United States ex rel. Tierney v. Richmond

Second Circuit

United States ex rel. Tierney v. Richmond

245 F.2d 222

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMay 15, 1957

DocketDocket 24503

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 245 F.2d 222 (United States ex rel. Tierney v. Richmond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States ex rel. Tierney v. Richmond, 245 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1957).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The transcript of the state court hearing bears out the statements in Judge Smith's reasoned memorandum that the relator was notified of the charge under the habitual criminal statute, Conn.Gen. Stat. § 8820 (1949), in all respects in accordance with the practice set forth in § 340, Conn. Practice Book of 1951, and accepted by us as due process in United States ex rel. Plue v. Cummings, 2 Cir., 224 F.2d 276. Relator was fully represented by competent counsel and there is nothing to suggest any “coercion” beyond what is inherent in the charges which the second oifender statute authorizes. We do not understand that we are required to appoint counsel to stultify themselves by pressing hopeless appeals.

The motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

The transcript of the state court hearing bears out the statements in Judge Smith's reasoned memorandum that the relator was notified of the charge under the habitual criminal statute, Conn.Gen. Stat. § 8820 (1949), in all respects in accordance with the practice set forth in § 340, Conn. Practice Book of 1951, and accepted by us as due process in United States ex rel. Plue v. Cummings, 2 Cir., 224 F.2d 276. Relator was fully represented by competent counsel and there is nothing to suggest any “coercion” beyond what is inherent in the charges which the second oifender statute authorizes. We do not understand that we are required to appoint counsel to stultify themselves by pressing hopeless appeals.

The motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

245 F.2d 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-tierney-v-richmond-ca2-1957.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack