United States of America Ex Rel. George Lee Rivers v. David N. Myers, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania

301 F.2d 782, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 5377

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 13, 1962
• Docket: 13779_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

STALEY, Circuit Judge.

Rivers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court in which he asked to have set aside a death sentence imposed by a Pennsylvania court after entry of a plea of guilty to murder generally, alleging that the sentence was imposed in violation of the due process clause. The killing occurred in the course of a 1957 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia drug store perpetrated by Cater, Williams and Rivers. Williams fired the shot that killed the druggist while Rivers acted as lookout at the door.

Rivers was twice sentenced to death. The first sentence was reversed in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959), on the ground that certain of the facts surrounding the killing, as found by the sentencing court and that may have influenced the determination of sentence, were not supported by the record. After additional testimony was taken, Rivers was again sentenced to death, and on appeal that sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 402 Pa. 48, 166 A.2d 44 (1960), cert. denied sub nom. Cater v. Pennsylvania, 366 U.S. 914, 81 S.Ct. 1089, 6 L.Ed.2d 238 (1961).

Both in the district court and here Rivers contended that the resentencing court erroneously concluded that the decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Cater, supra, required it to treat all participants in the Jobbery alike in sentencing them as all were equally guilty of murder under the felony murder rule. Further, that the resentencing court, without any basis in the record, found that Rivers knew Williams was carrying a loaded gun during the robbery. Lastly, that he was in effect denied the right to counsel because the resentencing court did not file its opinion setting forth the alleged misstatement of fact until February 2, 1960, after an appeal had been taken to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on December 1, 1959. The appeal was argued on May 4, 1960. The result, Rivers says, was that he was denied an opportunity to challenge, before the re-sentencing court, the facts which that court relied on when imposing sentence. In this regard, it is urged that Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948), is controlling. It is our conclusion that the district court correctly denied the petition.

Rivers’ first contention requires little discussion. From a review of the procedure followed by the resentencing court and its opinion, it becomes unmistakably clear that the peculiar facts surrounding each of the individual defendants, as well as the common facts of the crime, were considered in meting out punishment. During the resentencing hearing, the court re-examined confessions made by the defendants, stating that such confessions would be used only against the particular defendant. Separate statements were made by each defendant’s counsel. The resentencing court’s opinion discloses that it relied on different facts in the case of each defendant as a basis for imposing the death penalty. An examination of the majority and dissenting opinions in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, supra, clearly indicates that the points raised here were fully considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and resolved against Rivers. The court there did not think that the resentencing court misconstrued the prior decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Cater, supra.

As a general rule, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the finding of a state trial court is not subject to review by habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Holly v. Claudy, 101 F.Supp. 751 (W.D.Pa.), aff’d, 196 F.2d 1017 (C.A.3, 1952); Meyers v. Welch, 179 F.2d 707 (C.A.4, 1950). However, a constitutional basis for a federal intervention exists where there is an entire lack of evidence to support a finding, thereby making the trial fundamentally unfair. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207 (1961); United States ex rel. Brogan v. Martin, 238 F.2d 236 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 928, 76 S.Ct. 785 (1956); Garrison v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 130 F.Supp. 70 (M.D.Pa.1955). We think that not only has Rivers failed to meet this burden, but further that the challenged finding, based on our independent review of the record, is fully supported. There is no indication that the robbery was spontaneous or unplanned. The relevant occurrences began on the day of the killing when Rivers went to Cater’s room where he saw Cater get a gun out of a dresser drawer. While there, Cater changed his shoes, as did Rivers later, in order to make it easier for him to run. In his confession Rivers indicated that he spent most of the day with Williams and Cater and that while walking down the street with them, he said, upon reaching the drug store: “There’s some quick money.” Rivers told them that he would act as the lookout and opened the door to the drug store since both Cater and Williams had been fingerprinted. After the killing, all of them went to a friend’s house, divided up the loot, and rode past the scene of the killing in a taxicab as a crowd of people gathered there. Thereafter, Rivers and Cater sought out Williams, who had left the cab before they did, and obtained a gun from him which Rivers said looked like the gun he saw Williams with before the shooting. Rivers admitted this after first denying in a written confession that he had ever seen Williams or Cater with a gun.

In addition, Rivers did not assert, either in the first or second sentencing procedures, that he did not know that a loaded gun was being used in the robbery. His position was that he was not the man who actually carried the gun and pulled the trigger. This failure to deny knowledge that Williams was carrying a gun was entirely consistent with the contents of a neuropsychiatric report that Rivers himself offered into evidence. That report stated: “He [Rivers] was fully aware of what he was doing in the holdup, and was aware that Williams was carrying a gun.” With these facts in the record, it cannot be said that there was no evidence to support the finding of the resentencing court.

There remains the last point concerning the denial of counsel. Aside from the fact that, as we concluded above, the resentencing court’s findings were fully supported by the record, we think that Rivers’ constitutional right to counsel was not abridged. Although Rivers was not given an opportunity to challenge the resentencing court’s finding before it, his counsel did so before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal. That tribunal, with full power to reverse or to modify the sentence as the facts and law allowed, upheld the finding and affirmed the sentence. Under these circumstances we cannot say that Rivers was denied counsel.

Rivers’ reliance on Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948), is misplaced. There, not only were the findings of the sentencing court without support in the record, but were actually contradicted by it and, as the Supreme Court said at 334 U.S. 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, were the product of a “careless or designed pronouncement.” As we have demonstrated above, that is not this ease.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.