United States ex rel. Weinstein v. Bressler

60 F. Supp. 676, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2262
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 20, 1945
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 60 F. Supp. 676 (United States ex rel. Weinstein v. Bressler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Weinstein v. Bressler, 60 F. Supp. 676, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2262 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).

Opinion

LEIBELL, District Judge.

Certain of the defendants, United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union and Local No. 2 of the International Union (both hereinafter referred to as “Union”), together with Max Zaritsky, Jacob Roberts and Samuel Deckler, officials of the International Union or Local No. 2, have joined in moving for an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative for summary judgment.

The action was brought under what is commonly known as the Informer’s Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 231 — 235. It was instituted on August 26, 1943, by the relator, Albert Weinstein, for himself and for the United States. The statute was amended December 23, 1943, and pursuant to § 232(C), one of the amendments, the United States entered an appearance in the suit on March 4, 1944, and undertook to carry on the suit.

The complaint alleges that between January and November of 1941, the United States War Department circulated “Requests for Informal Bids” for contracts for the manufacture and sale to the Government of an aggregate of 6,000,000 army field hats and caps, “with the intention and purpose that free, unrestricted and competitive bids would be submitted,” and that contracts would be awarded to the lowest bidders possessing the proper qualifications. It is further alleged that the defendant manufacturers and labor unions and their officers and others conspired to secretly allocate among themselves the entire quantity of hats and caps required by the Government and “to designate certain manufacturers to bid upon arbitrarily limited quantities of said hats and cap's”; “to secretly fix arbitrary, non-competitive, unfair, excessive, identical and fraudulent prices in response to the ‘Request"for Informal Bids’ ”; to hinder and prevent the submission of bids by others not in the conspiracy; to deceive and defraud the United States War Department by representing that the collusive, arbitrary, unfair, excessive, non-competitive bids were honest and competitive bids based upon fair and competitive prices and that the manufacturers submitting such bids were rival bidders ; to thus secure the award of contracts at the non-competitive, collusive, fraudulent and excessive prices; to obtain and aid in obtaining the payment by the United States War Department of “false, fictitious, fraudulent and excessive claims” based upon the collusive and fraudulent prices fixed by defendants and their co-conspirators; and to restrain interstate trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note.

[678]*678The complaint then sets forth how the defendants and their co-conspirators allegedly carried out the aforesaid agreement of conspiracy, • so that the bids of the alleged conspirators on the first request for bids (February) were 700 per hat, on the second request (June) were 650 per hat, and on the third request (September) were 500 per hat.

It is also alleged that the United States War Department was defrauded, misled and deceived, by the acts of the defendants and their co-conspirators into the belief that the bids were fairly and competitively submitted and that the prices were fair, reasonable and competitive prices and that the United States, without knowledge of the collusive agreements, awarded contracts to the defendants and their co-conspirators and paid their bills, vouchers and claims for the hats manufactured under the contracts, and that the said bills, claims and vouchers were false and fraudulent by reason of the fixed, fraudulent, non-competitive and excessive prices submitted on the collusive bids. It is also alleged that a fair price at the time of these requests for bids was 450 per hat. [The Government furnished the material; the manufacturers made the hats.] The amount of damages alleged is $900,000, which per statute (31 U.S.C.A. § 231) is doubled to $1,800,000, plus specified forfeits.

As appears from the affidavits before the Court, and from the discussion of counsel on the motion, the Government does not contend that there was any fraud in the bidding for or the award of the contract for the 2,000,000 hats and caps in February and for another 2,000,000 in September 1941. The transactions attacked by the Government relate to bids for and the awarding of contracts in June 1941 for about 2,000,000 hats and caps, of which a total of 175,000 were awarded to two of the defendant manufacturers, Bell Cap Company and Ribbon Narrow Fabric Co., Inc.

The Government’s affidavits show that contracts for one-half the 2,000,000 hats on which bids were sought in February 1941 were awarded to certain low bidders, other than the defendant manufacturers, at prices between 450 and 650 (at an average of 550); that the defendants and other union shops which had submitted much higher bids agreed with the Government to reduce their prices so that for hats manufactured west of the Mississippi the price would be 650, while in the East the price would be 700. Thus the one-half of the February contracts which went to low bidders within the range of 450 to 650 were awarded on bids that admittedly were submitted without any collusion, and the other one-half of the February contracts went to the defendant manufacturers and other union shops at the revised 650 and 700 prices, under what were in fact negotiated contracts.

The Government’s affidavits and briefs also support defendants’ contention that there was no collusion in the bids submitted for the September requirement of 2,000,000 hats. The average price paid by the Government in September 1941 was 470. The Government intimates that the reason that there was no collusion in the September bidding was because the Department of Justice had started an investigation of the June bidding. But, regardless of the motive, the September bidding was not collusive. In fact there was a great variance in the prices bid.

As to the June bidding, it is clear that the bids submitted by the defendant manufacturers were collusive and that the defendant unions and their officers were active in bringing about the agreement of the manufacturers to submit similar bids of 650 per hat and to allocate quantities among themselves. The defendants contend that they thought their plan to bid that price and allocate the quantities met with the approval of at least one of the Government’s representatives. That is disputed; but one thing is certain, the Government officials knew of the defendants’ plans to submit identical bids of 650 before the bids were submitted. It is the Government’s position that the defendants were warned that any such conduct would be illegal. But there could not have been the warning without the knowledge. When the bids were submitted Colonel Jones took a firm stand and recommended that all bids of 650 per hat be rejected as, collusive. In all 46 bids were submitted in June; only 25 of them were at the collusive price of 650. The Colonel reported to the Quartermaster General at Washington, as follows :

“In addition to the above, the interview detailed in Exhibit A, established the fact that a group of manufacturers have entered into a collusive arrangement whereby the price to be bid on Government [679]*679contracts is fixed. Such collusion constitutes a fraud on the Government, whether it be instigated by a labor union, one of its officials, or by an association of manufacturers, since in any case the bidder has acquiesced in or concurred in this collusive arrangement. The fact that twenty-five of the bids submitted are identical in price (65$)

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Related

United States v. Hangar One, Inc.
406 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Alabama, 1975)
United States ex rel. Weinstein v. Bressler
160 F.2d 403 (Second Circuit, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 F. Supp. 676, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-weinstein-v-bressler-nysd-1945.