UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred Emerson GILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant

133 F.3d 809, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 832, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 802, 1998 WL 19661
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 21, 1998
Docket96-9459
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 133 F.3d 809 (UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred Emerson GILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred Emerson GILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant, 133 F.3d 809, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 832, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 802, 1998 WL 19661 (11th Cir. 1998).

Opinion

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred when it excluded evidence of a polygraph examination offered into evidence by Appellant Fred Emerson Gilliard. The district court excluded the polygraph evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and, alternatively, under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Gilliard contends that the district court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the judgment entered by the district court.

I.BACKGROUND

On March 8, 1996, a grand jury indicted Gilliard on 100 counts of submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, while he was chief executive officer of Penn-Teek Diagnostics, Inc. (Penn-Teck); 1 count of obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 by influencing a witness to make false statements pertaining to the Medicare and Medicaid claim submissions; and 1 count of making false declarations to a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.

On June 24, 1996, Gilliard submitted to a polygraph examination administered by Charles R. Honts, Ph.D. (the Honts Polygraph). 1 Dr. Honts is an associate professor of psychology at Boise State University whose training is in psychophysiology, the science of how the mind and body interact. The Honts Polygraph consisted of four relevant questions:

1. While you were employed by Penn-Teek, did you develop a scheme designed to defraud Medicare or Medicaid through the use of incorrect billing codes?
2. When the incorrect billings were filed with Medicare or Medicaid, did you know that they were incorrect?
3. While you were employed by Penn-Teck, did you deliberately cause incorrect billings to be filed with Medicare or Medicaid?
4. To the best of your knowledge, were the incorrect billings to Medicare and Medicaid made unintentionally?

Gilliard denied any wrongdoing. Dr. Honts scored the examination using two different methods, and concluded that the results indicated that Gilliard was not being deceptive when he answered the relevant questions. Gilliard notified the Government of the results of the Honts Polygraph. The Government never conducted its own polygraph examination of Gilliard, but instead moved for the exclusion of the Honts Polygraph evidence.

On July 11, 1996, the magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing, and on August 14, 1996, he issued an order holding the Honts Polygraph evidence to be admissible. The Government appealed that ruling to the district court. The district court recognized that under this Court’s en bane decision in United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.1989), polygraph evidence is no longer per se inadmissible. After performing the analysis required by our holding in Piccinonna, the district court sustained the Government’s objection and held that the Honts Polygraph evidence was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 702, as well as under Fed.R.Evid. 403.

The jury convicted Gilliard on all 102 counts of the indictment, and the district court sentenced Gilliard to imprisonment. Gilliard now appeals the exclusion of the Honts Polygraph evidence.

*812 II. ANALYSIS

Prior to this Court’s en banc decision in Piccinonna, polygraph evidence was per se inadmissible in this Circuit. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1531-32. In Piccinonna, however, this Court concluded that the per se rule was unwarranted in light of the advances that had been made in the field of polygraphy and the lack of evidence that juries are unduly swayed by polygraph evidence. Id. at 1535. Specifically, we held that a district court can admit polygraph evidence in two circumstances: (1) when the parties stipulate in advance as to the circumstances of the test and as to the scope of its admissibility; and (2)to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness at trial. Id. at 1536. We were careful to note, however, that neither modification to the per se exclusionary rule “preempt[s] or limit[s] in any way the trial court’s discretion to exclude polygraph expert testimony on other grounds under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id.

As the parties did not stipulate to the circumstances and admissibility of the Honts Polygraph, the issue here is whether the Honts Polygraph evidence should have been admitted to corroborate Gilliard’s trial testimony. There are three prerequisites to the admission of polygraph evidence for the purpose of corroborating the trial testimony of a witness: (1) “the party planning to use the evidence at trial must provide adequate notice to the opposing party that the expert testimony will be offered;” (2) the opposing party must be given a “reasonable opportunity to have its own polygraph expert administer a test covering substantially the same questions;” and (3) the polygraph administrator’s testimony must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of corroboration testimony. Id. Again, however, even if a party satisfies these prerequisites, a district court can exercise its discretion to exclude the polygraph evidence under other applicable rules of evidence. Id.

In this case, the district court assumed that Gilliard satisfied the three prerequisites to the admission of the polygraph testimony for the purpose of corroborating Gilliard’s trial testimony. 2 The court concluded, however, that the evidence was not admissible expert testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and, alternatively, that the evidence was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 403.

A. Rule 702

1. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Rule 702 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, — U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997).

2. Daubert v.

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Bluebook (online)
133 F.3d 809, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 832, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 802, 1998 WL 19661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-plaintiff-appellee-v-fred-emerson-gilliard-ca11-1998.