United States, ex rel. Todd Alan Duell v. State of Hawaii, ET AL.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Hawaii
DecidedApril 3, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-00161
StatusUnknown

This text of United States, ex rel. Todd Alan Duell v. State of Hawaii, ET AL. (United States, ex rel. Todd Alan Duell v. State of Hawaii, ET AL.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Hawaii primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States, ex rel. Todd Alan Duell v. State of Hawaii, ET AL., (D. Haw. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

UNITED STATES, ex rel. CIV. NO. 26-00161 JMS-RT TODD ALAN DUELL, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW Plaintiff, CAUSE WHY COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; AND FOR CLERK TO UNSEAL STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL., COMPLAINT Defendants. ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; AND FOR CLERK TO UNSEAL COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION On March 31, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Todd Alan Duell (“Plaintiff” or “Duell”) filed a “Petition for Qui Tam Complaint” “In Camera and Under Seal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)” against the State of Hawaii and several officials of the State of Hawaii and of the City & County of Honolulu. ECF No. 1. The Complaint asserts that “Relator-Petitioner is the disregarded entity ‘TODD ALAN DUELL’ and the “UNITED STATES is the Real Party in Interest.” Id. at

PageID.1. The Complaint was filed under seal because it cites the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (“FCA”). See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“The complaint shall be filed in camera . . . .”).1

Based on the following, the court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause by April 30, 2026, why the Complaint should not be dismissed. See, e.g., Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that

a pro se relator cannot “prosecute a qui tam action on behalf of the United States”); United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that pro se litigants lack statutory standing to bring qui tam claims because “relators lack a personal interest in False Claims Act qui tam actions” and

“are not entitled to proceed pro se”). Alternatively, by April 30, 2026, Plaintiff may obtain licensed counsel who may enter an appearance and certify in good faith that there is a basis for filing a legitimate FCA suit. If counsel enters such an

appearance, counsel may seek leave to file an Amended Complaint under seal in compliance with the provisions of the FCA. If Plaintiff does not show cause or have counsel enter an appearance by April 30, 2026, the court will dismiss the action without leave to amend.

Additionally, because Plaintiff may not bring a pro se qui tam FCA action and because the current Complaint otherwise lacks any basis to proceed as a qui tam action under the FCA, the Clerk is directed to UNSEAL the Complaint and

1 Plaintiffpaid the$405 filing fee. SeeECFNo. 2. Exhibit A, ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.2 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tung v. Hemmings, 2019 WL 3936968, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2019) (“[B]ecause the Court finds

that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a qui tam action, the Clerk of Court is directed to unseal this matter. All documents in the case should be filed unsealed.”).

II. DISCUSSION A federal court must screen an in forma pauperis civil action to determine whether it is “frivolous or malicious[,] . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). And even if a Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee, a court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte provided the court “give[s] notice of its intention to dismiss and afford[s] plaintiffs an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition . . . .” Reed v.

Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court must give notice of its sua sponte

intention to dismiss . . . .”); Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015)

2 Exhibit B, whichappears to includeprivateinformation coveredunder Federal Ruleof Civil Procedure5.2(a),shall remain underseal at present, subject to unsealing with redactions laterifnecessary. (“A frivolous action clogs the system and drains resources regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds in forma pauperis.”).

Accordingly, the court gives Plaintiff notice of its intention to dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend unless Plaintiff can show cause why the court should not do so. After a review of the Complaint, it is clear under well-

settled law that it should be dismissed. This is purported to be a qui tam action under the FCA. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and acknowledges that the United States is the real party in interest (if there is one). See ECF No. 1 at PageID.1, 4. But a plaintiff may not file a qui tam action on a pro se basis. See, e.g., Stoner, 502

F.3d at 1127 (holding that a pro se relator cannot “prosecute a qui tam action on behalf of the United States”); Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93 (upholding dismissal of pro se qui tam case, reasoning that “as the United States remains the real party

in interest in qui tam actions, the case . . . is not the relator’s own case as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, nor one in which he has an interest personal to him”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[A] relator cannot pursue a qui tam FCA suit pro se.”);

Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1076–77 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o maintain a suit on behalf of the government, the relator (as the qui tam plaintiff is termed) has to be either licensed as a lawyer or represented by a lawyer . . . .”); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] could not maintain a qui tam suit under the FCA as a pro se relator.”).

Moreover, the Complaint itself provides no basis for relief under the FCA. That is, the Complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (providing that a pleading must contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009) (explaining that, in considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the court must set

conclusory factual allegations aside, accept non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determine whether these allegations state a plausible claim for relief) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Related

Timson v. Sampson
518 F.3d 870 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
502 F.3d 1116 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
United States Ex Rel. Mergent Services v. Flaherty
540 F.3d 89 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Michael Georgakis v. Illinois State University
722 F.3d 1075 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson
785 F.3d 330 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Duane Belanus v. Phil Clark
796 F.3d 1021 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Anthony Reed v. Doug Lieurance
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Joseph Wojcicki v. SCANA Corporation
947 F.3d 240 (Fourth Circuit, 2020)

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United States, ex rel. Todd Alan Duell v. State of Hawaii, ET AL., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-todd-alan-duell-v-state-of-hawaii-et-al-hid-2026.