 2015)). It was not the now-lowered
3 guideline range upon which the sentence was based but the still-
applicable minimum sentence mandated by statute.
Petitioner is not entitled to sentence relief under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and appointed counsel has failed to make a
preliminary showing of petitioner’s eligibility for a sentence
reduction under Amendment 782. Accordingly, no further action
is required with respect to that potential claim.
Parenthetically, the court notes that it is not clear
whether petitioner’s correspondence seeking appointment of
counsel actually raises the claim or merely implies that such a
claim might be viable. Counsel’s response to the show cause
order, issued following appointment of counsel, properly makes
the case in support of petitioner’s eligibility for sentence
relief and is considered in that context. To the extent the
relief is actually sought under Amendment 782, it is, for the
reasons given, denied.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
November 8, 2018
cc: Seth R. Aframe, AUSA William E. Christie, Esq. U.S. Probation U.S. Marshal
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2018 DNH 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-v-alnardo-suarez-nhd-2018.